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UNICEF Office of Research | Innocenti Working Paper

WP-2018-10 | June 2018

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Elsa Valli, Amber Peterman and Melissa Hidrobo¹

Abstract

There is increasing interest in understanding if social protection has the ability to foster social cohesion, particularly between refugees and host communities. Using an experimental evaluation of transfers, including cash, food and food vouchers to Colombian refugees and poor Ecuadorians in urban and peri-urban areas we examine if transfers resulted in changes in social cohesion measures. The evaluation was a cluster-randomized control trial examining a short-term programme implemented over six months by the World Food Programme. We examine six aggregate dimensions of social cohesion, derived from 33 individual indicators, in addition to an overall index of social cohesion. Overall results suggest that the programme contributed to integration of Colombians in the hosting community through increases in personal agency, attitudes accepting diversity, confidence in institutions, and social participation. However, while having no impact for the Ecuadorian population. There were no negative impacts of the programme on indicators or domains analysed. Although we are not able to specifically identify mechanisms, we hypothesize that these impacts are driven by joint targeting, messaging around social inclusion and through interaction between nationalities at mandated monthly nutrition trainings.

Key words: Social transfers, Colombian refugees, social cohesion

JEL codes: I38, J15, O19

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We are grateful to the Centro de Estudios de Poblacion y Desarrollo Social for data collection and management and to the World Food Programme (WFP) (Quito and Rome) for collaboration and programme implementation. We thank colleagues at the International Food Policy Research Institute for support during the design and implementation of the impact evaluation, including John Hoddinott, Amy Margolies and Vanessa Moreira and participants at the 2017 International Conference on Social Protection in Contexts of Fragility and Forced Displacement in Brussels, the 2018 Centre for the Study of African Economies Conference in Oxford, the 2018 Conference on Rigorous Evaluation in Europe in Turin, and Tilman Brück, Jose Cuesta, Jacobus de Hoop, and Ugo Gentilini for helpful comments and feedback.

1. Introduction

According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), an estimated 65 million individuals were forcibly displaced in 2015, an increase of nearly six million individuals from the previous year (UNHCR, 2016). In response, global actors have committed to exploring policies and interventions to mitigate against health, economic and social consequences for both displaced populations and populations living in fragility in sending countries. Social protection, including the use of social transfers, has been identified as a key intervention for vulnerable populations in these settings, as signalled by the recent high-level commitments at the World Humanitarian Summit, the Grand Bargain, and the High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Cash Transfers (ODI and CGD, 2015).² As the use of social protection schemes among refugee populations of diverse ethnic groups within fragile settings increases, the effects of these policies on social cohesion is being questioned. Social protection has the potential to boost (directly or indirectly) measures of social cohesion by creating good will, feelings of equal treatment (both within and between groups), trust in institutions, and social capital through interaction with other beneficiaries during programme-related activities (for example, training, community meetings) (Leites et al., 2017). However, it is equally possible that implementation of social protection could generate feelings of resentment and jealousy towards recipients by non-recipients and trigger or exacerbate intracommunity or intra-ethnic tensions (Devereux et al., 2017).

The concept of social cohesion has been used to describe social relations, including cooperation and solidarity between groups and individuals in a society, and their interrelation with broader economic, social and political outcomes (Babajanian, 2012). Because of the

² See 'World Humanitarian Summit', Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, United Nations, New York, 24 May, 2016, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/ih1401.doc.htm>.

variety of definitions that have been produced, varying by discipline, context, or issues, it has been described as a quasi-concept (Beauvais and Jenson, 2002; Green, Janmaat, and Han, 2009). Definitions often respond to policy needs and foci of agencies and institutions. For instance, the Council of Europe, among the most active promoters of the concept, has broadly referred to social cohesion as “the capacity of a society to ensure the welfare of all its members, minimizing disparities and avoiding polarizations” (Council of Europe, 2004, p. 3). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development proposes that social cohesion is associated with three aspects – social inclusion, social capital and social mobility – and defines a cohesive society as one that “works towards the well-being of all its members, fights exclusion and marginalization, creates a sense of belonging, promotes trust, and offers its members the opportunity of upward social mobility” (OECD, 2012, p. 51). Yet, while common ideas underlay various definitions of social cohesion, there has not been a unified understanding of the specific components, nor the measurement of the concept.

A better understanding of the dynamics between social protection and social cohesion is justified by the fact that social protection is viewed as a crucial policy to promote social justice, of which social cohesion and inclusion are an integral part (Devereux, McGregor, and Sabates-Wheeler, 2011). In addition, social cohesion plays a key role in fostering economic and development outcomes, through, for instance, its influence on the quality of institutions and, in turn, on the implementation of pro-growth policies (Easterly, Ritzen, and Woolcock, 2006; Ferroni, Mateo, and Payne, 2008; Hayami, 2009; Ritzen, Easterly, and Woolcock, 2000; World Bank, 2005).³ Social cohesion is also widely viewed as crucial in relation to

³ For example, it has been argued that social cohesion, including substantial trust in institutions as well as inclusiveness among communities, is necessary if politicians are to implement pro-poor development policies. Cohesive societies are also more well equipped to share the costs associated with the short-term losses attached to welfare reforms (Ferroni, Mateo, and Payne, 2008; Ritzen, Easterly, and Woolcock, 2000).

peacebuilding and conflict prevention (Colletta and Cullen, 2000; King, Samii, and Snilstveit, 2010).⁴ While the development impacts of social protection have been widely studied, the contribution of social protection to social cohesion and state-building has been primarily assumed based on theory (Babajanian, 2012).

On the microlevel, the evidence of the impact of social protection on various social cohesion outcomes is limited and inconclusive. There is only one example in a refugee hosting setting. In Lebanon, the cash component of a winterization programme targeting Syrian refugees had a positive impact on social relations between beneficiaries and other community members (Lehmann and Masterson, 2014).⁵ In particular, the treatment group was found to be statistically more likely to be helped by Lebanese community members and less likely to be insulted by them. Other examples come from non-refugee settings of government programmes. For example, Familias en Accion, Colombia's flagship conditional cash transfer (CCT) was found to increase social capital, proxied by the willingness to cooperate among community members during a public good game (Attanasio, Polania-Reyes, and Pellerano, 2015). The Peruvian CCT Juntos was also found to have a positive impact on confidence in institutions, but not on membership in social organizations (Camacho, 2014). In Tanzania, a community-managed CCT was found to increase trust that beneficiaries have in local leaders, particularly in those who are elected by citizens to run the programme (Evans, Holtemeyer, and Kosec, 2018). In Lesotho, the Child Grant Programme strengthened informal sharing arrangements in

⁴ There is a growing related literature exploring the potential of social protection to contribute to peacebuilding and state-building (Beazley, Morris, and Vitali, 2016; Chioda, de Mello, and Soares, 2016; Crost, Felter, and Johnston, 2016). Despite the interest in these links, these outcomes are more likely to be goals of dedicated programming, rather than fall under the mandate of social protection.

⁵ Winterization is a term used by the humanitarian community to refer to the process of assisting beneficiaries in staying warm, dry, and healthy during winter months (Lehmann and Masterson, 2014).

the community, and beneficiary households were more likely to receive informal support from family members, friends and neighbours and to provide support to the rest of the community (Pellerano et al., 2014).

However, there is also evidence suggesting the potential for adverse effects of social protection on social cohesion. In Indonesia, poor targeting of the Bantuan Lansung Tunai, a national unconditional cash transfer aimed at compensating the poor for the increase in the price of kerosene as a consequence of the reduction of fuel subsidies, which erroneously included a large number of more well off households, resulted in deteriorated social capital, as measured by participation in community groups, as well as increased crime rates (Cameron and Shah, 2013).⁶ Qualitative studies also report a number of negative consequences mostly deriving from discontent around targeting. For instance, in Zimbabwe, the dissatisfaction linked to the targeting procedures of an emergency pilot programme was found to increase community tensions, although this dynamic was found in communities receiving cash transfers, as opposed to communities receiving food transfers (Kardan, MacAuslan, and Marimo, 2010). In Kenya and Yemen, feelings of jealousy around targeting led to a considerable degree of tension between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of an unconditional cash transfer (Pavanello et al., 2016). Envy, jealousy and resentment were reported in Nicaragua and the State of Palestine for similar reasons (Adato and Roopnaraine, 2004; Pavanello et al., 2016). Overall, evidence suggests that context and programme design (for example, targeting, complementary activities, and programme framing) are crucial in explaining diverse findings.

⁶ The definition of crime used by the authors include theft, looting, pillaging, assault, arson, rape, misuse of drugs, illegal drugs, murder, the sale of children and other. These categories were predefined and collected in the Indonesian Village Census, one of the data sources used in the analysis.

Using an experimental evaluation of transfers, including cash, food and food vouchers, targeted on Colombian refugees and poor Ecuadorians in urban and peri-urban areas, we investigate whether the transfers resulted in changes in social cohesion measures. The evaluation was a cluster-randomized control trial examining a short-term programme implemented over six months by the World Food Programme (WFP). The results suggest that the programme contributed to the integration of Colombians in the hosting community, expanding social cohesion through increases in personal agency, the emergence of attitudes accepting diversity, confidence in institutions and social participation among Colombians specifically, while having no impact on Ecuadorian participants. These effects appear to be largely independent of the type of transfer and also appear to accrue to all Colombian nationals, regardless of their motivation for migration (for example, economic versus political or personal). There were no negative impacts of the programme on the indicators or domains analysed. Although we are not able to identify specific mechanisms, we hypothesize that these impacts are driven by joint targeting and messaging around social inclusion and through interaction between nationalities at mandated monthly nutrition training sessions.

