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**ATTITUDES TO INEQUALITY AFTER TEN
YEARS OF TRANSITION**

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to compare people's attitudes to inequality at the end of the 1990s – the qualities they perceive are needed to get ahead, the role of government and rewards for employment – in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Western countries. Our data (from the 1999 International Social Survey Programme) suggest that overall, people in CEE express substantially more 'egalitarian' attitudes than those in the West, even after 10 years of economic adjustment to the market economy: Eastern Europeans' much stronger dislike of existing income differences and their corresponding preference for governmental redistribution at least partly reflected in the fact that they consider the factors that *actually* govern the income generation process (and therefore constitute the driving forces of income inequality) as not in line with meritocratic principles, such as effort, intelligence and skills. Surprisingly, however, they share basically the same values as the West when it comes to the factors that *should* in principle determine income. This evidence presents policy-makers in the transition countries with a challenge. While people support the notion that incomes should be determined by factors relevant to the working of market forces – ability to perform on the job, responsibility and education – a lot of people in Central and Eastern Europe believe that, in reality, many differences in income do not reflect merit, and – as a result – they are very concerned about the extent of inequality in their societies.

1. Introduction

The period of economic and political transformation that began around 1990 has proved to be difficult for most people in the former communist countries of Europe. Not only has national income declined but also inequality in both incomes and opportunities has increased. A large number of people in the region are not only worse off absolutely than they were during the 1980s: the relative gap between them and the rich in their societies has also widened. While changes in people's incomes, measured inequality and subjective well-being in the region have been relatively well documented, people's *attitudes* to the changed circumstances in which they live have been comparatively under-researched. This is all the more surprising, given that other research¹ – largely inspired by the transition experience itself – has underlined the crucial role of people's support for the success of reforms. At the same time, international organizations such as the World Bank have expressed concern about people's support for the necessary reforms to be undertaken in order to successfully create a market economy:

¹ See e.g. Rodrik (1995) and Fidrmuc (2000).

“In the end what matters is people. In the end a country’s transition will be judged by whether its citizens live better than they did before. Equity – how people share the benefits and pains of transition – is important.” (World Bank, 1996, p.66)

From this perspective, people’s attitudes to the sharp increase in income inequality that occurred across most transition countries during the 1990s *are* important. We aim in this paper to describe some of these attitudes, to compare them with those in Western countries, and to hypothesise on what influences people in the attitudes that they adopt. We would expect the comparison between East and West to be particularly instructive because it can be used to determine the extent to which governments in transition countries may suffer a ‘legitimacy deficit’ compared to those in Western countries. A high level of dissatisfaction with the level of inequality may reflect a high degree of disillusion with government and political institutions in a given country.

Against this background, our aim is to analyse attitudes to inequality in a selection of Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) after a decade of transition. We analyse 1999 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data on attitudes to meritocracy, governments’ role, income inequality and rewards for employment in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Slovakia and Slovenia. Although the data do not allow a focus on Central Asia and Caucasus, the simultaneous presence of countries where transition is most advanced (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia), one country that is lagging behind somewhat (Bulgaria) and one country with the least successful reform efforts in this sample (Russia), leaves us with a heterogeneous sample of transition countries. We compare our findings for these countries with a selection of Western industrialized countries.

We analyse three sets of attitudes in this analysis. The first set measures respondents’ attitudes to inequality in a fairly direct way. The second set relates to what respondents believe *is* important in getting ahead. And the third set covers respondent beliefs about how earnings, the major income source for the majority of people in every country, *should* be determined. Our main finding is that indeed, people in the East tolerate the degree of inequality in their societies to a much lesser extent than those in the West. This lower tolerance may be simply seen as reflecting unease with the extent to which inequality has increased in many of these countries since the early 1990s. As the results show, it does not appear to be related to attitudes regarding how people believe earnings *should* be rewarded – here there are few differences between East and West. This suggests that more negative attitudes to inequality in the East cannot simply be dismissed as a ‘socialist’ hangover. Rather, these attitudes may be associated with a considerable degree of disillusion in the East about what people believe is important for getting ahead in life: coming from a wealthy family, knowing the right people and even being corrupt.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes briefly the economic and political background of the transition countries in order to set the context for the subsequent analysis. Section 3 discusses the factors that might be expected to account for differences in attitudes across individuals and countries and presents the results on an aggregate East vs. West level. Section 4 examines the results for individual countries in order to check the robustness of the obtained aggregate results. Section 5 concludes.

2. The Economic and Political Background

It is unlikely that anybody would *choose* to live in a highly unequal society if they were uncertain of their position in the distribution of incomes, talents and opportunities prior to their insertion in that society. This is one of the key assumptions made by John Rawls in his *Theory of Justice* (1971). To put it another way, while many people may not have a problem with inequality *per se*, they may well object if they find themselves among the disadvantaged in society. Equally, many people in CEECs may not have particularly liked the constraints on their personal choices and freedom that communist society imposed on them. But they may have feared for their economic well-being as the excitement and uncertainties of capitalism came to replace the duller and more constrained, but also perhaps more secure, life under communism. Certainly, there is evidence that after an initial flurry of enthusiasm for state withdrawal from both the social and economic spheres, people in some countries had second thoughts. In Poland and Hungary, for example, this was reflected in ex-communist parties being returned to power by popular vote just a few years after their communist predecessors were so enthusiastically deposed. In most countries, public support for reforms – as measured in opinion polls – declined significantly after the early years.²


It is worth briefly examining the background against which respondents' attitudes to inequality and related issues were recorded in 1999. While average incomes in general increased throughout the 1990s in Western countries, they started from a lower base and decreased in nearly all countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Slovenia and Poland being notable exceptions. The decline in average incomes was particularly severe in Russia, Bulgaria and Latvia. In Hungary, an initial decline in the early 1990s was followed by a gradual increase in the middle to late 1990s.

But East and West did not just differ in terms of average income trajectories. For declining income in Central and Eastern Europe was accompanied in all cases by increased post-tax and transfer income inequality, as Figure 1 shows. The increase in inequality was particularly severe in Russia, Bulgaria and

² See the results from the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer analysed e.g. in Hayo (1999).

Latvia. In contrast, inequality hardly increased at all in any Western countries, with the exception of the United Kingdom and the US, although already in the 1980s inequality was relatively high in those countries, as well as in Canada, Spain and Australia.

Figure 1: *Income inequality in selected Central and Eastern European and OECD countries in the 1980s and 1990s (Gini coefficient)*



Source: UNICEF (2001), LIS database (see www.lisproject.org/keyfigures/ineqtable.htm).

