Mortality as an Indicator of Economic Success and Failure

by Amartya Sen
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Professor Sen was President of the American Economic Association in 1994 and is former President of the Econometric Society, the International Economic Association, the Development Studies Association and the Indian Economic Association. He was awarded the Senator Giovanni Agnelli Prize for Ethics in 1989 as well as the Alan Shaw Feinsteiner World Hunger Prize for his research on world hunger and its prevention.
1. Introduction

I feel most honoured to have this opportunity of giving the first Innocenti Lecture. UNICEF's record of dedicated and constructive work — serving the world's neediest children — through imaginative, well-reasoned and effective programmes has earned much-deserved admiration across the world. It is also a pleasure to give this lecture in the great city of Florence, and specifically in this wonderful building, with its own distinguished history.

The occasion, nevertheless, is also a sad one for me. Since the time this lecture was arranged we have lost Jim Grant, the great leader of UNICEF who earned the admiration of everyone who knew him personally and also of those who knew him through his work — his outstanding and momentous accomplishments. Jim was a deeply inspiring figure for us all.

Personally, I remember receiving very warm encouragement from James Grant almost two decades ago when I was trying to study famines and general economic and social deprivation. The last time I saw him was at a meeting at Harvard less than a year ago — it was a meeting to honour him. He was already very ill, but in his reply to the celebratory speeches Jim managed to communicate much optimism about the world — a reasoned optimism that had never deserted him right from the time he had first identified how terrible the world was, how it needed changing, and how that change could actually be brought about. We shall miss him always, but we can honour him most by continuing to pursue and support the work he had so robustly begun.

The terribleness of the state of affairs that James Grant had identified is not primarily that of 'poverty' defined in terms of just low income. There is, of course, plenty of that in the world in which we live. But more awful is the fact that so many people — including children from disadvantaged backgrounds — are forced to lead miserable and precarious lives and to die prematurely. That predi-
cament relates in general to low incomes, but not just to that. It also reflects inadequate public health provisions and nutritional support, deficiency of social security arrangements, and the absence of social responsibility and of caring governance. A massive change can be achieved through well thought out programmes of public intervention and through international as well as national efforts, and this can bear fruit even before the general level of income can be radically raised. It was this combination of optimism and realism that led Jim Grant to organize public action and international programmes to reduce preventable morbidity, avoidable undernourishment and unnecessary mortality. The successes achieved have been far-reaching and magnificent.

In the process of this intensely practical work, Grant also provided an effective reorientation of the concept of poverty. Instead of conceiving it in terms of the cold and often inarticulate statistics of low incomes, he saw poverty in the light of the directly relevant and immediately gripping facts of diminished lives, agonized existence and untimely deaths. That is a real shift in perspective. This lecture is partly an attempt to explore that penetrating approach somewhat more explicitly.

Elsewhere, I have tried to argue that in judging a person’s advantage and deprivation, we have to shift our attention from an exclusive concentration on incomes and commodities (often used in economic analyses) to things that people have reason to value intrinsically. Incomes and commodities are valued mainly as ‘instruments’ — as means to other ends. We desire them for what we can do with them; possessing commodities or income is not valuable in itself. Indeed, we seek income primarily for the help it might provide in leading a good life — a life we have reason to value. This suggests a case for concentrating on characteristics of living, which — as Aristotle analysed (in the Nicomachean Ethics as well as in Politics) — consists of specific functionings: what we can do and be. Since an increase in income from very low levels would help a person to be well-nourished rather than hungry and deprived (and possibly dead), a higher income would be instrumentally valued. On the other hand, being able to avoid starvation, hunger and premature death is valued for its own sake. This alter-

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native perspective suggests that, in assessing advantage and disadvantage, we should look at people's ability to do and be what they have reason to value — the 'capabilities' of each person. The 'capability perspective' leads to a very different empirical focus from what we get from the more orthodox concentrations in the literature of poverty and welfare economics, as low personal income is only one of the factors that influences the deprivation of basic capabilities. The approach underlying Jim Grant's work has some similarity with this perspective, though his strategy was grounded not so much on foundational theory as on practical reason with immediate applicability.