This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it adds to the scarce literature on the effects of social cohesion in refugee hosting settings; indeed, it is the first experimental evidence of quantitative impacts of which we are aware. Second, the paper contributes to discussions on measurement, analysing the most comprehensive operationalization of social cohesion thus far and suggesting areas where measurement could be improved in future studies. Finally, we discuss potential design components and mechanisms through which social protection has the potential to affect measures of social cohesion, an important area of further study with direct policy and programme implementation implications.

2. Framework

Various authors and institutions have suggested approaches to analyse or measure social cohesion. Beauvais and Jenson (2002), for instance, suggest a framework that distinguishes between those dimensions that capture social bonds and associational activity (often referred as social capital) and those which emphasize solidarity and equity. Similarly, Babajanian (2012) reviews social protection and its contribution to social cohesion and state-building. He distinguishes between distributional and relational dimensions of social cohesion, the former referring to “the patterns and the extent of distribution of resources and opportunities in a society” and the latter to “the nature and quality of interpersonal and social relations” (p. 13). For the purpose of this analysis, we follow the approach theorized by Babajanian (2012) by focusing on a subset of the relational components proposed, including the domains of “empowerment, community cooperation and solidarity [and] social participation” (p. 8). We complement this definition with two domains suggested by Green, Janmaat, and Han (2009), who review regimes and definitions of social cohesion, specifically (1) tolerance and respect for other individuals and cultures and (2) interpersonal and institutional trust. Because of data availability and appropriateness of the domain in relation to social protection, we do not include all components suggested by the authors, for example, conflict and stability, as suggested by Babajanian (2012), or shared values and goals, as suggested by Green, Janmaat, and Han (2009). As pointed out by Green, Janmaat, and Han (2009), definitions of social cohesion do not necessarily need to include all these characteristics. Our operational definition of social cohesion is therefore based on six aggregated indicators, as follows: (1) trust in individuals and social connectedness, (2) personal agency, (3) attitudes accepting diversity, (4) freedom from discrimination, (5) confidence in institutions, and (6) social participation. We discuss these domains in more detail in the methodology.

Social protection can, on theoretical grounds, influence social cohesion in a number of ways. Different design features and characteristics of social protection can have direct or indirect, intended or unintended effects on various components of social cohesion. We briefly summarize key features identified in the literature, along with the implications for design considerations. These include (1) targeting, (2) communication (for example, messaging and framing around implementation), (3) type of implementer (for example, government or other actor), (4) the size of benefits provided and (5) complementary activities or system links.

A key consideration in social protection programmes with implications for social cohesion is targeting. The most commonly observed and reported negative effect concerns between-group tensions and feelings of resentment arising because of the exclusion of vulnerable groups from programming (Babajanian, 2012; Leites et al., 2017; Pavanello et al., 2016). This is especially the case of complex targeting that is not completely transparent. For example, poverty targeting with proxy-means tests, particularly in areas of widespread poverty, will result in beneficiary lists that may not be easily distinguishable from populations excluded by community members and other stakeholders. Other targeting methods, such as categorical targeting, that identify beneficiaries based on demographics are more transparent and less prone to this type of dissatisfaction. However, it has been suggested that, in some cases, categorical targeting of social groups deemed undeserving of assistance, such as ex-combatants in post-conflict contexts, might result in feelings of resentment by those excluded from the programme, thus impairing the process of peacebuilding (Holmes, 2009). Furthermore, some researchers suggest that community-based targeting results in higher levels of acceptance because of the involvement of key local stakeholders and community members relative to methods such as proxy-means testing (Alatas et al., 2012; Ellis, 2012). Clear communication about programme objectives and targeting and the involvement of the community in programme design and

beneficiary selection can therefore significantly reduce the risks associated with intracommunity tensions and negative state-society relations (Pavanello et al., 2016).

The receipt of resources and services can foster social cohesion through enhancement of self-confidence, agency and empowerment. The greater availability of resources that allow beneficiaries to participate in ceremonial, cultural and other social activities can help strengthen social ties and break isolation (Pavanello et al., 2016). Better economic and financial standing can also reduce feelings of shame and stigma related to poverty and decrease social marginalization (Roelen, 2017). Children able to attend school can feel more accepted among their peers, greater satisfaction with their achievements and more self-worth, contributing to the agency of children and adolescents (Attah et al., 2016). Being selected to receive a regular programme transfer, particularly if it is a benefit from a state actor, can improve the confidence an individual has about the future and can strengthen trust in institutions (Pavanello et al., 2016). These impacts can accrue not only from the receipt of financial resources, but also from the complementary services and system links layered onto or integrated into programmes (Roelen et al., 2017). For example, numerous social protection programmes require or encourage the active social engagement of beneficiaries, which has the potential to expand social networks and social capital. These design features could include participation in training and other group activities or social events (whether conditional or unconditional) that have been found to generate feelings of solidarity, mutual support and enhanced dignity (Pavanello et al., 2016). However, the creation of groups and activities associated with the programme can also foster social divisions, particularly if beneficiaries are part of already socially marginalized groups (Skoufias, 2005).

These design features and mechanisms may be critical within social protection programmes targeting minorities or isolated and vulnerable groups, including refugees. For example, if programmes exclusively select a minority non-national citizen group, excluded

local vulnerable individuals could perceive this as unfair, resulting in higher levels of social fragmentation and tension. These tensions may be more likely if the benefits are being received from government sources, which may be viewed as crowding out funding for other national priorities. Social protection could also foster solidarity among refugees and national beneficiaries, especially if the social interaction is encouraged for the first time through the programme. This was the case in post-conflict Nepal and Sierra Leone, where cash transfers were implemented with the rationale of contributing to the peace process and social cohesion by targeting marginalized groups (Holmes, 2009). According to definitions of Narayan (1999) and Putnam (2000), social protection can foster bonding social capital, that is, solidarity among members of a same group, and bridging social capital, that is, linking between social groups.

As documented by an extensive literature (reviewed by Bauer et al., 2016), individuals who have been exposed to crime or war appear to exhibit more pro-social behaviour and more civic and political engagement, particularly within groups of similarly affected individuals. For example, in Sierra Leone, individuals who had experienced more violence were also more likely to attend community meetings, vote, join social and political groups, and participate in school committees and road brushing (Bellows and Miguel, 2006, 2009). They were also more altruistic and more inequality averse towards in-group members during lab-in-field experiments (Bauer et al., 2014). However, Bauer et al. (2016) hypothesize that the substantial within-group cohesion is associated with a lack of social cohesion between groups as a direct consequence of parochial attitudes. This has the potential to promote conflict cycles and a return to violence. A social protection policy focused on refugees therefore has the potential for both positive and negative effects on both intra- and intergroup social cohesion.

3. Programme, evaluation design and methodology

3a. Programme and Context

Ecuador is the largest refugee-hosting country in Latin America. It hosts primarily Colombian nationals fleeing from the decades-long conflict initiated by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. According to UNHCR (2012), Ecuador was hosting approximately 55,500 refugees at the time of the study in 2012, nearly all of whom had originated in Colombia. However, because of increasingly stringent application and approval processes, there were estimated to be approximately 68,300 people in refugee-like status and 14,400 asylum seekers of Colombian nationality, with nearly 70 per cent of refugees residing in urban areas. International actors have therefore focused on strengthening the implementation of urban programming and assistance to these groups. There is evidence that Colombian refugees are subject to discrimination and stigma, with implications for economic and health outcomes (Erk, 2016; Shedlin et al., 2014). In some cases, this can be explicitly linked to common perceptions that Colombian refugees are linked to violence and the drug trade, a belief that stakeholders have sought to address through media and other campaigns (UNHCR, 2012).

In response to the vulnerabilities experienced by Colombian refugees, WFP initiated the a cash, food and voucher pilot programme that ran from April 2011 to September 2011. The programme was targeted on Colombian refugees and poor Ecuadorians across urban and peri-urban neighbourhoods in seven urban centres in the northern provinces of Carchi and Sucumbíos. The three objectives of the programme were to (1) improve food consumption by facilitating access to more nutritious foods, (2) enhance the role of women in household decision-making related to food consumption and (3) reduce tensions between Colombians and host Ecuadorian populations. Neighbourhoods within the seven urban centres were selected for programme implementation based on consultations with UNHCR because both areas included large numbers of refugees and significant poverty. Households qualified for the transfers

provided through the programme if they met the poverty threshold as determined by a proxy-means test and if they were not currently receiving benefits from the government flagship cash transfer programme. Transfers equivalent to US\$40 were targeted on women and delivered monthly. Cash transfers were delivered on pre-paid ATM cards. Food transfers consisted of rice, vegetable oil, lentils and canned sardines. Food vouchers were redeemable for pre-approved nutritious foods at local supermarkets. Transfer and voucher beneficiaries were required to attend monthly sessions on nutrition training.

Previous analysis of the data indicates that the transfers were successful in meeting food security objectives. They raised both the quantity and quality of the food consumed, and also resulted in decreases in intimate partner violence (Buller et al. 2016; Hidrobo, Peterman, and Heise, 2016; Hidrobo et al., 2014).

