

Chapter 14  
Policy to protect children from and during war \*

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**Summary.** The magnitude of wars, deaths, physical incapacity and economic and social damage caused, as well as displacement all grew rapidly from 1945 to 1995, with possibly some reduction in the last years of the century. Most of the current wars are internal, which causes particularly hardship since civilians are often a major target. Children are among the worst sufferers from war, being particularly vulnerable to the reduced services and disintegrating families that accompany war. This chapter aims to explore how far the growing incidence of war is to be attributed to globalisation, and the nature of global policies that might reduce the negative impact on children. Analysis of the causes of war show that economic stagnation, horizontal inequalities, private incentives to fight, and the weakness of the state are among the most important causes, all playing on political and cultural problems. Global influences contribute to all four elements. In some respects, therefore, globalisation has encouraged outbreaks of war, helped to finance them, and provided incentives for their prolongation. But in other respects, globalisation might be expected to have reduced the likelihood of war, as when people become successfully integrated into market economies, they require peaceful conditions for economic success.

*JEL:* H56, I31, J23,

**\* This study presents the views of its authors and not the official UNICEF position in this field**

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## CHAPTER 14: CHILDREN IN WAR

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## INTRODUCTION

War situations present probably the worst conditions for children who are potentially subject to physical violence and abuse, loss of limbs, or death, illness, malnutrition, lack of education, separation from communities and families. With the very high levels of conflict prevalent, the question of how best to protect children in war must be a priority issue for all concerned with child welfare. This paper reviews the topic, with a particular focus on the global context, and specifically on international policies that might assist in protecting children.

The paper is organised as follows: Section 1 reviews the magnitude and trends in warfare; Section 2 considers the main factors responsible for the high levels of warfare, and how far globalisation bears responsibility; Section 3 reviews evidence on the general economic and social consequences of wars which are critically important in determining child welfare, while Section 4 looks specifically at the impact on children. Section 5 explores policy options, focussing on global policies that might prevent or reduce the incidence of warfare as well as policies to protect children during war. Because the topic is a vast one, we should say at the outset that in a single paper we could not avoid some superficiality and lack of depth.

### Section I: The trends in armed conflict, 1945-2000

There was a large rise in the numbers of wars, associated deaths and displaced persons from 1945 to the early 1990s. Over the period 1960-95 one half of the least developed countries and one third of low and lower middle income countries suffered conflict. There was some reduction in the numbers of armed conflicts at a global level after 1995, with a further rise in 1998 with the Kosovo war, and some levelling off thereafter. Here we first assess the situation up to 1990, and then the trends in the 1990s.<sup>1</sup>

#### 1945-1990


The rise in conflicts from 1945 to 1990 is illustrated in Figures One and Two. Both data sets show a rising incidence of severe conflict during the Cold War era. Figure One defines a major conflict as one involving more than 500 deaths a year.<sup>2</sup> In 1946 there were

<sup>1</sup> For an overview of data see Geldditsch et al., 2001.

<sup>2</sup> Data for Figure One are taken from the Armed Conflict and Intervention Project, compiled by Monty Marshall, which codes levels of violence in all types of major armed conflicts in the world from 1946-1999. A major armed conflict is defined as one which involves at least 500 fatalities. The definition includes all episodes of international, civil, ethnic and genocidal violence and warfare. Each episode of conflict is coded on a scale of 1 to 10 – according to an assessment of the full impact of the violence involved on the societies under their direct influence. These impacts include: fatalities and casualties, resource depletion, destruction of infrastructure, population dislocations, psychological trauma, and adverse changes to psychological and political culture of affected social groups. The coded scores for all ongoing episodes of major armed conflict in all independent states in each year are aggregated together to give the global warfare trends presented in Figure 1. Hence there may be some subjectivity and


approximately 30 wars of this magnitude; in the 1980s there were over 175. It is clear that the Cold war era was by no means one of political stability, as is sometimes suggested. Intra-state conflicts, or civil war were responsible for most of the rise. According to Marshall, civil conflicts accounted for almost 70% of the total. Within these the majority (over 65%) were categorised as ‘political’, with a minority being ethnically motivated (although of course this distinction is often difficult to make).

Fig. 1



Source: CSP web-site, 2000 (ACI data).

Fig. 2: Estimated number of deaths in developing country war: 1950s – 1980s



Source: Stewart et. al., 2000, from Sivard.

Estimates of the numbers of deaths in total in developing countries, shown in Figure Two, including those arising from war-related famines, in wars involving more than 1000 deaths per year show a rise from nearly ½million over the 1950s to over 5.5 million in the 1980s.


arbitrariness in the totals shown. In general data on war is unreliable, absent altogether or often manipulated by governments or other observers.

The wars in Asia accounted for most deaths in the 1970s (chiefly the Vietnam war), but since then there has been a steady rise in the incidence of wars in Africa, with a continuous rise in the number of deaths. In the 1980s, African wars accounted for about half the total deaths from war in developing countries, rising to over 80% by 1990-95. Over the period, 1960-1995, about 1.5% of the population on sub-Saharan Africa died as a result of conflict (including deaths from war-related famines), compared with 0.5% in the Middle East, 0.3% in Asia, and 0.1% in both Latin America and Europe. A breakdown of deaths according to the per capita income of the country shows that low-income countries had much the highest incidence (0.5% of their population dying from conflict, 1960-95), lower-middle income country deaths were 0.3% of the population, and upper-middle income countries' deaths were just 0.02% of the 1990 population.

### Conflicts in the 1990s after the Cold War

The early 1990s saw a very high number of conflicts, but in the mid-1990s there was a decline in the total number, including both major and minor conflicts (Figures One and Three).<sup>3</sup> However, there was a resurgence in 1998, with the Kosovo war as well as conflicts in Central Africa.

Fig. 3 Conflicts with over 1000 deaths p.a. in the 1990s by Region



Source: Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1999.

<sup>3</sup> In fact Gurr et al (2001) concluded that there has been a definite and continuous decline: 'The number and magnitude of armed conflicts within and among states have lessened since the early 1990s by nearly half' and describe the current situation as '... a world more peaceful than at any time in the past century'.

Immediately after the end of the Cold War there was a rise in major conflicts in every region except Latin America; this was followed by a fall in each region in the mid-1990s. At the end of the 1990s there was a resurgence of serious conflict in Africa -- in 1998 the number of serious conflicts was at the same level as at the peak in the early 1990s. Africa suffered by far the largest number of major conflicts during the 1990s, with over 40% of the total. However, lesser conflicts (those with deaths of 25 to 1,000, annually, and over 1,000 cumulatively) were concentrated in Asia.

The estimates of refugee numbers (Fig. 4) show parallel changes, with a rapid rise from 1975, particularly in Africa, peaking in 1990, at over 17 million in total, and declining since then in every region except Europe. The 1999 total was almost 12 million. Internal displacement is considerably more serious a problem than international refugees: in Africa there were estimated to be almost eleven million internally displaced people in 2000 (DFID 2000).

The aggregate data thus show some improvement globally in recent years, but still extremely high levels of conflict by historical standards, particularly in Africa where around a quarter of the countries were at war in 1998. War remains a potent threat to the well-being of many children. This is especially the case since most of these wars are internal or civil wars, although generally with international and regional connections. In such wars, damage to civilians (i.e. those who are not actively fighting) is often large. Not only are civilians deliberately targeted, but also the indirect consequences of war -- resulting from economic disruptions caused by war -- affect non-combatants particularly while combatants are in some ways protected by their status. In wars in Africa between 1970 and 1995, civilian deaths were estimated to amount to 95% or more of the total (Sivard 1996). While in international wars, child welfare can increase as a result of wartime planning and rations, as it did, for example, in Britain in the second world war<sup>4</sup>, in civil war children are certain to be seriously adversely affected. The next section will consider how far global forces have been responsible for these trends in conflicts.

## Section 2: Global Influences on Contemporary Conflicts

A rough coincidence in the growing incidence of conflict in the late twentieth century and the rise in globalisation suggests that globalisation may be responsible for the high prevalence of conflict. But the coincidence is not a tight one, since the peak of conflicts (around 1990) by no means coincides with the maximum (post-WTO) influence of globalisation; and a more in-depth analysis of the connections suggest that globalisation is not unidirectional in its effects.

Two views have been advanced on the connection between globalisation and conflict: on the one hand the neo-liberal view is that globalisation reduces the likelihood of conflict because it raises incomes and is likely to lead to spreading democratisation. On the other hand, it is argued that globalisation increases inequality and marginalisation, while increasing emphasis

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<sup>4</sup> Though international war can also damage children, as currently the economic sanctions are causing major problems for children in Iraq.

on local identities occurs as a reaction to cultural homogenisation which makes internal wars more likely.<sup>5</sup> According to Willett, ‘one of the major structural causes of current patterns of violence and conflict is to be found in the general failure of neoliberal policies, underpinning the current phase of globalisation, to deliver more equitable patterns of development to large parts of the world’ (p36).

The first view is undoubtedly over-simple and with little supporting evidence. The association between globalisation – when defined as an increase in the openness of economies – and accelerated economic growth is unproven, with much of the evidence adduced in its favour unconvincing (see, for example, Rodriguez and Rodrik’s critique of some empirical studies which purport to support the hypothesis. See, also, chapter 1). Moreover, there has been a slowdown in world economic growth since 1980, i.e. during decades when globalisation was making most advances. It is true that there has been an increase in the number of countries with democratic systems over these decades. But the new democracies are often very fragile and easily overturned; moreover, democracy does not necessarily prevent conflict and can even promote it, where a winner takes all system involves the suppression of minorities, and political parties divide along ethnic lines.<sup>6</sup> In addition, while the evidence of the rising incidence of conflict associated with accelerating globalisation does not prove causality, it does suggest that to regard globalisation as a *cure* for conflict is unjustified.

At the same time, globalisation has been associated with rising inequality in the majority of individual countries and, it seems, in the world as a whole (Stewart and Berry 1999.; Cornia 1999; Wade 2001, see chapter 1 and chapter 4 of this study). In general, the evidence suggests that more open economies, and ones with greater foreign direct investment tend to have rising inequality (Lundberg and Squire 2000; Wang 2001; Bornschieer and Chase-Dunn, 1995). Moreover, while globalisation has increased growth opportunities in some countries, it has been associated with prolonged stagnation in others. SubSaharan Africa and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have seen falling incomes, each regions where there has been a particularly high incidence of conflict. The falling incomes are, however, in part at least, a consequence of conflict, as well as a cause.

Before further analysis of the connections between globalisation and conflict it is helpful to consider the factors which empirical research has identified as likely causes conflict, and see how these relate to globalisation. In general, analysis of the causes of internal conflict does not come to definitive conclusions that when a particular event or events happen, conflict follows, but rather, as one might expect, that conflict is more likely in some circumstances than in others. To summarise very briefly, exploration of the underlying social and economic

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<sup>5</sup> See Hegre and Geldditsch, 2001. The neo-liberal view is advanced by Russett and Oneal, among others. The alternative view is put forward by the analysis of Duffield, and Willett, among others.