Accompanying the declines in GDP and the increases in inequality in most CEE countries, the role of the state in society was increasingly called into question. This debate was firstly ideological. After years of communism, and in common with the dominant neo-liberal, market-oriented ideology in Western countries during the 1990s, the preference for a ‘small state’ was often expressed (Ferge, 1997).³ But it also had a pragmatic basis – post-communist states were generally ineffective tax collectors. Because of this and because of declining GDP, social services and welfare programmes were greatly cut back. Therefore, both the logic of the transformation process and the fiscal restraints under which governments operated severely limited the extent to which

³ Ferge (1997) makes the interesting point that at the time of the revolutions of 1956 in Budapest, and 1968 in Prague, ‘existing socialism’ as practiced in communist countries could be denounced as a sham and criticised as such in the name of ‘socialism with a human face.’ But the international climate of 1990 was different, and the rejection of ‘existing socialism’ was categorical.

governments could, or wished to, compensate the widening market driven income dispersion.

Increasing income inequality per se, however, need not be bad from a dynamic social welfare point of view (Bertola 2000; Bardhan et al. 2000). In the case of transition countries, *some* increase in inequality was perhaps inevitable, starting from a situation in which governments had compressed income distribution to a greater extent than in western market economies, thereby reducing incentives for individual effort.⁴ Indeed, a large share of increased wage dispersion can be explained by higher returns to education (World Bank 2000, Newell and Reilly 1997). Given the steep increase in income inequality in many countries however, the question arises as to whether the target has perhaps been overshot. The degree to which income differences are beneficial from a welfare point of view, and popularly accepted, does not solely depend on the size of these differences, but also on what has caused them. Our results shed some light on this by taking into account what people consider as the causes of income generation and inequality in their societies.

3. Factors Determining Attitudes to Inequality, Getting Ahead and Earnings: Data and Summary Results

▪ 3.1 *The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) Data*

In this analysis we examine, first, differences between the group of Western industrialized countries and the group of transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe; and second, we look at inter-country differences within the group of transition countries. Our analysis is mostly aggregate – comparison of scores for countries and groups of countries. But we also compare differences between men and women, and between different age groups within countries.

The data used to measure attitudes to inequality are taken from the 1999 round of the ISSP including a total of 21 countries, of which eight are from Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Slovakia and Slovenia). In each country a sample of approximately 1000 respondents was questioned on a range of topics of current concern. Details of overall response rates and fieldwork methods are in Table A1 in the Annex. In all of the countries in the East, face-to-face interviews were used to obtain information from respondents, while in the West, mail surveys were also extensively used. Not surprisingly, the response rate for mail surveys is generally lower than that for face-to-face interviews. Spain, Bulgaria,

⁴ See e.g. Atkinson and Micklewright (1992).

Slovakia and Portugal all enjoyed response rates of over 80 per cent. Japan, Poland, Slovenia, Hungary, Austria, and New Zealand had response rates of between 60 and 80 per cent. The remainder had response rates of less than 60 per cent. In terms of differences in attitudes to inequality between East and West, the impact of response rates is difficult to assess. But the fact that there is more variation within than between the two groups provides reason to believe that the analysis is not systematically biased.

Included in the questionnaire were several questions relating to inequality. Of these, we have selected 16 questions which are the focus of this analysis. A summary statistic on these questions, respondent's age and gender as well as region is given in Annex Table A2. Table 1 lists the selected questions in detail.

Table 1 : *Attitudinal statements used in this analysis and item response for each statement (per cent sample)*

Statement asked of respondents	Valid (%)
<i>Cluster A: Attitudes to inequality</i>	
1 'Large income differences are necessary for prosperity'	93.5
2 'Differences in income are too large in your country'	97.5
3 'It is the responsibility of government to reduce differences in incomes between people with high and low incomes'	95.9
4 'Should richer people pay larger shares of taxes and poorer people lower shares'	95.4
<i>Cluster B: Criteria for getting ahead</i>	
5 'How important to getting ahead is coming from a wealthy family?'	97.4
6 'How important to getting ahead is knowing the right people?'	97.7
7 'In your country people get rewarded for their effort'	96.9
8 'In your country people get rewarded for their intelligence and skills'	96.3
9 'To get all the way to the top in your country you have to be corrupt'	94.2
<i>Cluster C: Determinants of earnings</i>	
In deciding how much people ought to earn, how important should each of these things be in your opinion for determining pay:	
10 'How much responsibility goes with the job'	97.5
11 'Number of years spent in education'	97.5
12 'Whether the job requires supervising others'	96.7
13 'What is needed to support a family'	96.4
14 'Whether the person has children to support'	96.4
15 'How well a job is done'	97.9
16 'How hard a person works at the job'	97.7

Source: ISSP 1999.

The item response rates for each question were high, the lowest being for the first attitude 'Large income differences are necessary for prosperity' (93.7% of respondents answered). All the questions are in the form of statements to which respondents are asked to register their attitude on a scale of 1 to 5. We classify these 16 questions into three broad clusters. Cluster A covers attitudes to

inequality (numbers 1 to 4). Cluster *B* deals with what people think *are* the criteria for getting ahead in their country (numbers 5 to 9). And Cluster *C* relates to what people think *should* be the determinants of earnings (numbers 10 to 16). We discuss each of these in more detail below.

▪ 3.2 *Cluster A: attitudes to inequality*

This cluster comprises four statements, all of which attempt to capture people's perception of and attitudes to inequality. The first statement is the most general and abstract one: 'Income differences are necessary for prosperity'. It addresses the potential implications of income inequality and gets close to the issue of whether people believe that there is an 'optimal' degree of inequality. A large body of literature shows that the *distribution* of income can influence *total* income in society. Some inequality may be positive for overall economic development, but 'too much' of it can have harmful effects on growth (see e.g. Deininger and Olinto 2000). The second statement tries to establish how people assess the perceived amount of income inequality by asking about whether the respondent finds that 'differences in income are too large in your country'.

While statements 1 and 2 ask about attitudes to income distribution, statements 3 and 4 are more concerned with attitudes to the *redistribution* of income. Statement 3 suggests: 'It is the responsibility of government to reduce differences in incomes between people with high and low incomes'.⁵ One might expect that those who consider the level of inequality in their society to be tolerable will not see a need for governmental redistribution, unless, of course, they are satisfied with the level of inequality in society because they believe it is the result of government action. Statement 4 focuses on one way in which governments can reduce income differences: 'Richer people should pay larger shares of taxes and poorer people lower shares' – through progressive income taxation.⁶

The correlation matrix in Table A3 shows that the four questions of the cluster form a fairly consistent group. People who view large income differences as necessary for prosperity are less likely to agree that the government should reduce income differences, or that income differences in the country are too large. And those who agree with the statement that governments should reduce income differences are more likely to agree also that richer people should pay larger shares of their incomes in taxes, and that income differences in the country are too large.