2. Counter-questions

We can begin with the question: why should — or how could — mortality be an indicator of economic success? Mortality statistics, it could be suggested, belong to the territory of the demographer, not of the economic analyst. Economics is not about mortality. Is there a 'category mistake' here?

Certainly, mortality is not in itself an economic phenomenon. But the connection lies in the fact that the influences that increase or reduce mortality often have distinctly economic causes, and there is thus a prima facie reason for not dismissing mortality as a test of economic performance. This is where we must begin, but in order to go beyond this prima facie thought, we have to address some specific questions that may be used to dispute this view. I shall identify the following queries as possible starting points of this dialectical inquiry.

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(1) Why is the reduction of mortality so important? What about other objectives? Why not look at all the valuable capabilities and not just the achievement of escaping mortality?

(2) Even if we want our policy analysis to be informed by considerations of mortality and morbidity, why can’t we concentrate on those aspects of economic performance (such as the national income and its distribution, and the level of poverty) that relate directly to such matters as morbidity and mortality rather than going ‘overboard’ to take on mortality itself as a criterion of economic performance?

(3) Wouldn’t it be better to look at morbidity rather than mortality since the suffering of people relates to illness, and, once dead, there are — we presume — no further pains?

(4) Even if mortality is the right thing to look at, is it not too sluggish a variable to be of much use as an economic indicator, since we need a focal variable that is sensitive and quick to respond, and permits us to adjust economic policies in time?

These are serious and challenging questions, and I should put in an effort to answer them.

3. What Is So Significant about Mortality? 

It is true that we do tend to take for granted the so-called ‘human predicament’ and do not constantly pine for immortality. While some of us may be imprudent enough to think that immortality might be rather agreeable, others seem to have come to accept it as not only unattainable, but possibly not all that nice either. “When I catch myself resenting not being immortal”, confessed Arnold Toynbee, “I pull myself up short by asking whether I should really like the prospect of having to make out an annual income-tax return for an infinite number of years ahead.”. Perhaps there might be even greater hazards in living in perpetuity than filling out infinitely many income tax forms (even though in the political climate of today’s United States, this is not an easy thought). But of course immortality is not an option, and the issue is the difference between living long or short, and in particular the difference that is made by the possibility of dying prematurely, at a comparatively young age.

There can be little doubt that living long is a much shared aspiration. Even though it is clearly not the only thing we seek, a long life is *inter alia* fairly universally valued — and valued very strongly. This is not only because living as a state of being is itself valued, but also because it is a necessary requirement for carrying out plans and projects that we have reason to value. The dead can’t do much. As Andrew Marvell told his ‘coy mistress’ more than three centuries ago:

The grave’s a fine and private place,  
But none, I think, do there embrace.

I don’t know how ‘coy’ Marvell’s mistress was, nor what importance ‘embracing’ had in Marvell’s life. But he was certainly right to think that we value life because of the things we can do, if alive. The value of living must reflect the importance of the diverse capabilities for which it is a necessary requirement.

The big changes in mortality that are continuing to occur across the world do not involve extending lives to unimaginable lengths, but relate to the saving of premature mortality — of infants, children and young or middle-aged adults. The *Ecclesiastes* might have been right to argue that there is “a time to be born, and a time to die”, but so many of the preventable deaths in fact occur — as Jim Grant knew so well — much before that “time to die”.

This is not to deny that there could well be good grounds for a person to seek to terminate his or her own life (for example, when the person is in massive pain and suffering, with no chance of recovery), but those who are less ill and less miserable also tend typically to live rather longer. So the extension of life expectancy is not only, typically, valuable for its own sake, but also for its associated characteristics (such as the lowering of morbidity).