Although the programme did not implement intensive activities to create impacts on social cohesion, there were implicit targeting decisions, socialization and messaging components that may have influenced social cohesion on an interpersonal level, in addition to the benefits of interacting with WFP and receiving economic transfers. For example, in targeting areas with high populations of Colombians and in delivering the same benefits to both Colombians and Ecuadorians in these areas, WFP aimed to create a feeling of equal treatment.⁷ In addition, through the nutrition training sessions, interaction between both nationalities occurred, for the first time in a meaningful way in some cases. There was also explicit messaging at the start of the programme, as beneficiaries were being sensitized to the overall programme components and guidelines and the programme was being presented to local

⁷ Originally, WFP had planned that the programme would be targeted exclusively on Colombians. However, this was viewed as problematic because it might create social tensions. Thus, the scope was expanded to include both nationalities (excluding Ecuadorians already receiving the government flagship cash transfer, the bono desarrollo humano).

administrative and government stakeholders. For example, the first page of a programme guidance booklet explained that Colombians had come to Ecuador after fleeing violence and were in need of assistance equally with Ecuadorians, and it described Ecuador as a welcoming country (figure 1). The information includes messages motivated by statistics on the region indicating that poor nutrition affects all people and that no one should be left behind.

3b. Evaluation Design

The cluster-randomized control trial included four arms and 145 clusters randomized to cash, food, food vouchers and a control. Because of the close geographical proximity between clusters, the randomization was performed in a two-stage process whereby, first, neighbourhoods were randomized into treatment and control, and, subsequently, clusters within treatment neighbourhoods were randomized to treatment arms (cash, food and food vouchers) (see figure A.1). The baseline survey was conducted in March and April 2011, before the first transfers, and the endline survey was carried out approximately seven months later, in October–November 2011. The evaluation was implemented by the International Food Policy Research Institute, along with the data collection partner, the Centro de Estudios de Poblacion y Desarrollo Social. The ethics review took place at the International Food Policy Research Institute in Washington, DC, and at the Centro de Estudios de Poblacion y Desarrollo Social in Quito, Ecuador. In total, 2,122 households were surveyed in both waves. The household attrition rate was approximately 10 per cent. For this analysis, we restrict the sample to the panel of individuals who responded to the questionnaire at both baseline and midline (who were most often also the transfer beneficiaries). The overall attrition rate among individuals was 20 per cent, indicating that, in approximately 10 per cent of the baseline households, different individuals answered the questionnaires at different times. Although the individual attrition rate was slightly higher in the control group (table A.1), the difference is not statistically significant.

Despite the similar overall attrition rates between the treatment and control groups, differential attrition may still threaten the internal validity of the study if the characteristics of the individuals who left the panel are different from those of individuals who stayed, and these characteristics also influence social cohesion. We therefore examine if individuals who left the survey are different between treatment and control groups with respect to background characteristics and the outcomes of social cohesion at baseline. Comparing the p-value of differences from tests of means, only one of 18 background characteristics appears to exhibit a statistical difference between control and treatment attritors at the $p < .10$ level or higher (table A.2, column 8). Specifically, treatment attritors live in smaller households compared with control attritors (3.8 members versus 4.11 members; p-value: .09). Because of these few differences, we can assume that attrition is unlikely to be a concern for the internal validity of the study, a conclusion also reached by other analysis using these evaluation data (Hidrobo, Peterman, and Heise, 2016; Hidrobo et al., 2014).

Demonstration of equivalence between treatment and control groups at baseline is also a prerequisite for the internal validity of the study and estimation of unbiased treatment effects. Table 1 shows that, among the 18 background characteristics, six are statistically different between the treatment and control groups at the $p < .10$ level or higher (Colombian nationality, including those who resided in the urban centre for more than 20 years, household size, number of children aged 6–15 years, and second and fifth wealth quintiles). These baseline imbalances of background characteristics are larger than expected, given the demonstrated balance of the household panel and result primarily from the use of the individual panel in this analysis (Hidrobo et al., 2014). We perform a joint orthogonality test by regressing the background characteristics on an indicator of treatment and computing the F-test across background characteristics, which confirms joint imbalance (F-stat = 2.01; $p = .024$). Thus, to address these

differences and improve the precision of estimates, we explicitly control for baseline measures in our estimation strategy.

In addition, we examine the disaggregated social cohesion components into 33 indicators and find that eight are statistically different at the $p < .10$ level or higher, of which one is an aggregate indicator (table 2). In particular, the standardized sum of the lack of discrimination indicator is lower in the treatment group (-0.16 versus 0.00 ; p -value: $.05$). Because of this imbalance, we interpret impacts on discrimination with caution, as well as individual disaggregated indicators showing imbalances (which primarily fall into the same discrimination index). We return to this discussion in the limitation section.

3c. Analysis Methodology

We use the analysis of covariance models (ANCOVA), which predict our social cohesion outcome of interest, while controlling for baseline values of the same indicator (Hidrobo, Peterman, and Heise, 2016; Hidrobo et al., 2014). ANCOVA estimates are preferred over difference in differences estimates in scenarios where autocorrelation of outcomes is low over time and provide a more efficient estimation of the effect (McKenzie, 2012). Autocorrelation for our main outcomes are low, ranging from 0.05 to 0.30 for the standardized aggregate indices (see table A.3). We run simple unadjusted models and models adjusting for covariates and cluster standard errors at the cluster level, using the basic model equation (1):

$$Y_{hj1} = \alpha + \beta_p Treat_j + \gamma Y_{hj0} + \delta C_{hj} + \theta P_{hj} + \mu_j + \varepsilon_{hj}, \quad (1)$$

where Y_{hj1} is the social cohesion outcome of interest for household h from cluster j at follow-up, and Y_{hj0} is the same at baseline. $Treat_j$ is an indicator of presence in a treatment cluster, which can be broken down into three indicators, one each for food, cash and vouchers. B_p is the intent-to-treat estimator for the pooled treatment, or the effect of being assigned to any treatment arm. δC_{hj} represents a set of basic covariates for our adjusted models, including

the following: respondent's attainment of secondary education or higher (dummy); age (years), sex (female dummy), if married (dummy) and nationality (Colombian dummy); household size; number of children aged 0–5 years; number of children aged 6–15 years; dummies for wealth quintiles (based on a wealth index constructed using assets and dwelling infrastructure); and an indicator of residence in an urban centre for less than or equal to 20 years (dummy). Our indicator of Colombian nationality is based on a simple question regarding self-reported nationality; however, our findings are robust to an alternative indicator asking about the country of birth (not shown). We cannot explicitly distinguish refugees and asylum seekers (or refugee-like individuals) or other types of migrants using this definition, and thus our assumption is that Colombian nationals in these areas are likely to be refugees. In all models (both adjusted and unadjusted), we control for residence in Carchi Province because the randomization was stratified at the province level (θP_{hj}). Finally, μ_j and ε_{hj} are iid errors across clusters and across households within clusters.

Our outcome indicators representing social cohesion include six indices that capture various dimensions: (1) interpersonal trust and social connectedness, (2) personal agency, (3) attitudes accepting diversity, (4) lack of discrimination, (5) confidence in institutions, and (6) social participation (table 2). We also analyse an overall social cohesion indicator that is an aggregate of all six subindices. Following the procedure set out in Banerjee et al. (2015), we construct the indices by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes the six dimensions of social cohesion (obtained by subtracting the control group mean for each round and dividing it by the control standard deviation) and then by standardizing these again with reference to the control group. We also calculate the indices through principal component analysis (PCA), although the scale reliability coefficient for some of the aggregated indices suggests that this methodology performs poorly in summarizing these

indicators (table A.4).⁸ We therefore rely primarily on the standardized z-score index, but still perform robustness checks using PCA.

All outcome measures are built from questions elicited in a module focused on perceptions and discrimination that was collected both at baseline and endline. To allow aggregation, all questions were converted so higher values equate to higher levels of social cohesion. For instance, questions on the experience of discrimination were transformed into questions about freedom from discrimination. In addition, as different indicators included varying response options (some binary; some on a Likert scale), standardization ensures that each contributes equally to the overall domain of social cohesion. We consider all measures collected that fit the domain definitions; however, in a few cases, we combine indicators where the incidence is too low to allow inclusion (for example, group participation).

Our main analysis seeks to understand if transfers affect social cohesion measures, and if these effects differ between Colombians and Ecuadorians. We test the difference between nationalities by interacting the indicator of baseline Colombian nationality with the treatment indicator. We then consider if these dynamics differ based on the type of transfer (cash, food, or voucher) or the history of migration among Colombians, as measured by the self-reported motivation for migrating. We hypothesize that migrants who are motivated by, for example, conflict or political reasons may have different profiles, with implications for social cohesion impacts compared with those who migrate for economic gain. We collect self-reported migration information only for those individuals who migrated in the previous 20 years and collapse self-reported migration into three domains: economic, political, and personal or other.

⁸ To assess whether the combination of individual indicators are a proxy for the underlying conceptual variable we use Cronbach's alpha, according to which indicators with alpha levels lower than 0.5 are unacceptable (Boermans and Kattenberg, 2011). Among our set of aggregate indicators, two perform as unacceptable, three between poor and questionable, and two as acceptable (see table A.4).

We compare interactions with these three categories or the alternative of residing in the urban centre for more than 20 years with the pooled treatment to assess if transfers affect social cohesion differentially by migrant type.