<sup>6</sup> Stewart and O’Sullivan provide examples where democracy has not promoted, and has even promoted conflict. The general evidence suggests that intermediate regimes (with some autocratic and some democratic characteristics) are most likely to be associated with conflict (Hegre et al., 2001). The majority of new democracies fall into this category.

causes of conflict has come to the following conclusions about the circumstances which raise the probability of conflict<sup>7</sup>:

- Long-term economic stagnation is conducive to conflict.
- Countries with a previous history of conflict are particularly likely to have renewed conflict.
- Serious civil conflict of an ethnic nature generally occurs where there are a few major groups divided both culturally and in their political and economic circumstances<sup>8</sup>. If there are very many small groups, no one group can achieve dominance so that alliances are necessary and conflict becomes less likely. A small minority which suffers systematic discrimination may resort to violence but it can usually be easily repressed.
- Violent conflict is less likely under strong autocratic regimes, or in well-established democracies, and more likely in politically intermediate regimes.
- Opportunities for profiting from conflict, by illegal trading (in drugs, diamonds, timber) as well as pillage, tends to make conflict more likely - and to prolong it once it has started - particularly in the context of general impoverishment. Such opportunities depend on the resource situation in the country and the absence of strong government which can suppress or control these activities.
- While there does not appear to be a significant relationship between the extent of *vertical* inequality and the outbreak of conflict, it does seem that the presence of strong *horizontal inequalities* is frequently an important cause of conflict. Horizontal inequalities consist in inequalities among groups, formed - or constructed - according to perceived cultural or geographic differences.<sup>9</sup> The cultural ties binding groups may be religious, ethnic or racial (or some combination). These are not set in stone, but constructed and/or reinforced by 'conflict entrepreneurs' so as better to mobilise people for conflict. Where there are differences in political, economic or social circumstances which coincide with cultural difference, such instigators and orchestrators of violence can mobilise people to fight by promoting and exploiting people's identities.
- Where such horizontal inequalities are consistent across categories (especially where political differences coincide with economic and social), and where they are getting large over time, they are more likely to lead to conflict.

Several factors often suggested as cause of conflict, in fact do *not* seem to be systematically related to it. As well as vertical inequality, which is often suggested as a cause of conflict, which has very little empirical support, as noted above, other frequently suggested causes that have been backed up by the evidence are environmental poverty generally, and water shortages specifically, and the presence of an IMF or World Bank programme.

- Water problems frequently lead to minor localised episodes of violence, but when they are serious at either national or international levels they are generally solved through negotiations rather than war (Swain 2000). Recent examples are the Bangladesh/Indian agreement on the waters of the Ganges, and progress among the ten Nile nations in sharing its water.

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7. Drawn largely from Nafziger et al., 2000; Collier 2000.

<sup>8</sup> Reynal-Querol, 2001; Collier and Hoeffler, 2000.

<sup>9</sup> *Vertical* inequality consists of inequality among individuals or households, and is the normal way we measure inequality, while *horizontal* inequality is inequality among groups. See Stewart 2000.

- More generally the ‘greenwar’ hypothesis – i.e. that environmental problems lead to conflict – a popular hypothesis argued by Kaplan and Homer-Dixon and others, does not appear to have empirical support. Indeed, Fairhead has argued convincingly that environmental riches are more likely to lead to wars than environmental poverty, as people fight to control resources (as suggested above), although the high and rising population pressure on land has been argued convincingly to have been a major factor behind the Rwanda genocide, supported by micro-evidence. (André and Platteau 1995).
- Neither statistical evidence nor case studies support the view that IFI programmes are a major element behind conflict in the short-run (Auvinen and Nafziger 1999; Morrisson 2000). There are sometimes riots following these programmes, but these are relatively minor in scale, and rarely involve physical violence. The International Financial Institutions (IFIs), indeed, are often absent in countries very prone to conflict because of macro-economic disorder and government weakness. Indeed, in some ways, the presence of IFI programmes can be seen as a sign of recovery from violence rather than a cause of it. But in so far as in the longer term IFI programmes weaken governments, as a result of cutbacks in public expenditure, decentralisation, and privatisation, they may lead to conditions liable to and general reductions in economic their programmes do generate conditions which can give rise to violence. Governments lose some of the patronage which may keep a country together, while the fewer the services a government provides, the less people may feel support for it is warranted.

What conclusions can we draw about whether globalisation accentuates forces making for violence from this review of the causes of conflict? At least in the medium term, it is clear that globalisation has not reduced the incidence of conflict. Where globalisation fails to lift incomes and leaves areas in a state of prolonged stagnation, as in much of Africa, the risk of conflict rises. Even in the ‘successful’ areas from the perspective of economic growth, e.g. East Asia, sudden reversals of fortune, as with the 1997 financial crisis, can lead to outbreaks of conflict, as was seen in ethnic riots in Thailand and Malaysia. The unstable situation in Indonesia shows that prolonged openness to global forces, even with a successful outcome, is not sufficient to prevent serious conflict. The rising inequality in many countries is not in itself a cause of conflict, but where it is reflected in sharpening differences between groups (as for example in Peru), it is likely to raise the potential for conflict. The weakening of the state which is often an outcome of liberalising policies also tends to make countries more conflict prone, as can be seen in many African states, of which Sierra Leone and Somalia are examples.

In addition, unregulated global markets for certain commodities – notably diamonds, timber and drugs – have increased both the motivation and the finance for conflict. Globalisation has been accompanied by an increase in informal trade channels (often illegal), and opportunities for money laundering. These make it easier for people to profit from war. The buoyant and generally unregulated world markets for some commodities constitute a major cause of conflict in some cases, and in many more, provide the finance which fuels it. The wars in Colombia and Sierra Leone, for example, cannot be understood outside the context of the world drug and diamonds markets, respectively. In the Congo the central role of outsiders, including multinational companies who have provided generous war-finance, and

neighbouring countries whose troops are heavily involved, arise largely because of the economic gains to be made from control of the natural resources in the Congo, which have immense value in global markets, rather than any fundamental ideological issue, or even any strong concern with identities. Financial opportunities offered by generous aid contracts can similarly serve as an incentive to gain control over governments where there are opportunities for corruption<sup>10</sup>.

During the Cold War, most domestic struggles in developing countries were ideological – crudely a matter of socialism versus capitalism -- strongly supported by the two major powers. With the end of the Cold War, this type of ideological war has become much rarer<sup>11</sup>, and current wars are much more concerned with identity, with struggles for full representation in all aspects of political, economic and social life, as well as with immediate economic gain. Globalisation can strengthen people's adherence to local identities, as the relative anonymity and homogeneity that goes with global citizenship encourages people to hold onto and reinforce local identities, especially among groups that are relatively unsuccessful in the global economy. For the unemployed and the poor, the potential economic losses from conflict are relatively small, their economic and social status is often weak, and there is a potential for psychological as well as economic gains from strengthened local identities, and from conflict. Ambitious leaders can exploit this motivation effectively, especially in failing economies, or among failing groups in more successful economies. Support for many current conflicts - e.g. Rwanda, Burundi, Sierra Leone - clearly reflects this pattern of events (see Nafziger et al, *passim*). Yet there is not a necessary connection with today's globalisation: Hitler's role in Germany in the 1930s can be explained in the same terms.

In summary, while it would be wrong to attribute to global influences major responsibility for all the conflicts in the world today, there is no doubt that the current system of globalisation has contributed to the motivation as well as the finance of many of today's conflicts.

## **Financing conflicts**

Most current conflicts are financed, to a greater or lesser extent, from abroad. There are a range of sources: official aid (sometimes with humanitarian intention, sometimes intended to support the conflict), loans (much from the private sector in the form of export credits), advance payments on resources, revenue from the current sale of commodities (diamonds, drugs, oil, gold, timber etc.) have all played an important role in recent conflicts as illustrated below. The availability of these sources of finance have been important in financing many of the conflicts, as well as in providing individuals with powerful material incentives for undertaking and prolonging conflict. However, while most recent conflicts received considerable resources from the global economy in one way or another, some of the most

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<sup>10</sup>. This was one of the motives for fighting in Sierra Leone (Reno, 2000).

<sup>11</sup> Though there remain some examples: e.g. the struggle in Nepal.

severe episodes were largely self-financed, such as Uganda in the mid-1980s, the Rwanda massacre, and the current developments in Somalia.

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**EXTERNAL SOURCES OF FINANCE FOR SOME RECENT CONFLICTS**

Country	official aid <sup>a</sup>	military aid <sup>a</sup>	Non-military aid <sup>a</sup>	loans private, for arms and other <sup>b</sup>	natural resources advances <sup>a</sup>	natural resources current sales <sup>b</sup>	from diaspora <sup>c</sup>
Angola	West, S.Africa <sup>b</sup> Cuba <sup>a</sup>		Some	Considerable	large, for oil; and diamonds	oil and diamonds	?
Afghanistan	USSR <sup>a</sup> ; West <sup>b</sup> Pakistan; Saudi Arabia. NGOs; Islamic community		Some	Some	finance for oil pipe line.	heroin; smuggling manufactured products	?
Cambodia	some: China, West		Limited	Some	Some	timber	little
Colombia	US		US	Large	No	cocaine	?
Liberia	West		Limited	Some	?	timber, rubber, iron ore	?
Mozambique	S.Africa; Cuba; West		limited in war	Large	?	?	?
Nicaragua	Russia; Cuba; US		some	Large	No	?	?
Rwanda	some		from West and IFIs <sup>a</sup>	Limited	No	no	little
Sierra Leone	limited		From West initially; later little <sup>a</sup>	Some	Some	diamonds	little
Somalia	limited		limited	Limited	No	little	significant
Sri Lanka	some <sup>a</sup> ; (1980s) <sup>b</sup>	India	from West and IFIs - considerable <sup>a</sup>	Some	No	limited	considerable
Sudan	substantial		substantial, West	Substantial	No	little; oil?	little
Uganda	limited		limited	Limited	No	little	little

a. Mainly to government; b; to govt. and rebels.

### Section 3: The Economic and Social Consequences of Conflicts

Wars affect people directly through physical attacks. They are also affected less directly, but generally equally or more seriously, as a result of the macro and meso economic consequences of conflict which can have the effect of destroying entitlements in a pervasive way, often leading to widespread starvation and diseases. In this section we briefly review some findings on the ways households are affected by the economic dislocations caused by conflict.<sup>12</sup>

Investigation into the economic and social consequences of war shows that a great many of the costs are *indirect*, i.e. they are not the result of the actual fighting but rather of the economic and social consequences of the conflict. These costs result in *entitlement failures* (using Sen's nomenclature). Entitlements represent individuals' and households' command over resources. Entitlements not only include money incomes arising from the market, such as through employment, but also *direct entitlements*, (subsistence production), *public entitlements*, (publicly provided goods), *civic entitlements*, (provided by communities or NGOs) and *non-legal entitlements* (goods taken in an unlawful way, through theft, illegal trade, etc.) Extreme human suffering results when entitlements fall below what is needed for subsistence. For children, negative impacts on access to food, health and education services can be fatal, or have long term debilitating effects. During war economic changing conditions can affect each type of entitlement quite dramatically

There are complex interactions between events associated directly with war (fighting, movement of people, deaths, physical destruction, international embargoes, military expenditures) and the macro, meso and micro economy which affect the various entitlements. Despite serious methodological problems about identifying precise effects, statistical analysis and case studies point to some general findings about economic behaviour during in internal wars<sup>13</sup>.