⁵ An alternative would be that people believe it should be left to the trade unions, the employers, or even the market forces themselves to bring about lower income inequality.

⁶ But note that there are other avenues open to governments and to society, to reduce income differences. Indeed, even progressive taxation can be used to fund regressive public programmes. See Commander and Lee (1998) for an example of this in the case of Russia.

Table 2 summarises differences between East and West in terms of these four attitudes and presents the respective t-statistics revealing the significance of the difference between both regions. It shows that while a majority of people in both CEECs and the West disagree with the statement that ‘income differences are necessary for prosperity’, there is stronger disagreement in the CEECs. This indicates a lower acceptance of inequality in the East. At the same time, 9 in 10 people in CEECs strongly agree or agree with the statement ‘income differences are too large in your country’, compared with less than 8 in 10 in the West. Responses to the third question also show strong differences between East and West: 80% of people in the East agree with the statement that it is the responsibility of government to reduce income differences between rich and poor, compared with only 61 per cent in the West. In terms of the last statement, that taxes should be progressive, there is a very high level of agreement among respondents in both East and West (84% and 78% respectively). However, the differences between Western and Eastern respondents are significant for all four questions.

Table 2: *Attitudes to inequality in CEE and Western countries*

Statement asked of respondents	Response		Level of significance of difference
	CEE	West	
‘Income differences are necessary for prosperity’ (strongly disagree and disagree)	69	54	<0.01
‘Differences in income are too large in your country’ (strongly agree and agree)	93	78	<0.01
‘It is the responsibility of government to reduce differences in incomes between people with high and low incomes’ (strongly agree and agree)	80	61	<0.01
‘Should richer people pay larger shares of taxes and poorer people lower shares?’ (much higher shares and higher shares)	84	78	<0.01

Source: ISSP 1999, own calculations.

Overall, therefore, respondents in the East appear to have stronger negative views on inequality than those in the West. There are several possible explanations for this: disillusion in the East at the rapid pace of change and growth in inequality; memory of more formally egalitarian times under communism; a sense of personal material loss for a large number of respondents in the East, who feel worse off at the end of the 1990s than they did at the start of economic transition; and perhaps a sense of the unfairness of the transition process – not only has there been an increase in inequality, but maybe the redistribution process has been tainted by nepotism, cronyism and corruption.

The following section sheds light on the latter potential cause of the higher aversion to inequality in CEECs.

▪ 3.3 *Cluster B: criteria for getting ahead*

This cluster comprises five questions, which go some way towards measuring people's perceptions of nepotism, cronyism and corruption – what they think it takes to get ahead in their country. The full statements are listed on Table 1 above, and can be subdivided into two groups. The three statements 'How important to getting ahead is coming from a wealthy family?', 'How important to getting ahead is knowing the right people?' and 'To get all the way to the top in your country you need to be corrupt', form one group – agreement with these statements would suggest that skills, effort, etc. are not the most effective ways of getting ahead. Who you know, rule bending and corruption appear to be much more effective. The correlation matrix in Table A3 shows that there is a high correlation between answers to all three questions.

The other two statements in this cluster are almost diametric opposites to the first three: 'In your country, people get rewarded for their effort' and 'in your country, people get rewarded for their intelligence and skills'. Not only are responses to these questions highly correlated with each other, but there is a *negative* correlation between these questions and the other three in the cluster (see Table A3). If people agree with these two statements, they are likely to disagree with the other three statements in this group.

Table 3 shows that there is a significantly stronger agreement in the East than in the West with the statements 'How important to getting ahead is coming from a wealthy family?', 'How important to getting ahead is knowing the right people?', and 'To get all the way to the top in your country you have to be corrupt'. Almost 40 per cent of respondents in the East view coming from a wealthy family as important for getting ahead, compared with only 23 per cent in the West. Almost six in ten respondents in the East view 'knowing the right people' as important for getting ahead, compared with five in ten in the West. And 52 per cent in the East believe that to get all the way to the top, you have to be corrupt, a view held by only 29 per cent in the West.

Table 3 : *Attitudes to criteria for getting ahead in CEE and western countries*

Statement asked of respondents	Response		Level of significance of difference
	CEE	West	
'How important to getting ahead is coming from a wealthy family?' (essential and very important)	39	23	<0.01
'How important to getting ahead is knowing the right people?' (essential and very important)	60	48	<0.01
'In your country people get rewarded for their effort' (strongly agree and agree)	12	42	<0.01
'In your country people get rewarded for their intelligence and skills' (strongly agree and agree)	19	52	<0.01
'To get all the way to the top in your country you have to be corrupt' (strongly agree and agree)	52	29	<0.01

Source: ISSP 1999, own calculations.

Moreover, people in the West (although still less than half) are much more likely than those in the East to agree with the statements 'in your country, people get rewarded for their effort' and 'in your country, people get rewarded for their intelligence and skills'. 42 and 52 per cent in the West agree with these statements, respectively, compared with 12 and 19 per cent in the East. The large differences between East and West on all five statements in this cluster therefore suggest a considerably weaker belief in 'merit' in the East. Fewer people in the East are willing to believe that hard work achieves results. Rather, contacts, family networks, and perhaps a willingness to bend rules are seen as the essential ingredients.

This profoundly negative view of achievement in post-communist society may have originated in communist society itself (which had its share of nepotism and corruption), or in the process of transition. It is reasonable to suppose that the widespread experience of downward economic mobility in the East is likely to have affected individual beliefs about the determinants of individual success. For example, from a personal perspective, fewer people may believe that effort pays off. And successful people (of whom there will be relatively more in the West than in the East) may rationalise their own success in terms of their own efforts (Piketty, 1995). But a large number of people may also have experienced the impact of real cronyism or corruption. In Russia, for example, 'robber barons' acquired vast deposits of mineral resources, particularly oil and gas, with minimal payment to the state. We return to the relationship between attitudes and corruption later in the paper.

There is potentially a close link between the questions in Cluster A and those in Cluster B, in that those who perceive 'getting ahead' as based on achievement

and ability criteria might be expected to see inequality in their society as legitimate, compared to those who view getting ahead as largely determined by ascription or illegitimate achievement (Robért 1999). The correlation matrix on Table A3 shows that this is indeed the case. Responses to these two statements are strongly positively correlated with the Cluster A statement ‘Large income differences are necessary for prosperity’, and strongly negatively correlated with the other three statements in Cluster A.