4. Results

Table 1 shows that 34 per cent of the sample identify as Colombian nationals, while 9 per cent reported they were Colombian and migrating for economic or political reasons; 6 per cent reported they were Colombian and migrating for personal or other reasons, and 10 per cent reported they were Colombian and a resident in the urban centre for over 20 years. Approximately 80 per cent of the sample are female and are, on average, 39 years old. Approximately 36 per cent have some secondary education or higher, and, on average, households contain nearly four members. Table 2 supplies detailed domain and indicator information as well as baseline values for the 33 social cohesion indicators aggregated into seven domain outcomes. Although we analyse the standardized indices for reasons mentioned above, we report the raw values of indicators here for ease of interpretation and to contextualize levels of social cohesion. The majority of indicators are either reported as binary or on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). For example, most individuals believe that people from different nationalities live together well in their communities (score 3.5 of 4.0, indicator 3 in attitudes accepting diversity), and 86 per cent of the sample reports they have not been discriminated against in the past six months because of their nationality (binary indicator, indicator 7 in freedom from discrimination). In total, the raw aggregate social cohesion indicator ranges from 35 to 115, with an average score of 67.3 among the full sample.

The main regression results are reported in table 3 as adjusted models whereby we assess the impact of the transfers on social cohesion (odd columns) and explore whether the

treatment had differential effects on Colombians and Ecuadorians (even columns). Transfers have a positive effect on agency, confidence in institutions, and overall social cohesion, on average, within the sample. The size of these effects are similar across these dimensions, ranging from 0.15 to 0.18 standard deviations. The coefficient for Colombian national across outcomes is typically negative, indicating that Colombians, on average, show statistically lower levels of social cohesion, particularly in relation to confidence in institutions and lack of discrimination. Alternatively, Colombians exhibit, on average, higher outcomes regarding attitudes accepting diversity. When the treatment is interacted with the indicator of Colombian nationality, there is a differential impact by nationality for personal agency (0.46 standard deviations higher), attitudes accepting diversity (0.22 standard deviations higher) and social participation (0.21 standard deviations higher). We also compute the absolute treatment effect for Colombians, reported in the bottom row of the table, which indicates that transfers improved four domains of social cohesion among Colombians (agency, attitudes accepting diversity, confidence in institutions, and social participation), as well as the overall social cohesion outcome.⁹ These net impacts are sizeable, ranging from 0.23 to 0.46 standard deviation increases. These results indicate that overall positive treatment effects across domains are driven primarily by the effect on treated Colombians.

We run the same regressions using the social cohesion indices constructed through PCA for robustness and find that, where indicators performed reliably, the results are in line with table 3 (table A.5).¹⁰ In addition, we replicate table 3 using unadjusted models and report our

⁹ The overall (or net) effect is obtained as a linear combination of the parameters on treatment and the treatment for Colombians.

¹⁰ To assess whether the combination of individual indicators is a proxy for the underlying conceptual variable, we use Cronbach's alpha, according to which indicators with alpha levels lower than 0.5 are unacceptable (Boermans and Kattenberg, 2011). Among our set of aggregate indicators, two perform as unacceptable, three between poor and questionable, and two as acceptable (see table A.4).

findings in table A.6. The unadjusted results are similar to our main models; however, they tend to be larger and more significant. This is likely partly because we are no longer controlling for length of residence in the community, which may be correlated with nationality and our outcome measures.

Because the treatment was implemented in three forms (food, cash, and food vouchers), we investigate whether the treatment results differed by arm. As the results reported in table 4 indicate, there is no clear pattern showing that one arm differentially increased social cohesion. As shown by tests of equivalency at the bottom of the table, there are statistical differences in only two cases. For trust in individuals, food transfers are statistically larger than cash and voucher transfers, and, for attitudes accepting diversity, cash impacts are larger than vouchers. While the significance of coefficients varies across outcome domains, the F-tests indicating statistical significance cannot be rejected in any other case. Similar to the result using the pooled treatment, each transfer arm (cash, food and voucher) show significant effects on overall social cohesion, ranging from 0.14 to 0.19 standard deviations. We interact the three treatment arms with the dummy for Colombian national, and no clear pattern emerges regarding differential treatment by modality and nationality (results not reported). However, the study is not powered to examine these heterogeneities; we thus cannot exclude the possibility that this lack of significance arises because of insufficient power.

To explore possible differential effects by type of Colombian migrant, we examine interactions between motivation for migration and the pooled treatment. The results reported in table 5 show few differential effects by migration motivation, with the exception of differences by economic migration. First, economic migrants have a statistically higher treatment effect on agency and confidence in institutions, but a lower treatment effect on social participation compared with political migrants. Economic migrants also have a higher treatment effect on confidence in institutions compared with migrants for personal reasons.

Colombians who migrated for economic reasons have a lower treatment effect on trust in individuals compared with Colombians who are long-term residents. We therefore conclude that economic migrants show some differential attributes and treatment outcomes with respect to other groups; however, few other patterns emerge.

To understand how migrant types differ, we provide descriptive profiles of the Colombian sample by migration status (table A.7). Colombians who moved for economic reasons appear similar on most background characteristics; however, they exhibit some demographic differences, specifically in relation to politically motivated migrants (smaller household size and fewer young children). Economic migrants appear to have moved, on average, more often (1.6 times, not counting the most recent move), while a smaller share moved with the entire household the first time they moved (38 per cent) relative to political migrants. In addition, they are less likely to be female, have smaller household size, have fewer school-age children and have suffered select adverse experiences since moving, including lower incidence of verbal threats (24 per cent) and levels of kidnapping (2 per cent) relative to personal migrants. All samples report unacceptably high levels of adverse violent events since migrating, including verbal insults or attacks (24–37 per cent), physical threats or attacks with a knife or gun (8–12 per cent), or robbery or property damage (17–23 per cent).

We analyse disaggregated indicators that we used to construct the six dimensions of social cohesion to investigate which indicators drive the results on aggregate indicators, while adjusting for issues of multiple testing. As suggested by Anderson (2008), we adjust the p-values of each indicator to reflect the multiple-inference problem by controlling the familywise error rate through Sidak-Bonferroni corrections.¹¹ We report these by domain in annex tables

¹¹ *adjusted* $\alpha = 1 - (1 - \textit{unadjusted } \alpha)^C$, where C is the number of indicators in the domain.

A.8–A.13. Overall, we find that few specific indicators are significant, which may not be surprising given the gains in power from aggregating into domains. For example, among the aggregates we find significant in table 3, three of the five indicators capturing personal agency are significant for the treated Colombians: “My life is determined by my own actions”, “I have the power to take important decisions to change my life”, and “I am satisfied with my life”. Among the indicators for attitudes accepting diversity, none are individually statistically significant with familywise error rate corrections (although two are individually statistically significant without the correction). In relation to confidence in institutions, only the non-interacted treatment effect for one indicator is statistically significant (the indicator associated with the question: “If I am a victim of a crime, I can go to the police to get help”). For social participation, the indicator on participation in NGOs and cultural groups appears to drive the overall treatment impacts found in the aggregate index; however, after adjustment for the familywise error rate, the differential effect by Colombian nationality is no longer significant. The impact on NGO participation could reflect participation in the cash and voucher programme, rather than an effect on broader group participation.

5. Discussion and Conclusions

Using an experimental evaluation of cash, food and food vouchers targeted on Colombian refugees and poor Ecuadorians in urban and peri-urban areas, we examine whether the programme resulted in short-term changes in social cohesion measures. Overall results across six domains of social cohesion suggest that the programme contributed to the integration of Colombians in the hosting communities through increases in personal agency, attitudes accepting diversity, confidence in institutions, social participation, and overall social cohesion for Colombians specifically. The size of the impacts on domains of social cohesion among Colombians is substantial; net increases range from 0.23 to 0.46 standard deviations,

compensating for lower baseline values of cohesion. However, there were no measurable impacts on social cohesion among Ecuadorian participants. In addition, two of the six dimensions of social cohesion are not affected by the treatment among either group, namely, trust in individuals and freedom from discrimination. There were no negative impacts of the programme on indicators or domains analysed here, although qualitative or other methodologies may be more well suited to the identification of such effects.

Our results are in line with the positive effects found by Lehmann and Masterson (2014), who found that cash transfers to Syrian refugees resulted in an approximately 19 per cent increase in receiving help from Lebanese community members (26 per cent in controls versus 31 per cent in treatment, including looking after children when you are sick, help with the housework, or giving money). Recipients were also 66 per cent less likely to be insulted by Lebanese community members (10 per cent in control versus 6 per cent in treatment). The authors hypothesize that transfers were shared among community members, thus creating goodwill and facilitating social networks. The increased financial support was hypothesized to relax time and mental constraints; thus, the time previously spent on income generation could be used to build social ties. This example is somewhat comparable with our study because the cash transfer was also implemented by a non-governmental actor (UNHCR and partners) and for a relatively short time (US\$575 in total over six months). Although different in programme design, our results are also in line with a number of other studies in development settings across measures of social capital and trust in institutions or community leaders and implemented by government actors over longer periods (Attanasio, Polania-Reyes, and Pellerano, 2015; Camacho, 2014; Evans, Holtemeyer, and Kosec, 2018).