- Economic growth is almost always negatively affected, sometimes dramatically so, such as in the wars in Mozambique and Nicaragua. The agricultural sector is usually particularly badly hit, especially if people were forced to move in the course of the conflict.
- Exports are invariably negatively affected. This stems from the general fall in production, a shift towards domestic markets, and disruptions in international markets. While foreign lending or aid sometimes allows import capacity to be sustained, foreign exchange is diverted towards military expenditure and essential consumption goods, leading to an acute shortage of foreign exchange for economic inputs. In Nicaragua this was one of the main causes of a collapse in production.
- The formal sector particularly is usually badly hit, while activities switch to the informal activities, some legal, some illegal.
- The share of government expenditure allocated to the military invariably rose, and mostly the

<sup>12</sup> This section draws heavily on a recently completed study of the economic and social consequences of conflict (Stewart, Fitzgerald and Associates, 2000). The study included case studies of Afghanistan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Uganda.

<sup>13</sup> The methods used included comparisons with similar countries not at war, and comparisons of war performance with previous performance of the economy when not at war.

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share of social expenditure fell. Public services fell in most cases, dramatically in countries where government revenue collapses, for example in Uganda and Afghanistan. Yet both Nicaragua and Mozambique gave increased priority to social expenditure compared with the pre-war situation. These countries managed to sustain government revenue, while in other countries it fell sharply. Budget deficits rose, and inflation generally accelerated, but in most countries at war in recent decades it remained quite modest, and hyperinflation was rare.

- Every study of countries at war shows *heavy development costs* as each type of capital was subject to destruction (including physical plant, land, human resources, social and organisational capital), and new investment was reduced. But some new forms of capital emerged, including social and organisational, with new informal systems of banking, and quasi-government structures developing in rebel held areas.

These economic effects of war lead to a reduction in some forms of entitlements, with some compensating effects on other forms:

- Market entitlements generally fall because of the decline of formal sector production. Rising inflation – associated with the rising budget deficits - further undermine real entitlements.
- Direct entitlements, however, rise in some areas, but not where the war is such as to make production difficult or impossible (as in the areas extensively mined in Afghanistan and Mozambique; and in the central war zone in Uganda).
- As noted above, public entitlements to essential services – health, education etc. – are mostly adversely affected, especially in those countries where tax capacity collapsed (e.g. Uganda). But in a few cases, a determined government manages to preserve and even increase these entitlements (e.g. Nicaragua).
- In some cases civic entitlements partially compensate for losses: they have been important for example in Sri Lanka, where there are strong local NGO and community systems of support, including from the rebel authorities. And also in Afghanistan during the 1990s where foreign NGOs attempted to provide services where the collapsed government could not. But again where the wars were most fierce, the ability of communities and NGOs to respond was reduced.
- Non-legal entitlements invariably rose: but generally, while there were gainers as a result there were equally losers, who often suffered physical harm as well as loss of commodities. However, in some cases new sources of trade and gain emerged (as with poppy production in Afghanistan) providing net additions to entitlements.

An indication of the overall costs of the wars is given by comparing infant mortality rates in countries at war with the rates that these same countries would have achieved if they had followed the trend of the countries in their region that were not at war.

The range shown in Table 1 indicates the large variation in experience of the impact of war. One critical factor is the nature of the government. The three governments where infant mortality rates improved relative to the regional trend, even during war, were all fairly strong governments, determined to maintain and even extend social services during the conflict. In contrast, other governments are or become very weak and cannot sustain services (e.g. Uganda in the 1970s and

1980s), while some deliberately reduce services to the ‘enemy’ territory, such as Sudan. External reactions also play a role – for example, the sanctions against Iraq have raised infant deaths, while in Mozambique food aid played an important part in preventing mass starvation. Refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran permitted massive emigration from Afghanistan during the fighting.

**Table 1:** Estimates of total costs of wars in terms of additional infant deaths

Country	War years <sup>a</sup>	Additional cumulative infant deaths as a % of 1995 pop. <sup>c</sup>	Numbers of additional infant deaths over war years
Angola	1974-95	0.73	80300
Burundi	1987-95	0.13	7800
Ethiopia	1973-95	1.57	879200
Liberia	1984-95	1.76	36900
Mozambique	1980-95	impr.	not applic.
Sierra Leone	1990-95	0.57	22800
Somalia	1987-95	0.31	29760
Sudan	1983-95	0.22	59400
Uganda	1970-90	2.03	385700
El Salvador	1978-95	Impr	not applic.
Guatemala	1965-95	2.03	not applic.
Nicaragua	1977-93	impr.	21200
Iran	1977-93	0.37	236800
Iraq	1979-91	1.5	300000

<sup>a</sup> The war-affected period is defined as the year preceding the outbreak of conflict and the five years following the estimated end of the war.

Source: Stewart, Fitzgerald and Associates, 2001.

## Section 4: The Impact of Wars on Children

Children suffer along with their families from the general loss in entitlements, and often in a worse way because they require more from the health and education sectors, and depend more on reasonable nutrition, for their physical survival and growth. War also frequently causes the movement and break-up of households, with loss of fathers, and sometimes mothers too, leading to the abandonment of children. Various survival or coping mechanisms that people adopt in the face of war also impinge on children - these may involve sending children away from home, children working, including their becoming soldiers. On top of these physical and material deprivations, children also suffer psychological trauma from the events they observe or endure.

Several writers have pointed to the fact that even though many lose, some people and groups gain from war - as Keen puts it war has important functions for some people.<sup>14</sup> These arise out of new profit making opportunities, the ‘legitimacy’ of theft, pillage and rape that is conferred by war, the breakdown of old hierarchies, etc. Doubtless, some children also gain - in status and independence, for example. Indeed, two children led an army in Myanmar. Some acquire opportunities for trading

<sup>14</sup> Keen, 1998.

lucratively<sup>15</sup>. They may be the recipients of food aid. But most of the gains from war described by Keen are monopolised by adults: for children, the impact of civil war is mostly negative, sometimes horrendously so.

### *The implications for children of the economic effects of wars*

The impacts of wars described in the previous section fall on children as well as adults; they are likely to be particularly adversely affected by some of the changes. For example, the universal negative impact on food production per capita is likely to contribute to reduced child nutrition; reduced availability of medical services is particularly deleterious for children, especially when vaccinations are interrupted and worsening education access affects the future of the children concerned as well as their immediate well-being.

Table 2 shows changes in education, food availability, and health services at the end of the war compared with the start of the war, in the countries worst affected by wars in the last quarter of a century. It must be noted that this comparison does not pick up what happened during the war – often war causes some adverse changes followed by some recovery as happened, for example, in Uganda. The variability of experience is striking. In primary enrolment, for example, some countries saw an *increase* in enrolment, while there were marked declines in Angola, Mozambique, and Burundi. A survey in Mozambique showed that more than one third of children had experienced damage or destruction of their school during the war (Raundalen and Dyregrov ). By 1989 45% of all primary schools had been closed or wrecked, and in the worst affected provinces 80% of children were deprived of schools (Graham-Brown, 1991). The negative impact on calories per head was almost universal. In some cases, the declines were extremely severe and to levels well below those needed for good nutrition: for example, daily calories per head fell to below 1700 in Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Afghanistan. Medical services, measured by doctors per population, worsened in two thirds of the cases.

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<sup>15</sup> See Chingono, 2001.

**Table 2: The availability of basic needs goods and services during conflict**Error! Bookmark not defined.

Country	War Years	Primary School Enrollment (% Gross)		Daily Calories per head		Population per Doctor ('000)	
		Start of War (or latest year)	End of War (or latest year)	Start of War (or latest year)	End of War (or latest year)	Start of War (or latest year)	End War (or latest year)
Angola	1975-95	174 (1980)	88 (1991)	2071 (1970)*	1904 (1995)*	13.15 (1965)	14.29 (1990)^
Burundi	1988-95	52 (1985)	70 (1992)	2025 (1980)	1741 (1995)	21.1 (1984)^	16.67 (1993)^
Ethiopia	1974-92	16 (1970)	23 (1992)	1711 (1970)	1610 (1992)	84.85 (1976)	25.0 (1993)
Liberia	1985-95	35 (1986)**	n/a	2398 (1980)	1640 (1992)	9.2 (1984)	9.34 (1990)^
Mozambique	1981-90	99 (1980)	67 (1990)	1953 (1980)	1680 (1992)	36.9 (1981)	50.0 (1990)^
Sierra Leone	1991-95	50 (1990)	48 (1991)	1895 (1990)	1694 (1992)	14.29 (1990)	n/a
Somalia	1988-95	25 (1985)	n/a	1788 (1980)	1499 (1992)	16.08 (1984)	14.29 (1990)^
Sudan	1984-95	50 (1985)	54 (1995)	2244 (1980)	2310 (1995)	10.1 (1984)	11.11 (1990)
Uganda	1971-87	38 (1970)	76 (1987)	2294 (1970)	2159 (1992)	9.21 (1970)	25.0 (1990)^
El Salvador	1979-91	79 (1979)	79 (1991)	1827 (1970)	2663 (1992)	3.22 (1980)	1.56 (1990)^
Guatemala	1966-95	50 (1965)	84 (1995)	2100 (1970)	2298 (1995)*	3.83 (1965)	2.27 (1990)^
Nicaragua	1978-88	84 (1978)	101 (1990)	2411 (1970)	2297 (1990)	1.59 (1977)	1.67 (1990)^
Iran	1978-89	101 (1977)	110 (1990)	2005 (1970)	2647 (1990)	2.56 (1977)	3.14 (1990)
Iraq	1980-88	113 (1980)	111 (1990)	2260 (1970)	2121 (1992)	1.8 (1980)	1.81 (1990)^
Lebanon	1982-90	111 (1980)	118 (1991)	2743 (1980)	3317 (1992)	0.51 (1981)	0.67 (1990)^
Afghanistan	1978-95	29 (1978)	49 (1995)	2082 (1970)	1523 (1992)	28.7 (1977)	6.43 (1990)^
Cambodia	1970-89	30 (1970)	118 (1990)	2715 (1970)	2215 (1990)	22.41 (1965)	25.0 (1990)^
Vietnam	1965-75	n/a	119 (1975)	2328 (1970)	2053 (1980)	5.34 (1976)	5.62 (1977)

Source: Stewart, FitzGerald and Associates, 2000, Vol. One. Chapter Four.

Some of the reactions which help protect adults from the worst effects - e.g. migration, change in household composition, moves into subsistence production, the introduction of rationing, the increased prevalence of illegal activities - may also provide some protection for some children. But many households have no access to these forms of adjustment, while some adjustments impinge especially negatively on children (such as sending children to other parts of the country, movement which deprives them of schooling). Below we provide a more detailed account of how children have been affected by wars based on the evidence of micro studies.

### ***Factors affecting children's well-being during war***

As well as the physical deprivations following from the economic effects of conflict, war has many other grave consequences for children's survival, development and well-being. Frequently it leads to mass displacement, the diminution of extended family and community networks and ties, and fundamental changes in both household structure and composition. Throughout history children have been recruited into, and casualties of, armed conflict. However, conflicts of the kind that prevail today present a special risk to children, in part because of the growth in *intra*-state hostilities, and also because of changes in weaponry and the spread of psychological and economic warfare.