▪ 3.4 *Cluster C: earnings determinants*

This group of statements is concerned with a narrower concept of ‘getting ahead’. It focuses on what people believe *should be* the factors determining earnings from employment. We can subdivide these questions: one group concerns factors related to the job itself: ‘How much responsibility goes with the job is important for determining pay’; ‘Number of years spent in education is important for determining pay’; ‘Whether the job requires supervising others is important for determining pay’; ‘How well a job is done is important for determining pay’; and ‘How hard a person works at the job is important for determining pay’. The other group concerns factors related to the need to support a family or children. ‘What is needed to support a family is important for determining pay’; and ‘Whether the person has children to support is important for determining pay’.

The most important thing to note about Cluster C is that it comprises normative statements about how earnings should be made (*what should be...*), in contrast to Cluster B, which asks respondents to evaluate the actual situation in which people get ahead (*what is...*) in their country. One might expect people’s normative views to be influenced by, or indeed influence, their views on inequality, and how one gets ahead. But as Table A3 shows, there is generally little correlation between any of the statements in Cluster C and any of the statements in either Cluster A or Cluster B. The exception regards the questions on the importance of family and child support for determining pay. Respondents who viewed the support of dependents as important, are also in favour of higher income equality and government’s redistribution.

Table 4 shows that in the case of all 7 statements in this cluster, differences between East and West are small. This suggests that people in both transition and industrialized countries on average hold similar attitudes to how earnings should be rewarded. There is no evidence of an overtly ‘socialist’ or ‘marketised’ set of attitudes to earnings in either group of countries.

Table 4: *Attitudes to determinants of earnings in CEE and western countries*

Statement asked of respondents	Response		Level of significance of difference
	CEE	West	
'Responsibility is important for determining pay' (essential and very important)	76	77	<0.05
'Number of years spent in education is important for determining pay' (essential and very important)	55	51	<0.001
'Whether the job requires supervising others is important for determining pay' (essential and very important)	50	51	<0.05
'What is needed to support a family is important for determining pay' (essential and very important)	48	49	not significant
'Whether the person has children to support is important for determining pay' (essential and very important)	45	42	<0.001
'How well a job is done is important for determining pay' (essential and very important)	81	83	<0.001
'How hard a person works at the job is important for determining pay' (essential and very important)	75	75	<0.05

Source: ISSP 1999, own calculations.

■ 3.5 *Gender and age*

Transition has arguably affected women and men differently. And marketised economies have rarely been successful in promoting equality between men and women. One impact of transition has arguably been to push women back towards the domestic role that communism never really freed them from, but expected them to manage in addition to full-time paid employment. With transition, the latter role not only became more scarce, but in many countries was popularly characterised as the man's proper role, while the woman did the nurturing and caring. The fact that there is very little difference,⁷ East or West, between men's and women's attitudes to inequality, getting ahead or earnings suggests that women in transition countries (as in the West) have not adopted significantly different positions to men on these issues, irrespective of their own personal gains or losses.

Surprisingly, differences between age groups are also, for the most part, small in both East and West. But with regard to some statements, attitudes among older respondents in the East (less so in the West) are stronger than those of younger respondents. In Cluster A for example, almost 9 in 10 (88%) of respondents aged 55 and over in the East agree with the statement 'It is the responsibility of government to reduce differences in incomes between people with high and low incomes', compared with three quarters of respondents aged

⁷ The results by gender and by age are summarised in Tables A4-A8 in the Annex.

up to 30. Similar proportions of older and younger respondents in the East (90 and 79 per cent, respectively) agree with the statement ‘Should richer people pay larger shares of their incomes in taxes and poorer people lower shares?’ But the fact that the responses of old and young respondents in the East are similar to each other with respect to the other two statements in this cluster makes it difficult to interpret the differences that do arise.

Differences in attitudes between younger and older respondents in both East and West, though still not large, are apparent in the case of attitudes to what should determine earnings (Cluster C). In both regions, older respondents are more likely than younger ones to agree with the statements that education, supervising others and how hard a person works should be important in determining a person’s pay. But differences between older and younger respondents are somewhat greater in the West than in the East on the attitudes ‘What is needed to support a family is important for determining pay’, and ‘whether the person has children to support is important for determining pay’: in both cases, older respondents are more in agreement with these statements than younger ones. In total, these results make sense: one might expect older people to believe that factors other than the market should be important in determining pay. But it should be emphasised that in general, the differences between old and young are not very large.

This general absence of large differences between older and younger respondents, in the East or in the West, is perhaps more surprising than the similarities between men’s and women’s views. One might expect generational differences for several reasons, not least differences in life experience. And one might expect that the process of transition, and the way it might be seen through older and younger eyes, would sharpen these differences. For the most part, this does not appear to have happened.

4. Differences Between Countries

While the differences between East and West shown in Section 3 are striking, they hide some interesting country-specific differences. In this section, we highlight some of the variations between both Eastern and Western countries.

▪ 4.1 *Cluster A: attitudes to inequality*

Table 5 shows the percentage of respondents expressing ‘against inequality’ opinions across the four attitudes in Cluster A. They are ranked according to the average percentage of respondents with these opinions. Bulgarian and Russian respondents appear to have the most egalitarian attitudes (the average score is 86%), but they are closely followed by the Portuguese, and then the Hungarians, Slovenians, Slovaks, Latvians and Poles. Egalitarian attitudes in the Czech

Republic, on the other hand, fall behind those in Austria and Spain, but are still quite high – three quarters of Czechs have egalitarian opinions. At the other end of the scale, respondents from Canada, New Zealand and Australia show lower concerns regarding societal inequality. People living in the USA are at the bottom of the scale and therefore appear to be most relaxed about inequality.

These results generally support the ‘East-West’ differences discussed in the previous section. But they also reveal considerable heterogeneity within both groups of countries. Portugal, for example, appears to have more in common with transition countries in terms of attitudes to inequality, while perhaps the opposite may be said of the Czech Republic. But it is also worth noting that the transition countries are more homogenous in terms of their attitudes: the range of average scores for this group is from 75 to 87 per cent. The range of scores for Western countries is from 52 to 84 per cent. On the key attitude ‘Differences in income in your country are too large’, the lowest percentage in agreement in the transition countries is 88 per cent in the Czech Republic. But the proportion in agreement reaches a level below or about 70 per cent in four Western countries – Japan, Canada, Australia and the USA. Inequality may be a burning issue in most Western countries, but it is in *all* transition countries.