Because the evaluation was not designed explicitly to examine the mechanisms through which the programme improved social cohesion, we are limited in the additional analysis possible to examine mechanisms explicitly. The economic transfers, targeting, messaging and

nutrition training that facilitated interaction among nationalities were components of every treatment arm; thus, it is impossible to disentangle specific contributions. However, we conduct descriptive analysis to understand if transfers allowed the sharing of resources (thus potentially leading to increased network size and trust in individuals) and if control and treatment households were differentially affected by adverse shocks at endline (indicating potential targeted attacks because of jealousy or adverse effects associated with the programme). We find evidence of a greater sharing of resources in the number of meals with non-household members, suggesting a potential mechanism, but not in total household cash and in-kind transfers in and out of the household. Furthermore, we find no differential experience of adverse shocks at endline between treatment and control groups (including theft of money, food or other goods from home, destruction of property, physical attacks, loss of job).¹²

There are several limitations. We are not able to distinguish with certainty if the sample of Colombian nationals can be truly classified as refugees (legally defined). In addition, we may lack sufficient power to detect differential effects among subsamples analysed here, for example differential analysis by migration motivation. Although gender differences in these outcomes are undoubtedly interesting, we are unable to say if impacts varied by the gender of the target recipient because our sample contained primarily women and was not randomized by sex,. Similarly, we analyse the perspective of only one adult household member. Thus, we cannot say if, for example, there are diverse (positive or negative) social cohesion experiences among other household members, including children. In fact, we are not aware of any publication that has examined children's perspectives on social cohesion within an empirical evaluation of a social protection programme. Because of imbalances at baseline, the results on lack of discrimination outcomes and specific disaggregated indicators exhibiting imbalances

¹² Results, not shown, are available upon request.

must be interpreted with caution; they may be biased because of differential initial values. Although we conduct additional descriptive analysis, we are unable to disentangle sufficiently the part of the programme or the combination of parts that were responsible for impacts.

Although there is little consensus on the exact domains and indicators necessary to measure social cohesion comprehensively, a more unified framework and consensus on the relevant components would facilitate future research. In our own analysis, because of data limitations, we excluded several relevant dimensions theorized by some to be critical to social cohesion, including crime, conflict and stability (Babajanian, 2012). In some contexts, for example, cash transfer recipients in the State of Palestine, increased marginalization and stigma have been reported, which may also be relevant in assessing the impact of transfers on social cohesion (Pavanello et al., 2016; Roelen, 2017). These dimensions are quite nuanced, similar to measures we assessed (for example, discrimination), and may require qualitative work to unpack specific measures. Other researchers have proposed that a behavioural approach (for example, field experiments and lab experiments) are more suitable for capturing unbiased measures of outcomes, including trust, cooperation and social capital. However, it is not clear that analysis using these measures differs significantly from survey-based outcomes (Attanasio, Polania-Reyes, and Pellerano, 2015; Avdeenko and Gilligan, 2015; Glaeser et al., 2000). For many of these indicators, it would be important to collect information on overall community dynamics, including spillover effects on non-recipient households in treatment communities, to assess potential negative effects on those not eligible for benefits. Overall, additional investment is needed in rigorous testing of indicators, domains and indices to capture locally relevant and contextual measures of social cohesion confidently.

This study demonstrates that even short-term social protection schemes hold promise for positively affecting social cohesion between refugees and host populations. As programming is scaled up in diverse settings, including communities hosting Syrian refugees

in the Middle East, Europe and elsewhere, there is a need for more programme-specific evidence. For example, dynamics may be different in settings where there are higher proportions of refugees and starker differences between ethnicity, culture and social standing of refugee and hosting communities. Impacts may differ between men and women, by rural or urban setting, or by programme design components, particularly related to messaging, complementary programming, and the transparency and inclusiveness of targeting. We encourage further mixed-methods evaluations in diverse settings, as well as methodological innovation to identify the most promising and contextually relevant outcome indicators of social cohesion and mechanisms through which impacts may be realized.

6. References

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Figures and Tables

Figure 1. Programme booklet introducing the motivation behind targeting Colombian nationals ('Ecuador: A welcoming country')



Ecuador: Un país de acogida

En los últimos años, muchos ciudadanos colombianos, se han visto en la necesidad de buscar refugio en nuestro país, debido a la situación de violencia que se vive en Colombia.

Ecuador y especialmente sus ciudadanas y ciudadanos, pese a sus limitados recursos, les han abierto las puertas para que su estadía en tierra ecuatoriana sea más llevadera.

Sin embargo, existen condiciones económicas y sociales, que hacen que la situación de los refugiados como la de las familias ecuatorianas de acogida, sea delicada.

Algunas cifras reflejan esta situación:

En Sucumbios y Carchi-Imbabura, 80 de cada 100 ecuatorianos son pobres. **1**

En el caso de los hermanos colombianos la situación no es diferente:

20 de cada 100 refugiados colombianos en Sucumbios y 14 de cada 100 refugiados en Carchi viven una situación de extrema pobreza.

Esta condición afecta la calidad de la alimentación de las familias tanto ecuatorianas como colombianas, de manera especial, la de los niños y niñas menores de cinco años y de las mujeres embarazadas y en período de lactancia.

- 5 de cada 10 niños y niñas tienen anemia.
- 4 de cada 10 embarazadas tienen anemia.

Superar esta situación y lograr la seguridad alimentaria y nutricional es responsabilidad de TODAS Y TODOS.

Source: WFP programme materials, cash and voucher intervention, 2011.

Table 1: Baseline Characteristics of Respondents and test of equivalence at baseline

	All	Control	Treatment	p-value of diff.
Colombian	0.34	0.42	0.31	0.06
Colombian: economic motivation for migration	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.72
Colombian: political motivation for migration	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.56
Colombian: personal motivation for migration	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.54
Colombian: resided in urban centre > 20 years	0.10	0.16	0.07	0.00
Female	0.81	0.80	0.81	0.63
Age	39.01	39.27	38.91	0.71
Married	0.27	0.27	0.26	0.87
Secondary education or higher	0.36	0.33	0.38	0.27
Household size	3.75	3.92	3.69	0.06
Number of children aged 0–5 years	0.60	0.56	0.61	0.31
Number of children aged 6–15 years	0.89	0.99	0.86	0.05
Wealth index: 2nd quintile	0.19	0.14	0.21	0.00
Wealth index: 3rd quintile	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.82
Wealth index: 4th quintile	0.21	0.20	0.21	0.73
Wealth index: 5th quintile	0.20	0.26	0.18	0.05
Resident in urban centre ≤ 20 years	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.89
Carchi Province	0.39	0.33	0.40	0.48
<i>N</i>	1,878	505	1,373	

Note: p-values are reported from Wald tests on the equality of means of treatment and control for each variable. Standard errors are clustered at the cluster level.

Table 2: Baseline social cohesion aggregate outcomes, individual indicators and test of equivalence at baseline

	All	Control	Treatment	p-value of diff.
Trust in individuals and social connectedness (standardized index)	-0.03	-0.00	-0.04	0.54
Trust in individuals and social connectedness (sum; range: 3-65)	11.84	12.36	11.65	0.15
(1) I trust most people*	2.46	2.44	2.47	0.77
(2) I can rely on my neighbour for sending mail*	2.56	2.49	2.58	0.37
(3) I can rely on my neighbour to take care of my house if I am away*	2.81	2.79	2.82	0.75
(4) Network size (Number of people who would lend US\$10 in time of need)	2.13	2.33	2.06	0.06
(5) Network size (Number of people who would lend US\$100 in time of need)	1.88	2.30	1.73	0.11
Personal agency (standardized index)	0.05	0.00	0.07	0.50
Personal agency (sum; range: 5-20)	17.73	17.59	17.78	0.45
(1) My life is determined by my own actions*	3.78	3.73	3.80	0.25
(2) I have the power to take important decision to change my life*	3.67	3.60	3.69	0.16
(3) I am satisfied with my life*	3.55	3.53	3.56	0.69
(4) I am capable of protecting my own interests*	3.81	3.80	3.81	0.92
(5) Overall, how do you feel lately? (1=very unhappy – 4=very happy)	2.92	2.93	2.92	0.70
Attitudes accepting diversity (standardized index)	0.04	0.00	0.06	0.49
Attitudes accepting diversity (sum; range: 3-12)	9.01	8.91	9.04	0.40
(1) Cultural diversity is good*	3.61	3.61	3.61	0.95
(2) Xenophobia is not an issue*	1.92	1.84	1.96	0.26
(3) In my community people from different nationalities live well together*	3.47	3.47	3.48	0.90
Lack of discrimination (last 6 months, standardized index)	-0.12	-0.00	-0.16	0.05
Lack of discrimination (last 6 months, sum; range: 0-10)	9.07	9.18	9.03	0.15
(1) Freedom from discrimination due to ethnic (=1)	0.94	0.95	0.93	0.06
(2) Freedom from discrimination due to gender (=1)	0.95	0.97	0.95	0.05
(3) Freedom from discrimination due to social condition (=1)	0.73	0.73	0.73	1.00
(4) Freedom from discrimination due to occupation (=1)	0.86	0.87	0.85	0.25
(5) Freedom from discrimination due to political views (=1)	0.96	0.98	0.95	0.00
(6) Freedom from discrimination due to disability (=1)	0.90	0.91	0.90	0.24
(7) Freedom from discrimination due to nationality (=1)	0.86	0.85	0.87	0.67
(8) Freedom from discrimination due to religious beliefs (=1)	0.94	0.96	0.93	0.09
(9) Freedom from discrimination due to physical appearance (=1)	0.95	0.96	0.94	0.05
(10) Freedom from discrimination due to other reasons (=1)	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.92
Confidence in institutions (standardized index)	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.72
Confidence in institutions (sum; range: 6-24)	18.98	18.94	18.99	0.84
(1) The Government would help my family in an emergency*	3.01	3.02	3.01	0.88
(2) Politicians represent my interests*	2.02	2.01	2.02	0.90

(3) If I am victim of a crime, I can go to the police to get help*	3.54	3.54	3.54	0.97
(4) I have the space to participate in the decisions of my community*	2.98	3.04	2.96	0.44
(5) I have the right to social basic assistance*	3.74	3.69	3.77	0.26
(6) I feel part of the community*	3.68	3.64	3.70	0.42
Social participation (standardized index)	-0.09	0.00	-0.12	0.16
Social participation (sum; range: 0-4)	0.71	0.78	0.68	0.22
(1) Participation in agricultural association or union (=1)	0.06	0.10	0.05	0.07
(2) Participation in religious or spiritual group (=1)	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.86
(3) Participation in community association or political group (=1)	0.24	0.23	0.24	0.88
(4) Participation in other groups (NGOs, cultural) (=1)	0.13	0.16	0.11	0.12
Social cohesion (standardized index)	-0.06	0.00	-0.08	0.31
Social cohesion (sum; range: 35-115)	67.34	67.76	67.18	0.43

Note: p-values are reported from Wald tests on the equality of means of treatment and control for each variable. Standard errors are clustered at the cluster level. PCA = principal component index.