The fact that most modern conflicts are internal presents an increased risk to children. In many conflicts states target their instruments of violence against their own citizens.<sup>16</sup> The categories 'civilian' and 'combatant' merge, with children, their families and communities appearing as both victims and perpetrators of violence. Fighting takes place in homes, fields and streets, and involves both public and personalised acts of brutality. As a result, civilians (including children) are estimated to account for 80-90% of total casualties (Eshete and O'Reilly-Calthrop 2000).

In such situations, children are jeopardised not merely as random casualties but also, as active agents of violence and as representatives of a new generation, they are themselves the direct objects of attack. Children may be tortured in order to force parents to relinquish information. In the general climate of lawlessness and impunity that often prevails during political conflict, many children are exposed to extremely high levels of criminal and domestic violence—assault, murder, rape, physical and sexual abuse, and armed robbery.

In many of the studies of children in war, they are regarded as homogeneous victims and studied in isolation from the wider environmental or structural conditions affecting them. But the social structural and cultural dynamics of war have a profound influence on both the hazards to children and their responses, while children's situation is greatly affected by their age and gender. Families and communities play a major role in mediating risk, coping and resilience in children. Families can help in problem solving, motivation and coping mechanisms.<sup>17</sup> Studies suggest that children with strong affective ties are more resilient than

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<sup>16</sup> As in Burundi where civilians were attacked by both Tutsi and Hutu units( Sommers, M. 2000 10.02).

<sup>17</sup> McCallin, M. a. F., Shirley, 1991; Turton et al., 1990.

those without.<sup>18</sup> Feeling supported and having guidance and reassurance promotes self-esteem and allows children to have a sense of hope.

Moreover, most studies of war-affected children tend to concentrate almost exclusively on the physical or psychological effects of exposure to highly traumatic events and experiences. Yet most armed struggles are less comprehensive and brutal than, for example, events in Cambodia or Rwanda. In fact, the majority of war-affected children do not live in communities subjected to mass genocide but in areas of entrenched repression and low-intensity conflict in which fighting is sporadic rather than continuous and shifts from one location to another. In such settings, military strategies commonly focus on forced relocation and forced labour, requisitioning of goods, destruction of productive assets such as irrigation systems, and despoilment, burning or confiscation of stored food and crops, curfews. Warfare frequently occurs in areas prone to high rates of criminal and domestic violence. In these situations children may be more exposed to inter-personal than to political violence. For example, a comparison of two cohorts of youth in South African townships, one that had experienced political violence and another that had not, showed that violence in the form of assaults, intimidation and harassment was more common than political violence for both. Moreover, exposure to violence per se was not necessarily greater during a period of political unrest, though, there were differences in the perpetrators of violence, with security forces and political organisation members more often reported to be the instigators (Turton, et al 1991). Children themselves commonly report crime, family discord, sexual abuse, lack of security, mobility or space, loss of school access, poor sanitation and hygiene as more troubling to them than violent clashes between opposing political factions. Indeed, of those children who suffer serious or long-lived psychological or emotional distress as a result of war, a significant proportion have not experienced a major misfortune but prolonged deleterious circumstances (Ressler 1992). Such circumstances include grinding poverty, diminished social interaction, forced migration, continuous discrimination and humiliation, loss of security and reduced opportunities for education and health.

### *Changing weaponry and military tactics*

Changes in military technology and practice have been an important contributory factor in rising civilian child casualties in recent decades. Three important aspects of recent conflicts should be noted. First, the low cost of small arms has resulted in their proliferation in most parts of the world.<sup>19</sup> Especially in the post-cold war era, the trade in small arms, which is linked to an increasingly lucrative and globalised black economy, has served both to fuel and sustain conflict. The use of small arms has drawn ever-increasing numbers of children into combat, for children can carry, clean, reload and fire modern light arms with ease.

Second, the widespread dissemination of anti-personnel landmines has led to casualties which are particularly concentrated among children. The special representative of the UN Secretary-

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<sup>18</sup> See, for example, Dawes, 1992; Werner, and Smith, 1982, 1992

<sup>19</sup> Eshete and O'Reilly-Calthrop (2000) report that of the 47 most recent conflicts, 43 have been fought with light weapons

General for Children and Armed Conflict estimates that 800 children globally are killed or maimed every month by landmines (<http://www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/ffaq.htm>). It is estimated that landmines are to be found in some 70 countries (Sutton-Redner 1998). Forced migration multiplies landmine casualties because the displaced are unlikely to be aware of their whereabouts during flight or on arrival in an unfamiliar location. Children may be targeted specifically, as when brightly coloured mines are laid close to schools.

A third factor is the importance of sexual violence as a weapon of war, particularly in civil wars. Children, especially girls, are often targeted directly, as in Tanzania where adolescent girls between 12 and 18 reported the highest incidence of sexual abuse among Burundian refugees (Nduna and Goodyear 1997). Children are also badly affected when adult family members are involved, as in Rwanda, where war widows who were raped during the genocide are now dying in large numbers of AIDS-related illnesses, leaving large numbers of orphans without adult support. Some war-affected families sell their daughters into brothels or other forms of prostitution. For example, in South East Asia, the sex industry has been sustained for decades by young girls from impoverished and conflict-ridden countries such as Vietnam, Cambodia, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. Children born as a result of forced pregnancy are among the most vulnerable of all, sometimes subject to infanticide, or to neglect and discrimination (Carpenter 2000).

### *Age, gender and ethnicity*

‘Children’, of course, are not a homogeneous group: they are differentiated by age, gender and social, religious or ethnic status and the impacts of war vary according to these factors. Clearly, children who form part of weak and targeted ethnicities are more vulnerable. For example, a study of the impact of the struggle in South Africa showed that black children were more likely to be adversely affected than white (Jupp 1987).

Some differences in the gender and age impact are due their different roles and vulnerabilities, some to family survival strategies, including the perception that some children within the family are more resilient or more expendable than others for economic, social or cultural reasons (Boyden 1994). A 1997 survey of Kabul in Afghanistan found that 72% of all ordnance victims and 53% of all mine victims were male and under 18 years of age, the rates for girls being just 10% and 5% respectively because boys were more likely to be outside their homes than girls, whether for work or play (Sellick 1998). In rural Afghanistan also males over 15 were found to be far more prone to mine-related motor disabilities than younger boys, because of the tasks they were involved in—which included canal cleaning, irrigation of land, cultivation and driving.<sup>20</sup>

Whether through abandonment, sale, or militarisation, some children may be expelled from the household to reduce the economic burden on the household, generate income, or create political alliances that are critical for the security of the domestic unit. For instance, families

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<sup>20</sup> Handicap International, June 1996, ‘A Household Survey in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan: Disability Prevalence, Rehabilitation Needs, Oral Polio Vaccine Coverage’ Report cited in Eshete and O’Reilly-Calthrop.

may place an elder son in the military as a safeguard against extortion, rape, intimidation, or theft. Teenage daughters, on the other hand, as noted above, are susceptible to trafficking, with domestic labour and prostitution being important sources of remitted income during periods of severe economic hardship and crisis.

The nature and degree of risk varies also with age. Younger children in particular clearly lack the ability to act independently, and the experience and power to ensure their own protection. They also have particular physical susceptibilities. When small children step on a landmine, they are more likely to be killed or injured severely, simply because they are short and their vital organs are close to the body's surface. Poor hygiene, sanitation and nutrition, due to a break down in health supplies and services or overcrowding in hastily established refugee settlements, are a major threat to infants and very young children who have not acquired the immunities necessary to overcome infection. In the very young in particular, high mortality is often linked to the severe hardships faced by women during warfare. Thus, a notable excess in deaths of infants below the age of two in the Democratic Republic of Congo was linked to obstetric problems, maternal malnutrition and mortality (International Rescue Committee 2000). In Mozambique, the war in the Gorongosa region disrupted the elaborate social relations and cultural practices surrounding breast feeding and weaning. Women were unable to sustain traditional practices that had ensured a two-year gap between births, and this led to early weaning and soaring infant mortality.<sup>21</sup> On the other hand, children between the ages of three and seven—who, while unable to keep up are still too heavy to be carried—are at greater risk than infants of becoming separated from adults during flight from war zones.

Older children and adolescents may be more resilient physically and have greater capacity to manage risk, but they are still the most liable to sexual violence, militarisation and forced labour.<sup>22</sup> Simply because they are more mobile and independent, older children are more likely than younger ones to experience the hostilities that are a part of daily routine in a war zone. Thus, in Northern Ireland, stop and search powers resulted in the regular harassment of children at checkpoints (Save the Children Fund UK 1996). And, as in the Occupied Territories, emergency legislation often leads to older children being detained without charge and to interrogations without the presence of a legal representative and/or parent. Both during arrest and in detention there is a high risk of sexual abuse, torture and other forms of ill treatment. Many detained children remain missing and unaccounted for after conflict has ceased.

### ***Child soldiers***

<sup>21</sup> [www.childreninadversity.org](http://www.childreninadversity.org). Report from the working group on children affected by armed conflict.

<sup>22</sup> Based on research in Albania and Kosovo from 1999 to 2000, The Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children (2001, p10) claim adolescents, more than younger children, bore the brunt of many of the offences associated with armed conflict.

Large numbers (estimated at around 350,000) of adolescents and even younger children—mostly boys, but also girls—also become directly involved in armed struggle in both government and rebel forces (DFID, 2000). Young conscripts tend to perform ancillary tasks, as porters (carrying arms, ammunition and loot), messengers, intelligence gatherers, cooks and weapon-cleaners to support the military enterprise. Some occupy combat functions, as soldiers, guards or political activists, and are responsible for patrolling and manning checkpoints, the laying, detection and clearing of land mines and bearing arms in battle.

Children are drawn into combat through many routes. Since the young tend to be particularly obedient and loyal and have a special talent for escaping surveillance, their recruitment, whether by force or choice, is an overt strategy of many armed forces. Abduction and forced recruitment of children has been reported as common in Angola (Honwana nd) , Liberia and Northern Uganda (Zack-Williams, 1999) and Sierra Leone<sup>23</sup>. Young people also join up voluntarily. Their motives are varied. In Angola, many children equated violence with power and the reasons given for enlistment included political commitment, ethnic loyalties, peer pressure, food, and the opportunity to engage in looting (Honwana nd). Economic necessity was a major motivating factor among adolescent boys in Afghanistan (Sellick 1998). In Sierra Leone, joining the military provides protection from starvation, as well as access to clothing, weapons and companionship. The risk of direct engagement in hostilities is likely to be greater for children than for adults because they are regarded as more expendable, are often required to undertake the most dangerous tasks and are less well trained and equipped.

### *Displacement*

Many families see evacuation from the war zone as the best option for survival. It is estimated that some 40 million people globally are at present displaced by conflict or human rights violations—mostly in Africa and Asia, and mostly within their own countries, of which eighty percent are women and children<sup>24</sup>. Only a small minority of the displaced population globally is in stable, organised refugee facilities in countries at peace. The vast majority are internally displaced, living in conditions of extreme poverty and insecurity, forced to relocate regularly, sometimes even daily. Most internally displaced persons are exposed to high levels of crime, disappearances, forced recruitment , and trafficking of women and girls. Many experience antagonism from or eviction by local people, as well as harassment, detention and deportation by the authorities.