I shall have to come back, presently, to the relation between mortality and morbidity, but the general point about associated features also applies to other correlates of mortality, even those variables — such as adult literacy, female education, birth rate, fertility rate, and so on — that are not as directly linked to mortality as morbidity is. The point here is not so much to argue that life

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6. For example, for the Group of 88 ‘low-income’ and ‘lower middle-income’ countries, as defined by the World Bank (in its *World Development Report* 1994), the rank correlation of life expectancy is:

- 86 with adult total literacy,
- 82 with adult female literacy,
- 88 with the lowness of the birth rate,
- 89 with the lowness of the fertility rate; and
- 95 with the “Human Development Index” (of UNDP) which includes several variables other than life expectancy. These results are based on data presented in the *World Development Report* 1994 and *Human Development Report* 1994.
expectancy can adequately represent these other achievements as well, but only that there might often be relatively limited tension between the virtue of raising life expectancy and many other elementary accomplishments central to the process of development. This does not deny the possibility of potential conflict between longevity and other constitutive elements of the quality of life, but the extent of that conflict is greatly moderated by the positive relations among several of the most basic capabilities.

These causal and associative connections are important to note, since mortality data are more readily available than information on many other types of related achievements. In the practical context, this can be a very important consideration, and it no doubt partly motivated James Grant’s powerful and poignant use of mortality information (even though he also utilized other data that were obtainable, such as the frequency of preventable illness and undernourishment). The significance of mortality information lies, therefore, in a combination of considerations, including (1) the intrinsic importance we attach — and have reason to attach — to living, (2) the fact that many other capabilities that we value are contingent on our being alive, and (3) the further fact that data on age-specific mortality can, to some extent, serve as a proxy for associated failures and achievements to which we may attach importance.

4. Why Not Just the Economic Variables?

It is certainly true that mortality rates are affected by poverty and economic deprivation. Personal income is unquestionably a basic determinant of survival and death, and more generally of a person’s quality of life. Nevertheless, income is only one variable among the many that affect our chances of enjoying life, and some of the other variables are also influenceable by economic policy.

The gross national product per head may be a good indicator of the average real income of the nation, but the actual incomes enjoyed by people will depend also on the distributional pattern of national income. Also, the quality of life of a person depends not merely on his or her personal income, but also on various physical and social conditions. For example, the epidemiological atmosphere in which a person lives can have a very substantial impact on morbidity and mortality. The availability of health care and the nature of medical insurance — public as well as private — are among the important influences on life and death. So are the other social services, including basic education, the orderliness of
urban living and the access to modern medical knowledge. There are, thus, many factors not included in the accounting of personal incomes that can be importantly involved in the life and death of people. The point is not the irrelevance of economic variables such as personal incomes (they certainly are not irrelevant), but their severe inadequacy in capturing many of the causal influences on the quality of life and the survival chances of people.

5. Growth of GDP per Head and Life Expectancy in Britain

To illustrate, consider Figure 1, which presents the decadal growth of real gross domestic product per capita in the UK for each of the first six decades of this century, as well as the decadal increases in life expectancy at birth for each of these six decades for England and Wales. There are two quite remarkable features of these life-expectancy experiences. The first is that the pattern of life-expectancy increase is almost exactly the opposite of the expansion of gross domestic product per capita. Whatever might have led to the high achievements in some decades, it was not faster

![Figure 1: Decadal Growth of Real Per Capita GDP (UK) and Decadal Increases in Life Expectancy at Birth (England and Wales), 1901-1960.](image)

7. The life-expectancy figures relate to England and Wales rather than the UK as a whole, but England and Wales do form the bulk of the UK population. Also, the decade counts for life expectancy involve 1940 and 1960 (rather than what would have been the normal census years of 1941 and 1961). On this contrast, see also Drieze and Sen, *Hunger and Public Action*, cited in note 2.
economic growth in those decades. It is, of course, possible to suggest that the explanation lies in a lagged relation, so that increases in GDP per head in one decade can be seen as determining the corresponding life-expectancy advances in the next decade. This possibility cannot be ruled out on the basis of these figures alone, but it is in fact not very consistent with other information we have about the relation between income changes and mortality rates.