* Values range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).

Table 3: ANCOVA models of impact of transfers on social cohesion measures (standardized indices)

	Trust in individuals		Agency		Attitudes accepting diversity		Lack of discrimination		Confidence in institutions		Social participation		Social cohesion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Pooled treatment	0.05 (0.07)	0.10 (0.08)	0.18 (0.09)**	-0.00 (0.05)	0.11 (0.07)	0.02 (0.06)	0.05 (0.07)	0.06 (0.10)	0.15 (0.08)*	0.06 (0.07)	0.11 (0.07)	0.02 (0.08)	0.17 (0.07)**	0.08 (0.07)
Colombian	0.01 (0.07)	0.09 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.35 (0.16)**	0.20 (0.06)***	0.04 (0.12)	-0.17 (0.07)**	-0.14 (0.14)	-0.12 (0.06)*	-0.27 (0.14)**	0.00 (0.05)	-0.15 (0.08)*	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.26 (0.14)*
Pooled treatment X Colombian		-0.11 (0.13)		0.46 (0.16)***		0.22 (0.13)*		-0.03 (0.14)		0.22 (0.15)		0.21 (0.10)**		0.24 (0.15)
R^2	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.09	0.09	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.12	0.12
N	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878
Net treatment Colombian		-0.01 (0.10)		0.46 (0.17)***		0.25 (0.13)*		0.03 (0.11)		0.28 (0.14)**		0.24 (0.08)***		0.32 (0.14)**

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the cluster level. Aggregate outcomes are compiled using standardized indicators. All regressions include the following covariates at baseline: respondent attainment of secondary education or higher (dummy); age of respondent; female (dummy); married (dummy); household size; number of children aged 0–5 years; number of children aged 6–15 years; dummies for wealth quintiles (based on wealth index); resident in urban centre ≤ 20 years (dummy); residing in Carchi Province (dummy); dependent variables at baseline.

* $p < .1$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Table 4: ANCOVA models of impact of transfers by treatment modalities on social cohesion measures (standardized indices) with covariates

	Trust in individuals	Agency	Attitudes accepting diversity	Lack of discrimination	Confidence in institutions	Social participation	Social cohesion
Treatment = food	0.21 (0.10)**	0.14 (0.12)	0.13 (0.10)	−0.01 (0.10)	0.15 (0.09)	0.13 (0.11)	0.19 (0.10)**
Treatment = cash	−0.03 (0.08)	0.22 (0.09)**	0.05 (0.08)	0.06 (0.08)	0.17 (0.08)**	0.03 (0.08)	0.14 (0.08)*
Treatment = voucher	0.02 (0.08)	0.16 (0.10)*	0.15 (0.08)*	0.08 (0.08)	0.13 (0.09)	0.16 (0.08)**	0.19 (0.08)**
R^2	0.07	0.05	0.02	0.09	0.07	0.07	0.12
N	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878
F test: food = voucher	3.14	0.04	0.07	1.14	0.06	0.08	0.01
p-value	0.08	0.84	0.79	0.29	0.81	0.78	0.91
F test: cash = voucher	0.33	0.71	2.90	0.12	0.30	2.43	0.76
p-value	0.57	0.40	0.09	0.73	0.58	0.12	0.38
F test: food = cash	5.06	0.63	0.87	0.55	0.05	0.82	0.29
p-value	0.03	0.43	0.35	0.46	0.82	0.37	0.59

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the cluster level. Aggregate outcomes are compiled using standardized indicators. All regressions include the following covariates at baseline: respondent attainment of secondary education or higher (dummy); age of respondent; female (dummy); married (dummy); household size; number of children aged 0–5 years; number of children aged 6–15 years; dummies for wealth quintiles (based on wealth index); resident in urban centre ≤ 20 years (dummy); residing in Carchi Province (dummy); dependent variables at baseline.

* $p < .1$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Table 5: ANCOVA models of differential impact of transfers on social cohesion measures (sum) with respect to Colombian Migration reasons

	Trust in individuals	Agency	Attitudes accepting diversity	Lack of discrimination	Confidence in institution	Social participation	Social cohesion
Pooled treatment	0.10 (0.08)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.06 (0.10)	0.06 (0.07)	0.02 (0.08)	0.08 (0.07)
Colombian: economic motivation for migration	0.41 (0.20)**	-0.52 (0.27)*	-0.08 (0.18)	-0.10 (0.17)	-0.47 (0.23)**	0.03 (0.13)	-0.26 (0.20)
Colombian: political motivation for migration	0.03 (0.14)	-0.35 (0.22)	0.13 (0.18)	-0.37 (0.24)	-0.18 (0.22)	-0.15 (0.11)	-0.34 (0.26)
Colombian: personal motivation for migration	0.13 (0.21)	-0.33 (0.19)*	0.09 (0.15)	0.03 (0.29)	0.01 (0.20)	-0.18 (0.16)	-0.07 (0.22)
Colombian: resided in urban centre > 20 years	-0.06 (0.14)	-0.25 (0.14)*	0.03 (0.13)	-0.12 (0.16)	-0.30 (0.14)**	-0.19 (0.12)	-0.28 (0.13)**
Treatment X Colombian: economic motivation for migration	-0.34 (0.22)	0.69 (0.27)**	0.35 (0.21)*	0.03 (0.18)	0.48 (0.24)**	0.05 (0.15)	0.37 (0.20)*
Treatment X Colombian: political motivation for migration	-0.11 (0.15)	0.40 (0.23)*	0.06 (0.21)	-0.04 (0.25)	0.07 (0.23)	0.45 (0.14)***	0.19 (0.27)
Treatment X Colombian: personal motivation for migration	-0.16 (0.23)	0.49 (0.20)**	0.14 (0.18)	-0.10 (0.29)	-0.02 (0.20)	0.17 (0.19)	0.10 (0.22)
Treatment X Colombian: resided in urban centre > 20 years	0.07 (0.16)	0.30 (0.15)**	0.31 (0.16)*	-0.02 (0.21)	0.24 (0.16)	0.12 (0.16)	0.24 (0.16)
R^2	0.07	0.07	0.03	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.13
N	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878
F test: economic = political	1.53	3.58	2.15	0.04	5.62	4.94	1.04
p-value	0.22	0.06	0.14	0.84	0.02	0.03	0.31
F test: economic = personal	0.37	0.70	0.84	0.24	4.49	0.33	1.06
p-value	0.54	0.40	0.36	0.63	0.04	0.57	0.30
F test: personal = political	0.04	0.18	0.11	0.02	0.10	2.03	0.08
p-value	0.84	0.68	0.74	0.87	0.75	0.16	0.78
F test: Colombian long resided = political	1.03	0.15	1.25	0.00	0.44	2.82	0.04
p-value	0.31	0.70	0.27	0.95	0.51	0.10	0.85
F test: Colombian long resided = economic	3.31	1.98	0.04	0.04	0.83	0.11	0.40
p-value	0.07	0.16	0.85	0.83	0.36	0.75	0.53
F test: Colombian long resided = personal	0.82	0.72	0.65	0.06	1.19	0.04	0.35
p-value	0.37	0.40	0.42	0.81	0.28	0.84	0.56

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the cluster level. Aggregate outcomes are compiled using standardized indicators. All regressions include the following covariates at baseline: respondent attainment of secondary education or higher (dummy); age of respondent; female (dummy); married (dummy); household size; number of children aged 0–5 years; number of children aged 6–15 years; dummies for wealth quintiles (based on wealth index); resident in urban centre ≤ 20 years (dummy); residing in Carchi Province (dummy); dependent variables at baseline.

* $p < .1$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

8. Annex Figures and Tables

Figure A.1. Distribution of treatment and control neighbourhoods across Carchi and Sucumbíos




Table A.1: Individual-level attrition (from baseline to endline) by treatment status

	N	All	Control	Treatment	p-value of diff.
Attrition rate	2,357	0.20	0.23	0.19	0.19

Note: p-value obtained from Wald test on the equality of means of Treatment and Comparison attrition rate. Standard errors clustered at the cluster level.