What drives these results? It does not appear to be the level of inequality *per se*, as the example of the USA shows. Could it be the perceived causes of inequality? If gains by well-off people are perceived as ‘ill-gotten’, could it be that resistance to inequality is greater? Appendix Table A3 suggests that this may be the case – there is significant correlation between the four attitudes in this cluster and the attitude in Cluster *B* ‘To get all the way to the top in your country you have to be corrupt’.

Another explanation might be the high *increase* of inequality in transition countries, leading to the impoverishment of a high proportion of people in transition countries. The newly poor and those who have lost most during transition are perhaps more likely to favour income redistribution that reduces their relatively new burden of economic insecurity. Hence, many poor people in transition countries may not have fully adjusted to their relatively new circumstances. On the other hand, inequalities in Western countries remained fairly constant during the last decade. It may be that poor respondents in these countries simply got used to inequality or accept it as necessary for economic growth.

Table 5: *Respondents expressing egalitarian attitudes, by country (per cent)*

	Large differences in income are necessary for prosperity	Differences in income in your country are too large	It is the responsibility of government to reduce differences in incomes	Richer people should pay larger shares of taxes, and poorer people smaller shares	Average percentage score
	Disagree/strongly disagree	Agree/strongly agree	Agree/strongly agree	Agree/strongly agree	
Bulgaria	72.7	96.85	85.02	92.69	86.8
Russia	73.8	95.48	86.15	90.51	86.5
Portugal	59.4	96.04	89.88	88.3	83.4
Hungary	75.5	93.08	80.08	83.96	83.2
Slovenia	63.9	90.99	84.82	87.74	81.9
Slovakia	78.3	93.67	74.54	80.65	81.8
Latvia	70.5	96.7	78.67	72.66	79.6
Poland	57.3	89.11	84.86	85.24	79.1
Austria	65.0	86.18	72.49	84.91	77.2
Spain	51.8	89.29	79.29	84.55	76.2
Czech Rep.	63.8	87.76	71.88	77.95	75.3
France	65.1	87.41	67.53	73.26	73.3
Great Britain	57.8	82.35	68.72	78.71	71.9
Germany	48.2	82.17	61.24	80.28	68.0
Norway	57.0	72.48	61.91	76.03	66.9
Sweden	49.0	71.11	59.46	76.31	64.0
Japan	40.7	69.15	52.55	90.97	63.3
Canada	64.7	70.6	47.48	69.18	63.0
New Zealand	61.0	73.15	49.43	62.51	61.5
Australia	46.3	70.89	49.69	77.9	61.2
USA	42.7	66.16	35.26	64.96	52.3
Average	66.5	92.3	80.7	84.5	81.0

Source: ISSP 1999, own calculations.

Note: The average refers to the unweighted average of countries.

■ 4.2 *Cluster B: criteria for getting ahead*

Table 6 shows the proportions of respondents in each country who are in agreement or disagreement (depending on the attitude expressed)⁸ with the five criteria for getting ahead that make up this cluster. This table is also ranked according to average percentage scores for each country across the five attitudes in the cluster. Again, countries in the East dominate at the top of the table, while those in the West take all the places in the bottom half. But again, there is

⁸ The ranking criteria is that those countries are on top which believe most in the fact that non-meritocratic principles are the main drivers for actually getting ahead in these countries.

tremendous variation within East and West. In particular, Portugal and Spain are more like the transition countries in their attitudes than like other Western countries. The range of percentages in agreement or disagreement with each attitude is wide. Fewer than one in five Czechs think that coming from a wealthy family is important for getting ahead, while more than three in five Poles think so. Nine in ten Bulgarians disagree with the statement ‘In your country people get rewarded for their intelligence and skills’ compared with four in ten Hungarians and three in ten Poles. Nonetheless, more than half Poles (57%) and Slovaks (53%) agree with the statement that ‘To get all the way to the top in your country, you have to be corrupt’, as do two in three Bulgarians and four in five Russians.

Table 6: Respondents who do not think meritocratic principles apply, by country (per cent)


	‘How important to getting ahead is coming from a wealthy family?’ Essential/very important	‘How important to getting ahead is knowing the right people?’ Essential/very important	‘In your country people get rewarded for their effort’ Strongly disagree/ Disagree	‘In your country people get rewarded for their intelligence and skills’ Strongly disagree/ Disagree	‘To get all the way to the top in your country you have to be corrupt’ Strongly agree/Agree	Average
Bulgaria	54.9	63.3	91.0	90.0	65.8	73.0
Russia	43.5	63.1	83.6	80.1	80.8	70.2
Slovakia	47.1	75.0	83.4	72.7	52.8	66.2
Poland	60.6	74.4	45.7	30.7	56.6	53.6
Latvia	37.1	59.5	69.1	59.6	40.5	53.2
Portugal	55.5	61.2	53.9	41.2	40.7	50.5
Slovenia	26.7	60.0	61.5	52.5	42.2	48.6
Spain	54.4	66.0	43.9	34.3	35.0	46.7
Czech Rep.	19.4	48.8	65.1	50.3	38.9	44.5
Hungary	35.4	42.5	71.3	40.3	31.8	44.3
Austria	28.5	71.5	25.2	18.5	47.6	38.3
France	10.2	42.2	50.3	39.5	40.9	36.6
Germany	26.6	60.9	18.6	14.5	42.9	32.7
Sweden	19.0	56.5	26.1	19.9	20.7	28.4
Great Britain	19.4	42.0	31.6	24.8	18.1	27.2
New Zealand	16.9	36.5	30.8	23.5	18.2	25.2
Norway	10.8	33.3	37.8	30.3	10.8	24.6
Canada	13.2	49.0	21.3	19.9	17.9	24.3
Japan	12.2	19.7	24.2	16.1	41.2	22.7
Australia	20.9	39.7	18.4	14.6	17.1	22.1
USA	20.5	47.2	12.0	8.9	17.1	21.1
Average	29.4	52.3	46.6	37.7	37.5	40.7

Source: ISSP 1999, own calculations.

Note: The average refers to the unweighted average of countries.