Interesting light on the movements of longevity increases is provided by the events of the respective decades. For this, it may be helpful to look at Figure 2. Life expectancy increases are fairly moderate (between one to four years added) for each decade, except for the decades of 1911-21 and 1941-51, when life expectancy jumped up by nearly seven years per decade. These were, as we know, the war decades. Life expectancy at birth could scarcely have gone up because of the wars themselves. Of course, the life expectancy figures at the beginning and at the end of each decade do not reflect war mortality, since they are calculated in terms of age-specific death rates at the point of observation, that is, 1921 and 1951 at the end of the war decades. The question is: why did the age-specific death rates fall so fast between the beginning and the end of the war decades?

The explanation, as I have tried to discuss elsewhere, almost certainly lies in the improvement in public delivery of food and health services over these decades, contingently associated with the war efforts⁸. While the total supply of food per head went down in the war times, the incidence of bad undernutrition also declined because of the more effective use of public distribution systems associated with war efforts and more equal sharing of food through rationing systems⁹. The National Health Service also emerged in Britain in the decade 1941-51. It is also possible, as Jay Winter has argued, that there was a greater spirit of sharing in the war years, and more cooperative actions could occur in such periods⁹. So we are really looking at influences on mortality rates that concern economic organization and social environment rather than the average level of real income per head.

6. Income and Life Expectancy: Cross-sectional Comparisons

Figure 1 can, of course, give the impression that economic growth is bad for life expectancy, and this contrary thought must also be eschewed. In fact, there is plenty of evidence that life expectancy increases are typically positively associated with economic growth, given other things; but these other things are also matters of eco-
nomic policy and thus need to be considered in policy decisions. In my joint book with Jean Drèze, *Hunger and Public Action*, we distinguished between two types of successes in the rapid reduction of mortality, which we called respectively 'growth mediated' and 'support-led' processes. The former works mainly through fast economic growth, well exemplified by mortality reduction in, say, South Korea or Hong Kong. Its success depends on the growth process being wide-based and participatory (employment orientation has much to do with this), and also on the resources generated by economic growth being utilized to expand the relevant social services (often in the public sector), particularly health care and education.

In this context, it is worth mentioning a statistical relation for which Sudhir Anand and Martin Ravallion have found considerable evidence. They find, on the basis of intercountry comparisons, that life expectancy has a significantly positive relation with GNP per head, but that the relationship works mainly through the impact of GNP on (1) the incomes specifically of the poor, and (2) public expenditure, specifically on public health. In fact, once these two variables are included in the statistical relation, the connection between GNP per head and life expectancy altogether vanishes. This does not, of course, imply that life expectancy is not enhanced by the growth of GNP per head, but it does indicate that the connection works through public expenditure on health care and poverty removal. It also helps to explain why some countries such as South Korea and Hong Kong have been able to raise life expectancy so rapidly through economic growth (with the fruits of growth being shared widely through their participatory character — related partly to the employment-oriented nature of that growth — and through using the resources generated to expand health care), while others — such as Brazil — have been more sluggish in expanding life expectancy despite their rapid rates of economic growth.

In contrast to the 'growth-mediated' mechanism, the 'support-led' process does not operate through fast economic growth. It is well exemplified by countries such as Sri Lanka, pre-reform China, Costa Rica, or the Indian state of Kerala, all of which have had very rapid reductions in mortality rates without much economic growth. This is a process that does not wait for dramatic increases in per-

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capita levels of real income; it instead works through priority being
given to providing social services (particularly health care and basic
education) that reduce mortality and enhance the quality of life.

But how can the 'support-led' process work in poor countries,
since resources are surely needed to expand public services,
including health care and education? Where is the money to come
from? In fact, despite the poverty of low-income countries, this
process is viable precisely because the relevant social services
(such as health care and basic education) are very labour intensive
and thus relatively inexpensive in poor and low-wage economies.13
A poor economy may have less money to spend on health care and
education, but it also needs less money to provide the same ser-
\vices that cost much more in richer countries. Relative prices and
costs are important parameters in determining what a country can
afford, given appropriate political commitment.