* $p < .1$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Table A.2: Testing individual differential attrition (from baseline to endline) by baseline characteristics and outcomes

	Attritors	Control Non- attritors	p-value	Attritors	Treatment Non- attritors	p-value	Difference Col(1)- Col(4)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Colombian	0.48	0.42	0.35	0.44	0.31	0.00	0.03	0.70
Colombian: economic motivation for migration	0.17	0.10	0.10	0.15	0.09	0.01	0.02	0.63
Colombian: political motivation for migration	0.16	0.10	0.09	0.16	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.94
Colombian: personal motivation for migration	0.07	0.06	0.69	0.09	0.05	0.06	-0.01	0.69
Colombian: resided in urban centre > 20 years	0.07	0.16	0.00	0.05	0.07	0.12	0.02	0.43
Secondary education or higher	0.44	0.33	0.06	0.45	0.38	0.01	-0.02	0.76
Age (years)	37.60	39.27	0.32	35.62	38.91	0.00	1.98	0.22
Female	0.71	0.80	0.06	0.70	0.81	0.00	0.00	0.96
Married	0.23	0.27	0.44	0.27	0.26	0.90	-0.04	0.45
Household size	4.11	3.92	0.33	3.80	3.69	0.30	0.31	0.09
Number of children aged 0–5 years	0.62	0.56	0.40	0.63	0.61	0.78	-0.01	0.92
Number of children aged 6–15 years	0.96	0.99	0.75	0.82	0.86	0.55	0.14	0.18
Wealth index: 2nd quintile	0.23	0.14	0.00	0.23	0.21	0.42	-0.00	0.99
Wealth index: 3rd quintile	0.18	0.22	0.45	0.14	0.21	0.01	0.04	0.34
Wealth index: 4th quintile	0.16	0.20	0.32	0.17	0.21	0.14	-0.01	0.73
Wealth index: 5th quintile	0.26	0.26	0.98	0.16	0.18	0.47	0.10	0.12
Resident in urban centre ≤ 20 years	0.60	0.40	0.00	0.56	0.40	0.00	0.04	0.57
Carchi Province	1.63	1.67	0.58	1.59	1.60	0.86	0.05	0.69
Trust in individuals	0.06	-0.02	0.38	-0.09	-0.06	0.65	0.15	0.13
Agency	-0.01	0.00	0.91	0.01	0.07	0.37	-0.02	0.85
Attitudes accepting diversity	-0.00	0.00	0.96	0.07	0.06	0.87	-0.07	0.57
Lack of discrimination	-0.14	0.04	0.08	-0.31	-0.10	0.06	0.17	0.22
Confidence in institutions	-0.16	0.05	0.04	-0.19	0.08	0.00	0.03	0.83
Social participation	-0.11	0.03	0.14	-0.15	-0.10	0.44	0.04	0.70
Social cohesion	-0.13	0.04	0.09	-0.26	-0.04	0.00	0.13	0.30
N	147	505		332	1,373			

Note: p-values are reported from Wald tests on the equality of means of Treatment and Control for each variable. Standard errors clustered at the cluster level.

* $p < .1$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Table A.3: Correlations baseline and follow-up: Aggregate outcomes

	PCA	Standardized index
Trust in individuals	0.249	0.217
Agency	0.077	0.110
Attitudes accepting diversity	0.065	0.064
Lack of discrimination	0.263	0.245
Confidence in institutions	0.182	0.170
Social participation	0.238	0.236
Social cohesion	0.295	0.296

Note: Correlation is calculated on the analysis sample (N = 1,878). PCA = principal component analysis.

Table A.4: Scale Reliability Coefficient for Principal Component Analysis measures: Alpha

	Baseline	Follow-up
Trust in individuals	0.548	0.580
Agency	0.594	0.617
Attitudes accepting diversity	0.140	0.306
Lack of discrimination	0.745	0.777
Confidence in institutions	0.483	0.568
Social Participation	0.344	0.361
Social cohesion	0.674	0.751

Note: Tests of scale reliability are performed separately for baseline and follow-up and performed on the analysis sample (N = 1,878).

Table A.5: ANCOVA models of impact of transfers on social cohesion measures (Principal Component Analysis)

	Trust in individuals		Agency		Attitudes accepting diversity		Lack of discrimination		Confidence in institutions		Social participation		Social cohesion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Pooled treatment	0.01 (0.07)	0.02 (0.09)	0.18 (0.10)*	-0.02 (0.06)	0.01 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.08)	0.07 (0.07)	0.08 (0.10)	0.18 (0.09)**	0.08 (0.08)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.07)	0.21 (0.11)**	0.10 (0.10)
Colombian	-0.01 (0.08)	0.02 (0.13)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.42 (0.16)***	0.04 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.15)	-0.15 (0.07)**	-0.14 (0.14)	-0.15 (0.08)*	-0.32 (0.15)**	0.00 (0.04)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.15 (0.09)*	-0.35 (0.20)*
Pooled treatment X Colombian		-0.05 (0.15)		0.51 (0.17)***		0.18 (0.15)		-0.02 (0.14)		0.24 (0.17)		0.15 (0.08)*		0.29 (0.21)
R^2	0.08	0.08	0.04	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.10	0.10	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.11	0.12
N	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878
Net treatment Colombian		-0.02 (0.12)		0.50 (0.18)***		0.12 (0.15)		0.05 (0.11)		0.32 (0.16)**		0.14 (0.07)**		0.38 (0.19)**

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the cluster level. All regressions include the following covariates at baseline: respondent attainment of secondary education or higher (dummy); age of respondent; female (dummy); married (dummy); household size; number of children aged 0–5 years; number of children aged 6–15 years; dummies for wealth quintiles (based on wealth index); resident in urban centre ≤ 20 years (dummy); residing in Carchi Province (dummy); dependent variables at baseline.

* $p < .1$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Table A.6: ANCOVA models of impact of transfers on social cohesion measures (standardized indices), unadjusted

	Trust in individuals		Agency		Attitudes accepting diversity		Lack of discrimination		Confidence in institutions		Social participation		Social cohesion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Pooled treatment	0.04 (0.06)	0.08 (0.08)	0.16 (0.09)*	-0.02 (0.06)	0.10 (0.07)	0.01 (0.06)	0.04 (0.07)	0.05 (0.09)	0.12 (0.08)*	0.05 (0.07)	0.09 (0.06)	0.01 (0.08)	0.15 (0.07)**	0.06 (0.07)
Colombian	-0.04 (0.06)	0.03 (0.11)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.42 (0.16)**	0.18 (0.06)***	0.00 (0.12)	-0.22 (0.06)***	-0.21 (0.13)	-0.14 (0.06)**	-0.27 (0.14)*	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.18 (0.08)**	-0.16 (0.06)***	-0.33 (0.14)**
Pooled Treatment X Colombian		-0.10 (0.13)		0.46 (0.16)***		0.24 (0.14)*		-0.02 (0.15)		0.18 (0.14)		0.19 (0.09)**		0.23 (0.15)
R^2	0.05	0.06	0.03	0.05	0.01	0.02	0.08	0.08	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.11	0.11
N	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878
Net treatment Colombian		-0.02 (0.10)		0.44 (0.17)**		0.25 (0.13)*		0.03 (0.11)		0.23 (0.13)*		0.20 (0.07)***		0.29 (0.14)**

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the cluster level. Aggregate outcomes are compiled using standardized indicators. Unadjusted model with the inclusion of dependent variables at baseline and residing in Carchi Province (dummy).

* $p < .1$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Table A.7: Background and migration characteristics by motivation for migrating

	Means of characteristics			p-value of difference		
	Economic	Political	Personal	Col(1)- Col(2)	Col(1)- Col(3)	Col(2)- Col(3)
<i>Background characteristics</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Secondary education or higher	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.95	0.98	0.97
Age (years)	33.07	34.24	34.12	0.37	0.42	0.94
Female	0.77	0.84	0.92	0.12	0.00	0.03
Married	0.16	0.13	0.13	0.29	0.52	0.92
Household size	3.66	3.92	4.46	0.16	0.00	0.06
Number of children aged 0–5 years	0.68	0.75	0.70	0.44	0.91	0.59
Number of children aged 6–15 years	0.85	0.96	1.56	0.29	0.00	0.00
Wealth index: 2nd quintile	0.22	0.26	0.24	0.43	0.71	0.69
Wealth index: 3rd quintile	0.18	0.20	0.27	0.59	0.09	0.24
Wealth index: 4th quintile	0.16	0.12	0.14	0.30	0.73	0.63
Wealth index: 5th quintile	0.08	0.07	0.11	0.74	0.40	0.27
Carchi province	0.44	0.36	0.18	0.12	0.00	0.00
<i>Migration characteristics</i>						
Area of origin: urban	0.25	0.20	0.32	0.29	0.23	0.03
Number of times moved excluding the most recent	1.59	1.15	2.20	0.01	0.00	0.00
Respondent moved with entire household during the first move	0.38	0.50	0.32	0.02	0.41	0.01
Respondent already had relatives in this urban centre when first moved	0.41	0.34	0.44	0.20	0.66	0.11
<i>Respondent or household member experienced (since first move):</i>						
Verbal threats	0.24	0.27	0.37	0.60	0.04	0.10
Verbal insults	0.27	0.30	0.34	0.48	0.16	0.42
Physically threatened with knife/gun	0.15	0.20	0.19	0.26	0.42	0.88
Physically attacked with knife/gun	0.08	0.09	0.10	0.77	0.73	0.96
Physically attacked/injured in other ways	0.08	0.12	0.08	0.26	0.78	0.18
Kidnapped	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.96	0.07	0.07
Obliged to do any manual work or other labour	0.09	0.06	0.08	0.49	0.71	0.73
Extorted for money or other goods	0.06	0.04	0.10	0.33	0.24	0.09
Robbed or damaged any property	0.17	0.19	0.23	0.68	0.21	0.40
Obliged to join military forces	0.07	0.09	0.10	0.52	0.49	0.87
Sexual aggression	0.05	0.09	0.06	0.13	0.65	0.24

Note: p-values are reported from Wald tests on the equality of means of treatment and control for each variable. Standard errors are clustered at the cluster level. N economic migrants = 177. N political migrants = 171. N personal reasons migrants = 105.