Concerning Cluster *A* above we argued that attitudes to inequality are not closely related to ‘actual’ inequality, because a given level of inequality may well be judged differently depending on the (e.g. fair or unfair) means by which it was generated. In the present Cluster *B*, however, it is straightforward to expect that this link between perception/attitude and reality (here: of the degree to which meritocratic principles are actually applied in society) will be much stronger. This is because there is much less disagreement that for instance corruption – as one example of a non-meritocratic criteria for getting ahead – is a ‘bad’ (as opposed to a ‘good’), irrespective of how it has come about in the first place. As it turns out from Figure 2 there is indeed a relatively close empirical relationship between the ‘actual’ level of corruption and the perception of it in the eyes of the respondents (as measured by the share of respondents that agree or strongly agree with the view that ‘to get all the way to the top you have to be corrupt’).

Figure 2: Views on corruption as a means to getting ahead by ‘actual’ corruption



Source: Table 12, Transparency International (2001).

Note: T-values appear in parentheses.

▪ 4.3 *Cluster C: values concerning determinants of earning*

Table 7 shows country-by-country responses to the seven attitudes that make up the cluster on earnings determinants. The country-specific average for respondents who think objective principles should apply in the determination of earnings is calculated by omitting the questions concerning the importance of child and family support, the answers to which are hard to reconcile with those to the other questions in this cluster.

Unlike the other two Clusters (*A+B*) examined in this section, there is no discernible pattern between East and West, as was already visible from the regional aggregate results in Table 4. Respondents in the USA, Portugal, Austria and New Zealand show the highest level of agreement with the five attitudes (deeming them ‘essential’ or ‘very important’), followed by Russians, Germans and Bulgarians.

These results are not easy to interpret. A priori one might expect a certain link between Cluster *B* and the questions in this cluster, since what people believe *should* be important (for pay or for ‘getting ahead’ more generally) will be *somehow* related to what they believe *is* important. But just how precisely would they be linked? As Table 2 had already indicated, the relation does not seem to be a very simple one, since correlations between the attitudes in this cluster and in the other clusters are generally low.

One hypothesis would be that people who were concerned about inequality and corruption might *strongly* favour ‘objective’ criteria (for example, education, supervision of others, hard work, or even family responsibilities) as means of determining earnings. One might equally expect that in the transition context, many of the ‘losers’ would favour objective criteria: for example, skilled industrial workers who lost their jobs, or who found their earnings progressively eroded.⁹ Yet in none of the seven attitudes in this cluster are transition countries concentrated at the top of the table. Nevertheless, they are neither at the bottom of the ranking, which suggests that there may indeed be some truth in this hypothesis, in particular when looking at Russia and Bulgaria, who had perceived strongest the presence of non-meritocratic principles in their societies (see Cluster *B*) and now also rank among the upper third in Cluster *C*. This clashes, however, with the example of Slovenia, whose respondents have shown much discontent with the non-meritocratic way in which incomes are generated, but who at the same time do not seem to cry out all too strongly for

⁹ Additionally, transition countries are often characterised by a poor fit between ‘objective’ labour market criteria (such as education or skill) and rewards for work (World Bank 2000). Hence, while in Western countries higher education decreases the risk of poverty, this relationship is more uncertain in the East. Therefore, it appears that respondents in the East who are subject to what they perceive to be arbitrary wage determinants might be more in favour of ‘objective’ principals for determining pay.

more emphasis on objective determinants of pay. This may suggest a degree of resignation or acceptance on how earnings should be determined.

Table 7: Respondents who think 'objective' principles should apply in the determination of earnings, by country (per cent)

	'How much responsibility goes with the job is important for determining pay'	'Number of years spent in education is important for determining pay'	'Whether the job requires supervising others is important for determining pay'	'What is needed to support a family is important for determining pay'	'Whether the person has children to support is important for determining pay'	How well a job is done is important for determining pay'	'How hard a person works at the job is important for determining pay'	Average
	Essential/very important							
USA	82.4	69.1	63.8	61.0	44.2	91.8	88.6	79.1
Portugal	86.0	64.8	67.3	44.9	44.5	80.6	80.2	75.8
Austria	86.8	61.9	50.0	49.3	53.3	91.2	78.9	73.8
New Zealand	81.4	54.8	58.9	49.7	37.0	88.6	82.7	73.3
Russia	85.1	59.2	55.0	58.2	51.7	83.8	79.3	72.5
Germany	87.9	60.7	42.7	56.4	64.5	91.4	79.5	72.4
Bulgaria	80.3	69.4	60.3	55.2	57.2	80.1	71.9	72.4
Australia	79.6	56.4	60.1	36.1	21.1	85.2	75.8	71.4
Slovakia	87.3	50.6	48.4	53.8	45.3	86.6	76.9	70.0
Canada	78.0	54.1	48.9	55.1	34.5	86.0	80.1	69.4
Great Britain	75.8	55.8	58.0	57.9	35.8	78.4	76.3	68.9
Poland	67.5	64.1	50.6	39.2	32.5	76.6	77.7	67.3
Hungary	72.2	49.3	46.7	43.3	40.5	83.5	80.7	66.5
Czech R.	75.6	48.5	45.7	39.0	34.3	80.9	77.2	65.6
Latvia	72.3	49.9	53.7	53.8	58.3	79.9	70.7	65.3
Spain	65.6	56.1	47.5	63.0	62.5	74.1	73.8	63.4
Sweden	76.1	41.1	52.9	30.7	26.7	81.2	61.9	62.6
Norway	68.6	43.7	48.9	45.9	37.8	75.4	75.6	62.4
France	69.6	39.4	50.8	60.5	49.5	79.5	59.7	59.8
Slovenia	66.6	51.6	41.1	45.7	48.8	72.9	65.1	59.4
Japan	73.1	11.6	19.7	33.4	33.0	79.8	68.4	50.5
Average	77.0	53.0	51.0	49.1	43.5	82.3	75.3	67.7

Source: ISSP 1999, own calculations.

Note: The average refers to the unweighted average of countries. It does not comprise the questions whether the support of a family or of children is important for determining pay, since neither the support of children nor of a family is directly work related.

A different explanation seems to hold for the USA, where respondents are most tolerant towards inequality (Table 5), believe more than any other country that getting ahead is subject to meritocratic principles (Table 6), while at the same time they seem to have the strongest conviction that objective criteria *should be* applied in determining pay in the market (Table 7). Hence, in this

particular case the perceived reality and the ideology of a free market economy are in unique concordance.

To summarise, Table 8 shows average scores for countries in the three clusters in a different way. The purpose of this table is to show which countries hold the most 'extreme' or 'unusual' views altogether. Countries score 1, 0 or -1 in respect of each attitude in a cluster, and these scores are aggregated within and across clusters in the table. A score of 1 is awarded to a country if the percentage of respondents in that country agreeing or strongly agreeing (or disagreeing, or finding essential or very important, as the case may be in Tables 5-7) with an attitude is greater than one standard deviation above the mean for all countries. A score of -1 is given if the percentage is more than one standard deviation below the mean. Therefore, a score of 1 or -1 represents 'outlier' countries, while a score of 0 is given to countries that fall within one standard deviation of the mean. The countries are ranked by the sum of scores for each cluster.