For children, displacement signifies separation from much of what is familiar and cherished, especially when parted from their families and community. It can lead to a loss of a sense of belonging, and identity. Separation from spiritual leaders, traditional healers, cultural practices and culturally valued sites as a result of displacement can make it impossible to carry out ceremonies and rites that are fundamental to forgiveness, atonement, healing, recovery and reconciliation.

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<sup>23</sup> It is claimed that in order to foreclose the possibility of return to their families, children in Sierra Leone were forced to execute the adult members of their own and neighbouring families (Smillie ad Gberie, 2000).

<sup>24</sup> By the Machel Review.

## *Separation*

In the huge population upheavals that occur during armed conflict, a large number of children become separated from their families. Children separated from parents and other adult kin constitute an important feature of warfare, particularly in those war-affected areas of sub-Saharan Africa that also experience high levels of HIV/AIDS, where large numbers of adults have died. According to Save the Children Fund US, there are today more than a million children separated or orphaned globally due to political violence. This is certainly an underestimate as only registered cases are included. The war in Mozambique represented one of the largest known incidents of separation, with 200,000 children being left without families, while some 100,000 children were orphaned, separated or disabled during the genocide in Rwanda (anon 1995).

Child separation may be planned, as when children are abandoned or sent by their families to relatives, residential institutions, refugee, or transit camps, for their own safety or to receive food rations and other benefits. Unplanned separation may result from the detention or death of parents or when children are left behind during the panic of attack and flight. Some children choose to run away, usually to live on the streets or join an armed unit. In most cases more boys are identified as separated than girls, in part due to the belief that they are better able to fend for themselves. In Burundi, for example, girls escaped with parents while boys escaped alone. The survival of separated children is precarious. Babies and infants in particular are completely dependent on the good will and care of others. Older children and adolescents, many of whom are caring for younger siblings, must often travel great distances to reach safety. By 1991 as many as 17,000 unaccompanied Sudanese boys, some just seven to eight years old, had trekked all the way to Ethiopia (Radda Barnen 1994). They had to cross wide and fast-flowing rivers, keep out of sight of soldiers, carry enough food and water for the trip and avoid theft and abuse. Many died along the way.

## **Section 5: Policies to Protect Children from and During War**

We are dealing with a very large arena. Avoidance of major conflicts, or bringing them to an end, are clearly the best ways of protecting children. But, failing that, it is essential to protect children as far as possible when conflict does occur, and this means policies directed at reducing the human costs of war generally, as well as policies addressed specifically towards children. Policy objectives, therefore, include:

1. The prevention of conflict;
2. Contributing to the ending of conflict;
3. Bringing about sustained peace and post-conflict reconstruction;
4. The protection of children during conflict.

Policies include both those of national and international actors - with national actors, governments, NGOs, community organisations, generally being the most important - indeed

systematically adverse national policies can reduce or eliminate the positive impact of any international action. However, given that the focus of the project of which this is a part is on globalisation, in this paper we will concentrate on *international* action. There is considerable overlap between policies towards all four objectives, especially the first three all of which must try to understand and address the reasons for conflict. However, somewhat different policies are needed for protecting children during conflict.

### ***Preventing and ending conflict and sustaining peace***

Special policies are needed towards all countries vulnerable to conflict (including of course, those actually in the middle of conflict). Vulnerable countries include all low income countries because of the heavy incidence of conflict among low-income countries; and all countries which have had serious conflict over the previous quarter of a century because of the evidence that this is one of the major factors predisposing to further conflict<sup>25</sup>.

Both domestic and international policies towards conflict prevention need to address the causes of conflict noted earlier (section II). Three areas are of particular importance:

- economic stagnation
- large, consistent and rising horizontal inequalities.
- strong private incentives for conflict.

The three are connected: economic stagnation increases private incentives to fight, since peace-time opportunities are poor. Unemployment of young men, in particular, means that war offers them possibilities of economic and psychological gain.<sup>26</sup> Large horizontal inequalities may also lead to particularly poor economic prospects among groups that face discrimination reducing the opportunity costs of war thereby increasing their private incentives to fight.

### ***Economic stagnation***

Vulnerable countries tend to have poor economic performance, partly *because* of their vulnerability. Political uncertainty, and war itself, put off investors, and reduce expenditures on development-promoting activities, such as in human capital and infrastructure, while also encouraging mobile resources (human and financial) to leave the country. Hence, it is extremely difficult to overcome the economic stagnation without first tackling the conflict. Nonetheless, something can be done.

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<sup>25</sup> The reasons for the high incidence of recidivism are disputed. Some argue that previous war experience entrenches hostility between the parties which is easily revived. But Walter has provided empirical support for the view that it is not the existence or characteristics of previous wars, but political and economic conditions present before subsequent wars that determine recurrence. High recurrence therefore occurs because the conditions which initially led to conflict did not change substantially, post-conflict (see Walter 2001).

<sup>26</sup> Keen has emphasised the psychological benefits of fighting for youths in Sierra Leone (see Keen ).

This is not the place to go over the vast literature on policies towards preventing economic stagnation. One simple requirement, however, is additional external resources, through aid, debt relief, improved markets and stable commodity prices. Yet politically unstable countries, countries at war, and post-war countries, find it especially difficult to meet the conditions which entitle them to external support or debt relief. The new approach to policy conditionality - that since it does not seem to work, the best way of distributing aid is to give it to countries that already have a proven track record of 'good' policies is particularly problematic for war-affected countries who almost by definition have no such track record. Countries vulnerable to conflict, those suffering actual conflict, and post-conflict countries should be given special aid status, with relaxed conditionality and immediate debt relief through the heavily indebted poor countries initiative (HIPC). Yet the present HIPC conditions make it almost impossible for war-affected countries to benefit. According to the World Bank HIPC unit, 'roughly a dozen countries which have yet to qualify for HIPC debt relief are either currently engaged in, or have recently ended, internal or cross-border armed conflict, or are struggling with severe governance problems which make it impossible to move forward with HIPC assistance'.<sup>27</sup> Debt relief is a particularly appropriate response to post-war situations. During war countries typically accumulate substantial debt, much of it war-related, to buy arms or meet short-term consumption requirements. Little of the borrowing goes towards economic projects that might generate potential means of servicing or repayment of debt. Comparisons of the debt of war-affected countries with that of other HIPC countries shows higher indebtedness for the conflict-affected - the ratio of debt to exports was 8.95 for conflict-affected countries in 2000 compared with 5.25 for non-conflict HIPC countries.<sup>28</sup> Those countries which have just ended wars urgently need untied foreign exchange resources for reconstruction.

Falling commodity prices have been an important source of economic stagnation, especially among African economies, where the loss in foreign exchange earnings due to declining commodity prices since 1970 has exceeded all the aid received. There is no willingness to put this on the international agenda - indeed it was never effectively tackled even in the more promising climate of the 1970s. However, for conflict-vulnerable countries, there is a strong case for developing compensatory aid to offset downward movements in commodity prices.

As shown earlier, wars tend to be associated with economic regress. In so far as economic stagnation was a predisposing condition for war, the situation thus worsens during wars. The international community tends to reinforce these trends, since there is a general presumption among the development community that aid should be devoted to humanitarian relief, not development because of the obvious need for humanitarian support and because it is believed development expenditure is not possible during war. Yet in these long wars, economic activity, of course, continues, and to put development on hold worsens the negative economic impact of war. International support for development is especially important, given the diversion of government towards military activities, so that their

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<sup>27</sup> (HIPC 2001)

<sup>28</sup> , Their relative debt would appear even greater if one allowed for the fact that a good deal of war-affected countries' borrowing is short-term, private and unguaranteed, for which data are generally deficient.

economic activities invariably decline. Such support is also needed to help protect people's livelihoods during war (see below).

### *Horizontal inequalities*

National policies dominate in influencing the evolution of horizontal inequalities. But international actors can play an important role in monitoring developments, and in the deployment of aid. In practice, the international community has done very little about this, leaving the outcome to market or government decisions.

Market outcomes often accentuate horizontal inequalities, where privileged groups start with greater education and assets, and are thereby able to exploit the market most effectively. To correct this, action is needed to facilitate market participation by weaker groups. One essential requirement is to ensure the spread of education and training. In addition, asset and credit policies, government and aid contracts can be designed to ensure that all groups benefit fairly.

Aid, including humanitarian aid, is often filtered through governments which may distribute it in a way that reinforces horizontal inequalities - as for example in the Sudan where benefits of aid have been largely monopolised in the North, or in Uganda where they have largely been concentrated in the South. World Bank public expenditure reviews are concerned with efficiency, and increasingly with poverty reduction, but do not take into account the implications for horizontal equity. Making horizontal inequality an explicit consideration of World Bank and other aid programmes should be an important part of conflict prevention. Unequal political participation is a particularly important aspect of horizontal inequality. Yet the usual political conditionality imposed by the international community<sup>29</sup> - democratic structures and political parties - does not contribute to reducing such inequalities, and in some circumstances, may reinforce them. Thus where one group forms a numerical majority, the result of democracy can be dictatorship by the majority with discrimination against minorities legitimated by democratic structures. Moreover, political parties often use ethnic division as a mechanism for gaining support, worsening divisions within society.<sup>30</sup> Inclusive government structures are needed, not majoritarian democracies. This means that all major groups within a society should be included in government structures, at all levels, including cabinet level, elected representatives, civil service, police and army. The political dialogue conducted by the international community in conflict prone countries should thus move beyond simplistic advocacy of democracy to allow for horizontal equity in political systems.

### *Private incentives*

Economic as well as political motives inspire conflict. Possibly becoming more important once conflict is underway, private economic gains from war can act as an incentive to start

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<sup>29</sup> See Robinson, 1993; Stokke, 1995.

<sup>30</sup> See Stewart and O'Sullivan 1999.

and then prolong the war. Some of these economic incentives are negative - poor alternative economic opportunities associated with low per capita incomes and slow growth, lack of employment opportunities and lack of education. The positive incentives relate to the opportunities for making money out of war, often in illegal ways -- drug production and trafficking, sales of commodities like diamonds, arms dealing, looting etc.,-- all of which tend to be greatly enlarged by war and facilitated by the widening global opportunities. Control over and profiting from humanitarian aid acts as another type of incentive.

Policies to reduce these incentives for undertaking and prolonging violence include both the provision of alternative opportunities (employment, education, diverse production opportunities), and controls over the war-related opportunities. The war-related opportunities not only act as a strong private incentive to participate in conflict, but also help finance it, as shown in the earlier matrix on global financing of conflict. The final section of this paper considers a range of global policies that are intended to reduce these sources of war-finance and the opportunities to profit out of war.

### ***Policies to protect children during conflict***

Some policies are specifically directed towards children: but others, probably of greater importance for children's well-being, are designed to protect livelihoods and social service provision generally. We will first consider the general policies, and then the specific ones.