* $p < .1$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Table A.8: ANCOVA models of impact of transfers on indicators of trust in individuals

	I trust most people ^a		I can rely on my neighbour for sending mail ^a		I can rely on my neighbour to take care of my house if I am away ^a		Network size (number of people who would lend US\$10 in time of need)		Network size (number of people who would lend US\$100 in time of need)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Pooled treatment	0.07 (0.06)	0.09 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)	0.13 (0.07)*	0.05 (0.09)	0.11 (0.09)
Colombian	0.01 (0.06)	0.05 (0.10)	0.00 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.10)	0.00 (0.06)	0.00 (0.10)	0.03 (0.08)	0.18 (0.13)	0.01 (0.09)	0.12 (0.12)
Pooled treatment X Colombian		-0.04 (0.11)		0.09 (0.11)		-0.00 (0.12)		-0.21 (0.14)		-0.15 (0.15)
R^2	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.03	0.03
N	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878
Bonferroni-Sidak p-value: pooled treatment	0.72	0.74	0.99	0.98	0.99	0.99	0.98	0.33	0.99	0.73
Bonferroni-Sidak p-value: pooled treatment X Colombian		0.99		0.93		0.99		0.54		0.87

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the cluster level. All regressions include the following covariates at baseline: respondent attainment of secondary education or higher (dummy); age of respondent; female (dummy); married (dummy); household size; number of children aged 0–5 years; number of children aged 6–15 years; dummies for wealth quintiles (based on wealth index); resident in urban centre ≤ 20 years (dummy); residing in Carchi Province (dummy); dependent variables at baseline.

a. Values range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).

* $p < .1$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Table A.9: ANCOVA models of impact of transfers on indicators of agency

	My life is determined by my own actions ^a		I have the power to take important decision to change my life ^a		I am satisfied with my life ^a		I am capable of protecting my own interests ^a		Overall how do you feel lately? (1 = very unhappy – 4=very happy)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Pooled treatment	0.15 (0.08)*	−0.01 (0.06)	0.13 (0.08)	−0.02 (0.06)	0.10 (0.07)	−0.07 (0.06)	0.16 (0.09)*	0.04 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.04 (0.07)
Colombian	−0.06 (0.06)	−0.35 (0.14)**	−0.07 (0.06)	−0.33 (0.12)***	0.03 (0.06)	−0.27 (0.13)**	−0.04 (0.07)	−0.25 (0.16)	0.03 (0.07)	0.03 (0.10)
Pooled treatment X Colombian		0.41 (0.16)**		0.37 (0.13)***		0.42 (0.14)***		0.29 (0.17)*		0.01 (0.11)
R^2	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.09	0.10	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03
N	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878
Bonferroni-Sidak p-value: pooled treatment	0.31	0.99	0.46	0.99	0.63	0.75	0.37	0.96	0.95	0.98
Bonferroni-Sidak p-value: pooled treatment X Colombian		0.05		0.03		0.01		0.37		0.99

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the cluster level. All regressions include the following covariates at baseline: respondent attainment of secondary education or higher (dummy); age of respondent; female (dummy); married (dummy); household size; number of children aged 0–5 years; number of children aged 6–15 years; dummies for wealth quintiles (based on wealth index); resident in urban centre ≤ 20 years (dummy); residing in Carchi Province (dummy); dependent variables at baseline.

a. Values range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).

* $p < .1$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Table A.10: ANCOVA models of impact of transfers on indicators of attitudes accepting diversity

	Cultural diversity is good		Xenophobia is not an issue		In my community people from different nationalities live well together	
	(1)	(2)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Pooled treatment	0.03 (0.08)	−0.08 (0.07)	0.08 (0.08)	0.10 (0.09)	0.08 (0.08)	0.02 (0.07)
Colombian	0.04 (0.06)	−0.17 (0.14)	0.19 (0.07)***	0.23 (0.11)**	0.13 (0.06)**	0.02 (0.14)
Pooled treatment X Colombian		0.29 (0.15)*		−0.05 (0.13)		0.15 (0.15)
R^2	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02
N	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878
Bonferroni-Sidak p-value: pooled treatment	0.99	0.72	0.77	0.68	0.76	0.99
Bonferroni-Sidak p-value: pooled treatment X Colombian		0.22		0.99		0.79

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the cluster level. All regressions include the following covariates at baseline: respondent attainment of secondary education or higher (dummy); age of respondent; female (dummy); married (dummy); household size; number of children aged 0–5 years; number of children aged 6–15 years; dummies for wealth quintiles (based on wealth index); resident in urban centre ≤ 20 years (dummy); residing in Carchi Province (dummy); dependent variables at baseline. Values range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).

* $p < .1$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Table A.11: ANCOVA models of impact of transfers on indicators of freedom from discrimination due to:

	Ethnicity		Gender		Social condition		Occupation		Political views		Disability		Nationality		Religious beliefs		Physical appearance		Other reasons	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
Pooled treatment	−0.07	−0.02	0.02	0.02	0.06	0.03	0.10	0.10	0.04	0.07	0.07	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.09	−0.01	0.01	−0.09	−0.12
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.06)*
Colombian	−0.10	−0.02	0.04	0.03	−0.04	−0.10	−0.04	−0.04	−0.00	0.04	−0.05	−0.10	−0.43	−0.42	−0.04	−0.01	−0.11	−0.07	−0.14	−0.18
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.07)***	(0.11)***	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.17)	(0.08)*	(0.11)
Pooled treatment X Colombian		−0.12		0.01		0.08		−0.00		−0.06		0.08		−0.02		−0.05		−0.05		0.07
		(0.12)		(0.11)		(0.12)		(0.13)		(0.10)		(0.15)		(0.12)		(0.11)		(0.16)		(0.13)
R^2	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.07	0.19	0.19	0.07	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.01
N	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878
Bonferroni-Sidak p-value: tooled treatment	0.83	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.78	0.95	0.99	0.98	0.95	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.86	0.91	0.99	0.99	0.76	0.45
Bonferroni-Sidak p-value: pooled treatment X Colombian		0.97		0.99		0.99		0.99		0.99		0.99		0.99		0.99		0.99		0.99

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the cluster level. All regressions include the following covariates at baseline: respondent attainment of secondary education or higher (dummy); age of respondent; female (dummy); married (dummy); household size; number of children aged 0–5 years; number of children aged 6–15 years; dummies for wealth quintiles (based on wealth index); resident in urban centre ≤ 20 years (dummy); residing in Carchi Province (dummy); dependent variables at baseline. Indicators equal to 1 if respondent did not experience discrimination episode and 0 otherwise.

* $p < .1$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Table A.12: ANCOVA models of impact of transfers on indicators of confidence in institutions

	The Government would help my family in an emergency		Politicians represent my interests		If I am victim of a crime I can go to the police to get help		I have the space to participate in the decisions of my community		I have the right to social basic assistance		I feel part of the community	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Pooled treatment	0.11 (0.06)*	0.03 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.10)	0.16 (0.06)**	0.12 (0.06)*	0.12 (0.07)*	0.06 (0.07)	0.12 (0.08)	0.07 (0.07)	0.13 (0.08)	0.04 (0.06)
Colombian	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.16 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.12)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.12)	-0.13 (0.06)**	-0.23 (0.12)*	-0.13 (0.07)*	-0.22 (0.14)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.24 (0.14)*
Pooled treatment X Colombian		0.19 (0.11)*		-0.03 (0.13)		0.09 (0.13)		0.15 (0.14)		0.13 (0.15)		0.24 (0.15)
R^2	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.03	0.03
N	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878
Bonferroni-Sidak p-value: pooled treatment	0.34	0.99	0.81	0.97	0.09	0.32	0.43	0.95	0.49	0.89	0.50	0.99
Bonferroni-Sidak p-value: pooled treatment X Colombian		0.45		0.99		0.98		0.86		0.94		0.53

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the cluster level. All regressions include the following covariates at baseline: respondent attainment of secondary education or higher (dummy); age of respondent; female (dummy); married (dummy); household size; number of children aged 0–5 years; number of children aged 6–15 years; dummies for wealth quintiles (based on wealth index); resident in urban centre ≤ 20 years (dummy); residing in Carchi Province (dummy); dependent variables at baseline. Values range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).

* $p < .1$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Table A.13: ANCOVA models of impact of transfers on indicators of social participation

	Participation in agricultural association or union		Participation in religious or spiritual group		Participation in community association or political group		Participation in other groups (NGOs cultural)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Pooled treatment	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.13 (0.07)*	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.41 (0.09)***	0.31 (0.11)***
Colombian	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.10 (0.10)	0.00 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.10)	0.01 (0.05)	0.00 (0.10)	0.02 (0.09)	-0.17 (0.11)
Pooled treatment X Colombian		0.10 (0.10)		0.15 (0.12)		0.01 (0.11)		0.27 (0.14)*
R^2	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.09	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04
N	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878	1,878
Bonferroni-Sidak p-value: pooled treatment	0.38	0.28	0.99	0.79	0.96	0.98	0.00	0.03
Bonferroni-Sidak p-value: pooled treatment X Colombian		0.82		0.62		0.99		0.19

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the cluster level. All regressions include the following covariates at baseline: respondent attainment of secondary education or higher (dummy); age of respondent; female (dummy); married (dummy); household size; number of children aged 0–5 years; number of children aged 6–15 years; dummies for wealth quintiles (based on wealth index); resident in urban centre ≤ 20 years (dummy); residing in Carchi Province (dummy); dependent variables at baseline. Indicators equal to 1 if respondent did not experience discrimination episode and 0 otherwise.

* $p < .1$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$