Table 8 shows that in terms of 'outlier' scores, Bulgaria, Russia, Portugal, Slovakia, Austria and Hungary are at the top of all the three clusters taken together. In these six countries, views on inequality, what is needed to get ahead and earnings, are overall most strongly held. Among the countries at the opposite extreme, i.e. those who tend to be 'extremely' tolerant towards the existing income differences and their determinants, are exclusively industrialized market economies, such as first Canada, followed by Japan, Norway, Australia, France and the USA. Note that given the less than perfect correlation between Clusters *A* and *B* on one hand, and Cluster *C* on the other hand, the overall ranking of outlier countries would look somewhat different if we were to focus on the first two clusters solely – especially for the USA. A further examination of the precise nature of the relationship between Clusters *A+B* and Cluster *C*, in order to find out what is it that makes people call more actively for a certain policy change, could well be an area of fruitful future research.

Table 8: ‘Outlier’ scores for attitudes summed across clusters, by country

	Cluster A	Cluster B	Cluster C	TOTAL
Bulgaria	4	4	1	9
Russia	4	3	1	8
Portugal	2	2	2	6
Slovakia	1	3	1	5
Austria	0	1	2	3
Hungary	1	1	0	2
Latvia	1	0	0	1
Poland	0	3	-2	1
Czech Rep.	0	0	0	0
Germany	-1	-1	2	0
Spain	0	1	-2	-1
Great Britain	0	-1	0	-1
Slovenia	1	0	-4	-3
Sweden	-2	0	-1	-3
New Zealand	-3	-2	2	-3
USA	-4	-3	4	-3
France	0	-1	-3	-4
Australia	-3	-2	0	-5
Norway	-1	-3	-2	-6
Japan	-2	-2	-2	-6
Canada	-3	-3	0	-6

Source: Tables 5-7.

Notes: for derivation of scores, see description in text.

5. Conclusion

Our main purpose in this paper was to examine how, ten years after the collapse of the Iron Curtain, attitudes to inequality in Central and Eastern Europe compared with those in the West. Our main conclusion is that inequality in the East is perceived in considerably more negative terms than in the West. We also found that compared to people in the West, people in the East have a very jaundiced view as to what it takes to get ahead in their countries. People in the East are more likely to agree that contacts and corruption are important for getting ahead. This certainly explains at least part of their greater aversion towards existing levels of income inequality.

At the same time, we found no substantial East-West differences in the level of support for ‘objective’ criteria in terms of earnings determinants. People in both East and West appear to share basically the same views as to how earnings should be determined, while they differ markedly in the evaluation of actual determinants. This points to an important possibility: people in the East may be disillusioned with the level of inequality in their society at least partly because

they see it as the result of unfairness and ill-gotten gains. From the reverse point of view this most likely implies that they are in principle prepared to accept a given level of inequality (perhaps even substantial inequality, which occurs in many Western countries), if it is not predominantly caused by ‘unjustified’ or ‘unethical’ means. The challenge for policymakers in the transition countries is to introduce the principles of ‘fairness’ and ‘equal opportunity’ in the market, not least in order to ensure sustained public support for and legitimacy of policies in general.

Examination at the country-level of the three clusters of attitudes in this analysis sheds further light on the issue of corruption and legitimacy. Respondents in Russia and Bulgaria, followed by Portugal, Slovakia, Latvia, Poland and Austria, on average hold the strongest views against inequality, about corruption and about objective criteria for determining earnings. In all of these countries except Austria, perceptions of corruption are high. Inequality is clearly an important issue in itself, but when linked in people’s minds to corruption, it can become an issue for the legitimacy of social and economic reforms.

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ANNEX

Table A1: Response rate of the questionnaires and fieldwork methods by countries

Country	Response Rate (%)	Fieldwork method
Australia	40.1	Mail survey with four follow-up mailings
Austria	63.3	Face to face interview
Bulgaria	91.8	Face to face interview
Canada	21.9	Mail survey with one reminder
Czech Rep.	48.9	Face to face interview
France	18.1	Mail survey
Germany	56.2**	Self-completion of questionnaire distributed by interviewer
Great Britain	40.2	Face-to-face interview
Hungary	64.6	Face-to-face interview
Japan	73.6	Self-completion (Dropping off and later picking up questionnaires)
Latvia	56.3	Face-to-face interview
New Zealand	60.5	Mail survey with two follow-up mailings
Norway	52.84	Mail survey with one reminder and two follow-ups with questionnaire
Poland	66.5	Face-to-face interview
Portugal	80.1	Face-to-face interview
Russia	57.8	Face-to-face interview
Slovakia	90.2	Face-to-face interview
Slovenia	64.9*	Face-to-face interview
Spain	98.5	Face-to-face interview
Sweden	57.5	Mail survey with four reminders
USA	43.4	Face-to-face interview

The sample type for selecting respondents differs throughout the countries.

Response rate refers to the general questionnaire and not only the ISSP module.

** Response rate refers to the surveys ISSP 1999 and ISSP 2000 together.

Table A2: Summary statistics

Variable	Obs.	Weight	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Age	26323	26339.8	45.66	17.06	16	98
Gender (female=2)	26372	26387.2	1.53	0.50	1	2
Income differences necessary for prosperity	24608	24607.5	3.61	1.14	1	5
Differences in income too large	25749	25771.2	1.76	0.92	1	5
Government's responsibility reduce taxes	25285	25283.0	2.20	1.18	1	5
Richer people should pay more taxes	25151	25193.6	1.91	0.76	1	5
Determining pay: responsibility	25701	25731.1	1.96	0.76	1	5
Determining pay: education	25705	25733.5	2.47	0.91	1	5
Determining pay: supervising	25458	25484.8	2.49	0.88	1	5
Determining pay: family	25340	25384.8	2.60	1.09	1	5
Determining pay: children	25346	25375.8	2.78	1.15	1	5
Determining pay: well job done	25809	25832.5	1.85	0.75	1	5
Determining pay: hard work	25756	25787.9	2.00	0.80	1	5
Getting ahead: wealthy family	25651	25678.0	3.11	1.13	1	5
Getting ahead: knowing right people	25757	25772.8	2.47	0.99	1	5
Getting ahead: effort	25526	25551.7	3.30	1.16	1	5
Getting ahead: intelligence, skills	25350	25380.4	3.07	1.15	1	5
Getting ahead: corrupt	24728	24750.1	3.04	1.26	1	5
OECD countries	26437	26452.1	0.62	0.49	0	1
CEE countries	26437	26452.1	0.38	0.49	0	1

Source: ISSP 1999.