#### ***a. International policies to protect livelihoods***<sup>31</sup>

The exploration of economic behaviour during war, and especially the variations in behaviour and outcomes, shows that economic and social policies of both governments and donors can be designed to reduce the economic and human costs of conflict, *even during the conflict*. Policies should be constructed so as to lessen the human and development costs of war. The objective is not simply to sustain livelihoods in the short-term, but to reduce medium-term vulnerability and dependence by creating conditions in which households (and society) can become self-sustaining. Understanding the functions of war also sheds new light on policy design. Some well-intentioned policies may actually contribute to the functionality of war, but others may counter it.

The international community veers between the judgement that the standard adjustment package should be introduced and the view that adjustment should be postponed until the war is ended. Neither view is correct. On the one hand, economies do function during war, and appropriate macro and meso-policies are needed, designed to maintain macro-stability and sustain entitlements; on the other, conventional conditionality packages are generally not appropriate during a major conflict, as the price system functions poorly, and the inevitable wartime disequilibria can have devastating consequences for entitlements. Therefore, administrative allocation of foreign exchange, intervention in food markets and rising tax pressure should be accepted by donors even if they are inconsistent with the usual 'Bretton

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<sup>31</sup> See Stewart, FitzGerald and Ass., 2001, Vol. One, Chapter Nine for a much fuller exposition of these policies.

Woods style' adjustment package. Thus donor conditionality needs to be altered during war<sup>32</sup>.

A key requirement at a macro-level is to sustain import capacity, usually under threat as a result of falling export earnings, so as to moderate the negative effects on GDP. From this perspective, the international community should avoid the use of trade and financial embargoes which are typically ineffective in reducing conflict and usually hit the vulnerable worst (see below); maintain access to normal trade and banking channels by conflict economies in order to avoid recourse to clandestine markets; and suspend bilateral and multilateral debt payments for the duration of the conflict, the resources released thereby to be allocated to the provision of health and education services to all vulnerable groups without discrimination.

In addition to macro-requirements, wartime policy conditionality needs to relate to the two overriding wartime distributional objectives: to sustain public health entitlements and food entitlements for the whole population, and to correct substantial horizontal inequalities. With regard to social costs, donors should support governments and others in their efforts to sustain public entitlements and food access. This involves: supporting revenue raising efforts with technical assistance; the sale of food aid; devoting aid to primary health and education expenditure as well as using conditionality to help secure adequate government support for these sectors; supporting government efforts to ensure adequate entitlements to food by contributing to agricultural support and employment schemes; providing food aid, where no other sources are available; wherever possible supplying food aid to camps should be avoided as this undermines future self-sufficiency and promotes disease. Aid policy should also contribute to the strengthening of the capacity of the state to deliver the public goods of health, education and security to all citizens. The specific policies that are most appropriate will vary according to the situation. What is needed is: first, to make the sustaining of access to food and basic health services an overriding priority; secondly, to identify where these are under threat; thirdly, to support government efforts to ensure universal access, with resources and technical support; and fifthly, where the government is either refusing or failing to ensure adequate access, to provide resources directly or through NGOs.

International actors should support (and possibly organise) the real-time *monitoring* of social and economic conditions during conflict, so that there is early warning of impending entitlement collapse. Official monitoring efforts tend to disintegrate during war not only because of a general weakening of the administrative machinery but also for political reasons. Local NGOs, supported by foreign NGOs, are often best placed to monitor conditions, but some central coordination is needed to make this systematic and country-wide. Quick and comprehensive monitoring of changes in human and economic conditions during conflict is probably the most important contribution the NGO community could make to alleviating costs.

### ***b. Specific Policies towards Children during Conflict***

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<sup>32</sup> See FitzGerald 2001.

Most international policies towards the protection of children during war focus on specific ways of sustaining their well-being. These specific policies are important, but the more successful the general policies discussed above, the less will be the need for the specific policies reviewed here.

The international norms and standards with regard to the care and protection of children during and following conflict are largely agreed upon and are expressed in a range of international treaties.<sup>33</sup> Recent instruments of special relevance include those on the age of recruitment to combat<sup>34</sup>, the Convention against landmines<sup>35</sup>, and the ILO Convention against the worst forms of child labour.

The Machel report, and its recent update, identified policy priorities in the area of child protection during war, notably for protection for separated children, promotion of education, prevention of sexual exploitation, special problems posed by adolescents and children affected by HIV/AIDS and the prevention and monitoring of military recruitment of children. The first of these reports led to the institution of a Special Representative to the Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict, a position that allows for advocacy, monitoring and lobbying on children's issues.

A general conclusion of recent reviews<sup>36</sup> is that despite the plethora of agreed Conventions there are many unfulfilled promises and too few mechanisms to ensure accountability. While provisions for children may appear quite strong nominally, at the level of policy, implementation of protection policies requires greater resources, more coherent strategies and continuity in staffing, improved consultation with beneficiaries, and greater sensitivity to local context, among other changes.

There are also some serious gaps in the international protection regime, particularly in relation to the need for greater support for the internally displaced. Improvements are needed in the following areas:

- Children have an important role to play in their own protection. Greater consultation in planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation is needed with local civil society organisations and young people themselves, since in most cases those directly affected have many insights about causes and possible solutions to their problems. Encouraging children to become actively involved in decisions and measures affecting them is likely to enhance their ability to cope with adversity. This requires implementing agencies to guarantee children better access to information about the conditions and options they experience.
- Greater effort is required to meet the specific age-related and gender needs of children affected by conflict and to be more responsive to the particular circumstances of children of ethnic and religious minorities. Previously, there has been a particular focus on children

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<sup>33</sup> These include the various instruments of human rights law, and, in particular, the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (CRC), humanitarian law in the form of the four Geneva Conventions, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 and the 1967 Protocol to that Convention.

<sup>34</sup> The Optional Protocol to the CRC.

<sup>35</sup> The Ottawa Convention on Anti-personnel Landmines.

<sup>36</sup> E.g. the Winnipeg Conference on War-affected children, 2000.

under-5, on the grounds that this age group is the most susceptible physically. More attention should be given to teenagers, both in preventative measures and in demobilisation, recovery and reintegration in post conflict settings; in the absence of viable alternatives, this is the age group that is most likely to be involved in the perpetuation of conflict.

- Most interventions for children focus primarily on physical needs - water, sanitation, nutrition and health care. Other needs are for provision of security information, psychosocial support during and after conflict and for education both during and after conflict (see below).
- Education is one of the most important preventative and protective mechanisms for war-affected and displaced children. Providing a structure to children's daily lives and a sense of purpose, education represents a return to 'normalcy' in the midst of chaos. Education may also reduce child enlistment. Education can also assist in reducing or preventing conflict by bringing children together across divides.<sup>37</sup>

It should not be assumed that the international protection regime is the first line of defence for children during conflict. The social and cultural resources that are brought to bear during emergencies by local communities, families and children are often considerable. Local models and resources are likely to be more sustainable and culturally appropriate, have greater outreach and frequently more effective than interventions designed and implemented by outside experts.

To the extent possible, preservation of children's links to family, community, peers, and normal patterns of life is a major priority. Except in cases in which children's family, community or peers are themselves the source of risk, measures to protect children should reinforce ties to them. In these cases culturally appropriate systems of care and support should be promoted.

### ***c. Global Policies to Reduce War-finance and the Economic Profitability of War***

The ability to wage war—and thus the human cost of conflict—can be reduced by changing the way in which the global economy is regulated. To the extent that globalization involves the creation and expansion of trans-border markets which are independent of any one nation state, and are generally not subject to any system of international public or private law, it creates new opportunities for financing conflict. This section reviews a variety of ways that global actions might inhibit war-financing and at the same time reduce the motivation for conflict among some actors.

#### ***1. Regulation of natural resource sales from conflict areas.***

The international sale of natural resources is a major source of war-finance (see earlier), and also a motive for people to start or prolong wars. Some natural resources, such as oil, tend to be government-controlled and these can act as a motive for groups to fight to gain control over the government, and also as a major source of war finance for the government. Other

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<sup>37</sup> This strategy was adopted successfully (albeit with opposition) in N. Ireland (McWhirter).

types of resource can be secured and traded by private groups, especially in a war context when government regulation fails, and can then become a motive for conflict as well as a source of finance for non-governmental groups. Timber and alluvial diamond trading are examples. Production and/or trade in some types of resource – notably drugs - are illegal and their exploitation either requires government complicity or defiance against it. The freedom to trade in drugs can be an important motivation for war and source of war-finance.

Diamonds are the best known example of natural resources which fuel conflict, although other resources (timber, oil, cobalt, gold, drugs) are much more important in particular conflicts. Diamonds have been a particularly important source of war-finance in Angola, where they financed anti-government (UNITA) activities. In Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front largely financed its rebellion against the government with smuggled diamonds. Diamonds have also contributed to war-finance in the Congo, along with gold, timber and oil. Namibia, which has provided troops to support the Congo Government, is involved in diamond mining there. It appears that the objective of securing control over Congo's natural resources is a major cause of international interventions in that conflict. Diamond laundering also offers opportunities for profit in other war-affected countries (e.g. Rwanda, and Liberia). In both Angola and the Sudan, the international oil industry has hugely contributed to the government's war finance<sup>38</sup>. In Cambodia and Burma, sale of hard-woods has been a major source of war finance for anti-government forces. In Colombia, the drug trade constitutes a major motivation for the rebellion, though there are other ideological and grievance motives as well. In Afghanistan, the huge growth in poppy production and trade provided a source of war-finance for government and others, and possibly a motive for prolongation of conflict too, though here other motives appear to have been much more important.<sup>39</sup> The near anarchy associated with conflict facilitates a variety of illegal activities to flourish, many involving global trade – all war-affected countries tend to become centres of the drug trade, human trafficking etc. Each of these activities both motivates and finances conflict, and regulation of these markets can potentially contribute towards reducing the incidence of conflict.

Most progress has been made in identifying mechanisms for controlling the global trade in diamonds. The UN has led on the need for an effective control system<sup>40</sup>, with Security Council endorsed sanctions against diamonds produced in Angola introduced in 1993, and in Sierra Leone in 2000.

However, the UN sanctions against Angola were relatively ineffective – in 1999 a certificate of origin could be bought for \$5 and the UNITA soldiers traded diamonds with government soldiers<sup>41</sup>. A preliminary report to the Security Council in March 2000 noted that 'UNITA is still trading in illicit diamonds, has access to funds abroad'<sup>42</sup>. Recently, there has been a

<sup>38</sup> See <http://www.christian-aid.org.uk/indepth/0102suda/sudanoil/htm>; Goreux 2001; Le Billon, 1999.

<sup>39</sup> See Marsden and Samman 2001. The Taliban banned poppy production when they secured power.

<sup>40</sup> For example, the UN Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA March 2000, which described Angolan rebel's funding by diamonds,

<sup>41</sup> Goreux 2001.

<sup>42</sup> Quoted in Goreux, p7.

shift in international opinion regarding conflict diamonds – even the commercial diamond industry changed their position after pressure from NGOs, including Fatal Transactions, Global Witness, Niza, and Medico International. Global Witness has outlined the nature of global controls needed to prevent the sale of conflict diamonds.<sup>43</sup> In 1999, De Beers, the major diamond company controlling 70% of the uncut diamond market, halted its purchase of Angolan diamonds following pressure from NGOs.