Table A3 : Correlation matrix

			Cluster A				Cluster B				Cluster C						
		Income differences necessary	Income diff. too large	Govt. reduce income diff.	Richer more taxes	Get ahead: wealthy family	Get ahead: right people	Get ahead: effort	Get ahead: skills	Get ahead: corrupt	Pay: responsibility	Pay: education	Pay: supervising	Pay: family	Pay: children	Pay: well done job	Pay hard work
Cluster A	Income differences necessary	1.00															
	Income difference too large	-0.27	1.00														
	Govt reduce income differences	-0.22	0.56	1.00													
	Richer more taxes	-0.15	0.32	0.36	1.00												
Cluster B	Get ahead: wealthy family	-0.02	0.15	0.17	0.13	1.00											
	Get ahead: right people	-0.03	0.14	0.14	0.07	0.48	1.00										
	Get ahead: effort	0.24	-0.30	-0.25	-0.17	-0.12	-0.12	1.00									
	Get ahead: intelligence skills	0.22	-0.25	-0.21	-0.14	-0.09	-0.11	0.69	1.00								
	Get ahead: corrupt	-0.05	0.24	0.25	0.18	0.22	0.24	-0.31	-0.28	1.00							
Cluster C	Pay: responsibility	0.01	0.02	-0.03	n.s.	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	1.00						
	Pay: education	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.30	1.00					
	Pay: supervising	0.06	0.01	0.00	n.s.	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.34	0.38	1.00				
	Pay: family	-0.03	0.16	0.20	0.13	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.21	0.12	1.00			
	Pay: children	-0.02	0.18	0.23	0.16	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.04	0.19	0.09	0.74	1.00		
	Pay: well done job	-0.04	0.03	-0.03	n.s.	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.37	0.16	0.23	0.08	0.08	1.00	
	Pay: hard work	-0.03	0.07	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.28	0.21	0.22	0.16	0.16	0.58	1.0

Source: ISSP 1999, own calculations.

Note: Bold correlation coefficients refer to a significance at a 1% level, n.s.= not significant.

Table A4: Attitudes to inequality in CEE and western countries by gender

Statement asked of respondents	Response			
	CEE		West	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
'Income differences are necessary for prosperity' (strongly disagree and disagree)	69	70	52	56
'Differences in income are too large in your country' (strongly agree and agree)	92	94	76	81
'It is the responsibility of government to reduce differences in incomes between people with high and low incomes' (strongly agree and agree)	78	83	57	64
'Richer people, higher taxes' (much higher shares and higher shares)	82	86	78	78

Source: ISSP 1999, own calculations.

Table A5: Attitudes to inequality in CEE and western countries by age

Statement asked of respondents	Response					
	CEE			West		
Age categories	-30	31-54	55+	-30	31-54	55+
'Income differences are necessary for prosperity' (strongly disagree and disagree)	66	70	71	54	56	51
'Differences in income are too large in your country' (strongly agree and agree)	91	93	94	74	78	83
'It is the responsibility of government to reduce differences in incomes between people with high and low incomes' (strongly agree and agree)	75	79	86	60	59	64
'Richer people, higher taxes' (much higher shares and higher shares)	79	82	90	74	76	82

Source: ISSP 1999, own calculations.

Table A6: Attitudes to criteria for status attainment in CEE and western countries by gender

Statement asked of respondents	Response			
	CEE		West	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
'How important to getting ahead is coming from a wealthy family?' (essential and very important)	41	37	25	21
'How important to getting ahead is knowing the right people?' (essential and very important)	62	58	49	46
'In your country people get rewarded for their effort' (strongly agree and agree)	13	11	45	40
'In your country people get rewarded for their intelligence and skills' (strongly agree and agree)	20	18	54	50
'To get all the way to the top in your country you have to be corrupt' (strongly agree and agree)	53	51	29	28

Source: ISSP 1999, own calculations.

Table A7: Attitudes to criteria for status attainment in CEE and western countries by age

Statement asked of respondents	Response					
	CEE			West		
Age categories	-30	31-54	55+	-30	31-54	55+
'How important to getting ahead is coming from a wealthy family?' (essential and very important)	39	39	40	21	23	25
'How important to getting ahead is knowing the right people?' (essential and very important)	62	61	58	50	47	47
'In your country people get rewarded for their effort' (strongly agree and agree)	12	12	13	41	40	46
'In your country people get rewarded for their intelligence and skills' (strongly agree and agree)	18	18	20	51	49	56
'To get all the way to the top in your country you have to be corrupt' (strongly agree and agree)	51	51	54	28	30	29

Source: ISSP 1999, own calculations.

Table A8: Attitudes to determinants of earnings in CEE and western countries by gender

Statement asked of respondents	Response			
	CEE		West	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
'Responsibility is important for determining pay' (essential and very important)	76	75	77	79
'Number of years spent in education is important for determining pay' (essential and very important)	53	58	45	52
'Whether the job requires supervising others is important for determining pay' (essential and very important)	51	50	47	49
'What is needed to support a family is important for determining pay' (essential and very important)	47	48	45	49
'Whether the person has children to support is important for determining pay' (essential and very important)	44	46	40	46
'How well a job is done is important for determining pay' (essential and very important)	81	80	83	83
'How hard a person works at the job is important for determining pay' (essential and very important)	75	75	71	75

Source: ISSP 1999, own calculations.

Table A9: Attitudes to determinants of earnings in CEE and western countries by age

Statement asked of respondents	Response					
	CEE			West		
Age categories	-30	31-54	55+	-30	31-54	55+
'Responsibility is important for determining pay' (essential and very important)	73	75	75	78	78	79
'Number of years spent in education is important for determining pay' (essential and very important)	52	55	61	48	46	55
'Whether the job requires supervising others is important for determining pay' (essential and very important)	46	49	55	47	47	53
'What is needed to support a family is important for determining pay' (essential and very important)	45	47	50	46	44	53
'Whether the person has children to support is important for determining pay' (essential and very important)	44	45	48	41	40	46
'How well a job is done is important for determining pay' (essential and very important)	78	80	81	83	82	84
'How hard a person works at the job is important for determining pay' (essential and very important)	71	74	78	75	73	75

Source: ISSP 1999, own calculations.

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