Preliminary moves to outlaw ‘conflict diamonds’ were made by the industry itself in July 2000 when a meeting of the World Diamond Congress in Antwerp agreed to take concerted action to eliminate trade in conflict diamonds.<sup>44</sup> So far, however, there is no system of verifiable controls or certification in place that reliably gives conflict-free status to diamonds. To enforce the industry’s proposals there is a need for legislation by importing countries. An NGO Campaign, initiated on Valentine’s day 2001 was intended to gain the support of the US public for legislation, as well as the industry which fears that the image of diamonds will change from being one of enduring love to one of enduring war. In June 2001, legislation to ban the sale of illegally traded diamonds in the US was introduced into the US Senate, supported by the US diamond industry and NGOs<sup>45</sup>. Since the US accounts for more than one third of world diamond sales, this could have a substantial effect in itself, as well as by encouraging other importing countries to introduce similar laws.

A notable aspect of the progress in moves towards conflict-diamonds is the important role of the NGOs in monitoring the situation, publicising it, and orchestrating public opinion.

Other natural resources involved in financing war are even more difficult to control. Similar certification procedures to those for diamonds have been proposed for teak. For the most part, however, the only solution offered to date are trading sanctions imposed on particular countries (to be discussed below).

## **2. Controlling Revenues from Drugs**

The developed countries, led by the US, have been trying to eliminate production, imports and consumption of drugs for several decades, with limited impact. Trade in drugs from war economies is more difficult to control than diamonds because the trade is invariably illegal, and hence legislation and controls which reach *legal* trade do not affect it. Current policies include prosecution of both producers and consumers of drugs, including the use of military force to attempt to eradicate drug production. Thus US aid against drugs has become a source of war-finance for governments in drug-producing countries, such as Colombia.

A group of NGOs put forward a manifesto to the UN General Assembly in 1998, arguing that the international conventions on control of the drug trade had been ineffective in controlling the drugs trade or consumption, had led to criminalisation of producers and

<sup>43</sup> [www.oneworld.org/globalwitness/reports/conflict/conflict.html](http://www.oneworld.org/globalwitness/reports/conflict/conflict.html).

<sup>44</sup> Information from “Diamond Industry to police illicit gems” *Financial Times*, 20 July 2000. Three elements in the proposed system of control are: the establishment of an International Diamond Council composed of producers, manufacturers, traders, governments, and international organizations; strong penalties for traders caught dealing in illegal diamonds; and agreement by importing countries to accept parcels of rough diamonds only sealed in a standardised way and registered in an approved international database.

<sup>45</sup> *Financial Times*, June 22, 2001.

traders, had involved violation of human rights and had used large amounts of resources for suppression of production which might have been used for social purposes. In their stead they proposed that production of drugs by small farmers should not be prosecuted; that small farmers should be offered profitable alternatives; military eradication measures should be stopped; and that prosecution of consumption should cease.<sup>46</sup>

Although not specifically directed at the war-related drug trade, these proposals provide a basis for policies towards drugs in war. So long as drug production and consumption remains illegal, it will provide an important motive for conflict, since conflict makes it easier to sustain illegal activities and also to hide the profits in ways that facilitate war finance. Legalisation would thus help reduce the role of drugs in motivation and war finance. But it is clear that legalisation of the major war-drugs (cocaine and heroin) is not likely in the near future, the efforts to reduce demand are not likely to have major success so drug production and trade is likely to continue to be an important source of war-finance..

Other policies which might help include:

- offering alternative income generating opportunities to small farmers. This is important not only to reduce the production of drugs, but because drug production provides an important source of income to some households during war; although so far this approach has been rather ineffective, e.g. in Colombia because the alternatives are much less lucrative.
- policies directed at reducing the laundering of drug money and its use for arms (see below).

### ***3. Reducing the Availability of Small Arms***

The ready availability of small arms, at a low price, reduces the costs of conflicts, and may increase their damage and extent – though horrendous human injuries can be inflicted by primitive weapons, such as pangas and machetes, as shown in Rwanda. There are various international efforts to reduce the flow of arms to conflict-affected areas, which generally appear to be rather ineffective.

The European Union has a Code of Conduct (1998) which excludes arms exports to countries barred by sanctions; if the arms are likely to be used for internal repression; or those ‘that would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or increase existing tensions..’ . The first global multilateral arrangement containing export controls for conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies, (the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)) received final approval in July 1996 and began operations in September 1996.<sup>47</sup> Participating States (which mostly include developed countries) agree to ensure that transfers of arms do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities that undermine international and regional security and stability and are not diverted to support such capabilities.

However, its evident that there are large loopholes in the arrangements so that small arms are effectively available to all countries. The loopholes include: arms production brokered by

<sup>46</sup> Manifesto of the International Coalition of NGOs for a Just and Effective Policy of Drugs, Vienna 15 March 1998 <http://www.tni.org/drugs/encod/oasis.htm>

<sup>47</sup> <http://www.wassenaar.org/docs/talkpts.html>

or under license from signatory countries but produced elsewhere; production and sale by non-signatory countries; and 'legal' sales from signatory countries which in fact end up in conflict-countries, either because they are resold or because of weak monitoring and implementation. For example, a variety of British companies sold arms to Rwanda and were never brought to account, while guns and rifles have been produced under licence from Heckman and Koch (a subsidiary of British Aerospace) in Turkey, Mexico, Iran, Burma, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, countries which are themselves involved in violent repression, and all non-signatories of WA.<sup>48</sup>

There is a strong case for more systematic international agreements on small arms . In July 2001, a UN conference aimed at extending the WA approach on a world-wide basis. It had strong support from a large range of developed and developing countries. However, the US – which produces over half world production of small arms -- blocked an agreement aimed at restricting arms sales to rebel groups, arguing that in some contexts they wished to support such groups. However, even if it had been accepted, it is probable that it would do little more than make a small dent in the market for small arms, given the large number of actual and potential producers. Most reviews conclude that the problem has to be tackled at the demand end, with controls over supplies playing a subordinate role.

#### ***4. Eliminating Land Mines***

Landmines indiscriminately kill and maim innocent civilians, children being especially vulnerable because they wander and are small. The International Committee of the Red Cross estimates that upwards of 26,000 people lose their lives and limbs to landmines each year. In 1997, an international treaty to ban landmines was created; however, the United States did not join. President Clinton announced at that time that the United States would not sign the treaty until 2006, and only then if "suitable alternatives" to landmines had been found. Currently, 139 nations have joined the Mine Ban Treaty, of which 110 have ratified it. Among the countries that have not yet joined the treaty are China, Russia, the United States, Cuba, India, Pakistan, North Korea, South Korea, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Nigeria, Finland, Turkey, and Yugoslavia.

Over the two years of the treaty most trends were positive, notably decreased use of landmines, fewer new mine victims, and more land being cleared of mines.<sup>49</sup> However, among those governments apparently still actively laying antipersonnel mines two years after the treaty was initiated are Russia, Burma, Sri Lanka, and Angola. It is also likely that rebel groups are using the weapon in about a dozen conflicts. Despite the important exceptions, the Land Mine Treaty has made a significant contribution to diminishing the use of land mines, which is important not only from the point of view of avoidance of casualties, but also because it facilitates agricultural production and economic recovery.

Like the diamond situation, progress that has occurred has been highly dependent on NGO campaigning and monitoring. But the diamond campaign was able to rouse US opinion

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<sup>48</sup> Evidence from OXFAM, 1998.

<sup>49</sup> Reported by Landmine Monitor, a civil-society based monitoring organisation established by the The International Campaign to Ban Landmines.

sufficiently to threaten industry profits. The possibilities of achieving this in small arms are rather remote.

### 5. *General Sanctions*

International economic sanctions have been widely adopted as a mechanism to discourage conflict or repression. Yet their record is not good, since not only are they often ineffective in bringing about policy change, but they frequently harm the vulnerable within the economy sanctioned.

The most comprehensive study of the efficacy of sanctions, organised by the International Institute of Economics (IIE), found that sanctions failed to achieve even ‘partial success’ in bringing about desired changes in behaviour in 66% of 115 cases between World War One and 1990.<sup>50</sup> Moreover the failure rate increased over time as the global market became more open. Between 1973 and 1990, only one in four sanctions regimes achieved partial success.<sup>51</sup> One of the core assumptions justifying sanctions is that the pain inflicted by sanctions on citizens of the target state will cause them to pressure their government into making the changes demanded. But in authoritarian states, those who bear the brunt of the sanctions have no power to influence policy, while those in power tend to be relatively unaffected. A recent study found that sanctions against authoritarian states failed in more than 98% of the hundred-plus cases, with greater success against democratic regimes (Nossal, 1988).

Sanctions also often actually strengthen the regime against which they are targeted, while inflicting heavy costs on low-income households, including children. For example, the sanctions-induced scarcity of goods causes prices to rise, often dramatically. In Iraq, between 1990 and 1995, price rises for basic commodities of around 1000% a year were not uncommon. The poor suffered most, while the economic independence of the middle class, a building block for democratisation and source of potential resistance to the regime, was largely destroyed. Infant mortality and malnutrition rates rose sharply.<sup>52</sup> A recent Columbia University study estimates that more than 200,000 under-five year-old children have died as a consequence of sanctions (Garfield, 1998). This is far more than the total number of Iraqis killed in the Gulf War, when the majority of casualties were combatants.

Members of the ruling elite who controlled the black market profited hugely. In fact sanctions may have created a perverse vested economic interest in their perpetuation among the very elite they were targeted against, while reducing the potential for resistance in the wider community. In Iraq, efforts by the international community to relieve the suffering of the people had a further perverse effect. Regime control over much of the food and medical supplies distributed under the Oil-for-Food program has provided an additional lever of control and coercion for the regime, by increasing the dependence of the people on the state. Analysing the impact of sanctions on Haiti, Gibbons argues that the Haitian army

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<sup>50</sup> See Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot (1990). A forthcoming update covering the 1990s supports the original conclusions.

<sup>51</sup> Even this very modest success rate has recently been disputed, with one critic arguing that the IIE’s ‘partial success’ estimates are far too high, and that in fact less than 5% of sanctions regimes can be deemed successful. See Pape, 1998.

<sup>52</sup> Garfield, 1998.

‘...by seizing control of the black market in embargoed goods, especially fuel, was also able to realise huge windfall profits, creating a strong (perverse) incentive to continue sanctions.’

### **6. *Smart Sanctions***

Today few dispute that sanctions have, in Kofi Annan’s words, been a ‘blunt instrument’. One response to these concerns has been support for the idea of ‘targeted’ or ‘smart’ sanctions. Like ‘smart’ weapons systems, ‘smart’ sanctions, are supposedly precision-targeted and designed to reduce ‘collateral damage’, that is they are designed to coerce regimes without causing significant harm to ordinary citizens.

Targeted sanctions may include:

- Freezing of overseas financial assets of government and regime members.
- Suspension of credits and aid from bilateral and multilateral institutions.
- Denial or limitation of access to overseas financial markets.
- Specific export or import embargoes: on e.g. the import of arms, luxury goods, etc., or the export of major conflict-financing items, such as oil, timber, diamonds.
- Flight and travel bans.
- Political sanctions intended to stigmatise the target regime, including diplomatic isolation and withdrawal of accreditation.
- Denial of overseas travel, visas, educational opportunities to regime members and their families.

The advantages of smart sanctions are that in principle they reduce the burden on poor populations, focussing on the items which benefit the government and elite, and/or provide war-financing. They allow the international community to pick out the items that are critical to the war efforts of a particular country. But it should be noted that it is difficult to do this and avoid broader economic and social costs. For example, sanctions prohibiting the export of timber from Cambodia or Liberia would inevitably reduce earnings among the poor directly, and by limiting export earnings may have harmful effects on the economy as a whole, and thereby livelihoods and social services, as well as reducing the import of essential goods such as medicines or food.

### **7. *Financial Sanctions***

In general financial sanctions - which could be argued to be a special case of ‘smart sanctions’ - appear to be more effective than trade sanctions. For example, the IIE study showed that trade sanctions alone ‘worked’ in 24 percent of the cases compared with a success rate of 41 percent for financial sanctions alone. Combined sanctions were successful in just over 30 percent of the cases examined. Financial sanctions tend to be more effective than trade sanctions because they are relatively easier for the sanctioner to enforce, harder for the target to evade, market reactions are more likely to reinforce than to undermine them, and they can have broad trade and economic effects that are more difficult to avoid than under trade sanctions.

The most commonly-used financial sanctions affect such flows as economic aid, official trade credits or guarantees, or private bank loans. Sanctions may also target financial stocks, such as bank accounts or other assets held abroad by either the government or particular

individuals. Firms can be required to divest their holdings in a targeted country. The transfer of worker remittances may be blocked.<sup>53</sup>

Freezing *assets* of individuals in the target country has few collateral effects but may be relatively easy to evade. Other types of restriction on financial inflows can have negative impact on the macro-economy and on livelihoods which are likely to outweigh any political benefits.

In sum, financial sanctions are preferable to broad trade sanctions, as one option in the general 'smart sanctions' menu, but are likely to be subject to significant evasion. Financial sanctions will also have indirect effects on the economy which can be deleterious to the vulnerable, including children.

### **8. Money Laundering**

Money laundering is an illegal activity through which criminal proceeds take on the outward appearance of legitimacy. It is an integral support function common to virtually all profit-producing criminal activities. It is vital for disguising the proceeds of the many illegal war-activities, including profits from sanctions breaking, revenue from the exports of illegal or banned items, and profits from selling arms illegitimately. It is also of course a tax evasion device. The main motives for trying to eliminate money-laundering are to prevent tax avoidance, and the stashing away huge sums from corrupt activities as well as to make profiting from drug trading more difficult. The control of war-finance is not a prime target. But effective controls over money-laundering would assist in reducing some of the major illegal war transactions – for example, it would certainly reduce finance to Colombia's drug barons. Smaller profiteering, such as through diamond smuggling in Sierra Leone, is less likely to be affected. In addition, by reducing the possibilities of making huge personal fortunes from political power – such as those amassed by Abacha in Nigeria or Marcos in the Philippines or Suharto in Indonesia -- reducing money laundering might help reduce corruption and increase political stability.

In most financial transactions, there is a financial trail to link the funds to the person(s) involved. Hence criminals avoid using traditional payment systems, such as checks, credit cards, etc., because of this paper trail, and prefer to use cash. But physical cash is bulky and difficult to move. For example, in the case of cocaine street cash can weigh more than six times the drugs.

*Placement, layering* and *integration* describe the three stages through which criminal proceeds are laundered. Placement occurs when illicit monies are deposited at a financial institution. During the layering stage, a launderer conducts a series of financial transactions in order to build layers between the funds and their illicit source, disguising the trail. Finally, illicit funds are integrated with monies from legitimate commercial activities as they enter the mainstream economy. The illicit funds thus take on the appearance of legitimacy.

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<sup>53</sup> Elliot, 1999.

Money laundering schemes vary greatly in character and complexity. They may involve any number of intermediaries and use both traditional and non-traditional payment systems. Advanced computing and communications technologies are currently routinely used to enhance the efficiency and the security of money laundering operations. There are a variety of national regulations designed to detect money laundering. But international activities are less well controlled. Moreover, the speed and “paperless” nature of cyber-payment transactions pose potential challenges for traditional methods of policing illegal cash transactions.

A Financial Action Task Force (FATF) set up the G7 targeted 15 countries seen as money laundering havens. This was supported by similar action by the OECD. Of the target countries, seven enacted laws to curb flows and others announced their intention to do so.<sup>54</sup> Some Caribbean tax-havens tightened up their own rules to avoid sanctions. However, the US expressed doubts about important parts of the initiative<sup>55</sup>, though they are taking steps to tighten up their national regulations, along with others including the UK and Russia.

International policies to control money laundering have an important role to play in helping to enforce prohibitions on particular exports (such as diamonds), or imports (arms) in war economies. Without such policies, many of the other policies discussed above may be quite ineffective.

### ***9. Promoting Corporate Responsibility during Conflict: the Important Role of NGOs***

Historically many companies have contributed to providing war-finance by negotiating contracts with governments and rebel forces (as in the Congo, for example), and provided arms and private security (for example, Landline in the UK and Executive Outcomes of S.Africa). In contrast, there is now a move to encourage companies to adopt ethical codes and to operate in way that will be peace-promoting.<sup>56</sup> Some recent activities by De Beers, Rio Tinto and Microsoft provide examples where companies have adopted more peace-promoting activities - for example, by desisting from contracts which clearly involve war-finance; by civic education; by helping to negotiate peaceful solutions. For example, in Chad and Cameroon an oil pipeline was built with private sector and World Bank finance, with commitments from the government that the revenue would not be used for military expenditure. However, the Chad government used the early oil receipts to purchase weapons, throwing the validity of the project in doubt.<sup>57</sup>

Examples of corporate peace-building behaviour are concentrated among companies which have previously behaved in a way that in some way made a contribution to war-activities, who were then subject to major critical campaigns led by NGOs which led them to take an

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<sup>54</sup> ‘Blacklist leaves a mark on money laundering’, *Financial Times*, Dec. 5th 2000. The intention was to capture ‘corruption’ money as well as other illegal profits.

<sup>55</sup> ‘US move jeopardises tax haven reform’, *Financial Times*, May 11 2001

<sup>56</sup> See a report issued by Council of Economic Priorities, 2000.

<sup>57</sup> Bennett, 2001.

active peace-promoting stance. Examples include: Shell in Nigeria; Talisman in Sudan; Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold Inc. in Indonesia.<sup>58</sup>

At best the role of the corporate sector in peace-promotion is likely to be rather limited and uneven in its effects, although if they simply desisted from *providing* conflict-finance by their activities this would represent a major advance. The long-term interests of many (but not all) private companies are served by peace. However, their short-term interests may not be, while some companies (e.g. arms manufacturers) benefit from conflict. Experience suggests that companies may move from a war-promoting to a peace-promoting stance if under sufficient pressure from regulation, consumers, shareholders etc. This type of pressure is often inspired by ‘name and shame’ campaigns by NGOs, supporting and monitoring government regulations - this was the role of Global Witness in the diamond case. Hence the monitoring and campaigning role of NGOs in this area is critical one.

### ***10. Aid***

As with other areas, there is a dilemma: on the one hand, aid finance can be diverted to support war activities; on the other, there is a need to support the macro-economy as well as particular projects with aid (and other sources of foreign exchange) so as to avoid the potential negative impact on entitlements of massive economic dislocations. In general, we believe aid should be sustained during conflict, but with strict monitoring to ensure that the leakage into war-finance is limited. Hence multilateral lenders (that is, the Bretton Woods institutions and the regional development banks) should suspend principal repayments on their debt for countries in conflict, so as to avoid bilateral aid being diverted for debt service rather than alleviating the economic burden of conflict on vulnerable groups. In addition, the HIPC initiative should contain special provisions for countries in conflict, relating requirements to conflict resolution and the protection of vulnerable groups rather than to long periods of macroeconomic probity that conflict economies cannot fulfil. This might be achieved by the suspension of debt payments against commitments to maintain health and education without discrimination; or possibly payment of debt service into accounts for aid agencies to dispense.

The threatened withdrawal of official bilateral credits, longer-term development loans and multilateral investment funds, with the aim of putting pressure on the governments in conflict economies should be applied with great care. If the development finance to be cancelled was properly designed in the first place—in other words it followed DAC criteria and was clearly targeted at poverty reduction—then aid sanctions would affect vulnerable groups disproportionately. Much preferable is to monitor it carefully, perhaps dispensing it via NGOs.

## **Conclusions**

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

It is clear that war in the early twenty-first century is an immensely important source of suffering among children. Hence a major element of any child-centred policies must include preventing and stopping wars, and protecting children when they occur. Most of these wars are within countries, not between them, but there is almost invariably a strong international presence, one way or another. The ultimate solution to wars lies in changed domestic actions. Yet because of the importance on international actors, both public and private, from the region and outside, international action can have extensive effects. Moreover, the wars take place in a global context, global forces often contribute to and accentuate the conditions which generate war, while the global economic system facilitates the financing of conflicts and contributes to the powerful economic incentives which inform many of them. Hence, while the role of domestic policies is ultimately most important, international and regional policies are of major relevance. Perhaps, the best prescription for international policies would be 'Do no harm' - if fulfilled comprehensively this would greatly improve the situation. But to achieve this is not as simple as it sounds. This paper has detailed a large number of policy areas where changed international policies would make a contribution, by economic and social policies which help prevent conflict, by assisting in the protection of children during war, and by reducing war-finance. The porous, flexible and joined-up nature of the global economy make it difficult to be optimistic about introducing sufficiently effective international controls to extinguish the war-oxygen provided by global trade and finance.

Global policies can, though, make a contribution to prevention and ending conflict, especially where domestic forces are favourable. To do so would require considerable changes in the global economy and policies towards vulnerable economies. The marginalisation of large parts of the world associated with globalisation needs to be ended, and trade and finance organised to assist the least developed participate on favourable terms in the global economy. The programmes of aid donors and the IFIs need to be changed to incorporate specific war considerations – in particular, macro-policies need to be designed for war conditions; meso policies need to be systematically aimed to improve horizontal equity; and development agencies generally should aim to promote development, and the protection of livelihoods even *during* conflict and not restrict their activities to humanitarian relief.

It is clear that the NGOs have a special role to play in conflict-affected contexts. National and international NGOs are in a position to monitor the situation, more so than governments (whose reach is often limited, and vision distorted), noting where and why human conditions are deteriorating. International NGOs are in a position to communicate their findings clearly and loudly to governments and development agencies. NGOs can also monitor the global flows which facilitate war, and to mount campaigns to control them. They have achieved this spectacularly well in the arena of diamonds and landmines. While the powerful interests favouring war-activities cannot be ignored, NGOs can act as a countervailing power which may strengthen governments' resistance to special interests and even, as in the case of diamonds and other instances of 'corporate responsibility' turn around the interests themselves. Of course, NGOs are also political actors, and can be coopted or subverted, as recorded by de Waal. The more they become dependent on official finance, and act as pseudo-governments in the provision of services etc., the less they are likely to carry out the much more needed role of monitor, critic and campaigner. We do not suppose that all, or

even most, NGOs will behave in this way, but given their large number, and the ease with which new ones are formed around particular issues, a few agencies whose major concern is children may assume the role that is needed to help protect children from and in war.

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