It is, in this context, also important to note that despite the
general connection between real income per head and life expect-
cy, which is reflected in many intercountry comparisons, there
are significant gaps in that relationship. Figure 3 compares the
GNP per head and the life expectancies of a few selected
economies. It is quite striking that the populations of Sri Lanka,
China and the Indian state of Kerala enjoy much higher longevities than do the people of South Africa, Brazil and Gabon, despite the GNP per head of the latter economies being many times those of the former. The former economies exhibit successes of economic organization of a kind that is not seen in the latter countries. These contrasts are of considerable policy relevance and bring out the importance of the ‘support-led’ (rather than the ‘growth-mediated’) process.

7. Mortality Indicators and Gender Inequality

The existence of a strong gender bias against women (and against young girls in particular) has been much discussed in the development literature. Gender bias is, however, very hard to identify, since many of the discriminations are subtle and covert and lie within the core of intimate family behaviour. Mortality information can be used to throw light on some of the coarsest aspects of gender-related inequality. Indeed, even the single statistic of the ratio of women to men in the total population can provide insights into the long-term discrimination against women in many societies.

It is often assumed that there must be more women than men in the world, since that is the case in Europe and North America, which have a female to male ratio of 1.05 or so, on average. In fact, there are only about 98 women per 100 men in the world as a whole. This ‘shortfall’ of women is most acute in Asia and North Africa. For example, the number of females per 100 males in the total population is 97 in Egypt and Iran, 95 in Turkey, 94 in China, 93 in India, 92 in Pakistan, and 84 in Saudi Arabia (though the last ratio is somewhat reduced by the presence of male migrant work-

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ers from elsewhere who come to Saudi Arabia). Figure 4 presents the female-male ratios in different regions of the world, and it can be seen how variable they are. Differential mortality rates of females and males — now and in the past — do have much to do with these differences in the 'sex ratio' of the population.

Given similar health care and other forms of attention, women tend to have a lower mortality rate than men in nearly all age groups. This seems to have a biological basis (even female foetuses have a lower probability of miscarriage than male foetuses), though the differential is sometimes increased by social influences — for example, the higher propensity of men to die from violence, and, until recently, the higher tendency of men to smoke compared with women. Everywhere in the world, more male babies are born than female babies (this may be, to some extent, nature's way of
compensating for the lower survival chances of males), but the proportion of males goes on falling as we move to higher and higher age groups, due to greater male mortality rates. The excess of females over males in the populations of Europe and North America results mainly from the greater survival chances of females, though this excess has been fed, to some extent, also by greater male mortality in the past wars involving the European people (principally the Second World War) and the North American population (mainly the wars in Korea and Viet Nam).

However, because of 'gender bias' against women in many parts of the world, women receive less attention and care than men do, and particularly girls often receive very much less support than boys. As a result, the mortality rates of females often exceed those of males in these countries. The variations of the female-male ratios in Figure 4 largely reflect these differences operating over a long time.

To get an idea of the magnitude of the phenomenon, it is possible to calculate through one of several methods the number of 'missing women' as a result of the differential elevation of female mortality related to gender bias. In principle, the concept of 'missing women' is an attempt to quantify the difference between the actual number of women in these countries and the number we might expect under no gender bias. For example, if we take the ratio of women to men in sub-Saharan Africa as the standard (there is relatively little gender bias in terms of health care and social status in sub-Saharan Africa), that ratio of 1.02 can then be used to calculate the number of missing women in women-short countries. Other standards can also be used, and, more ambitiously, it is possible to make some guess of the likely decrease in age-specific mortality rates of women had they received the same care as men. The techniques of estimation can vary, but the basic motivation is to get an idea of the numerical significance of the shortfall of women because of gender asymmetry. This is given by the difference between (1) the number of women we could expect to see in that country in the absence of gender bias in matters of

15. Note must, however, be taken also of the fact that (1) countries with higher longevity would tend to have, given other things, a somewhat higher ratio of females (since women's survival advantages accumulate over the lifetime), (2) greater male mortality in wars has some effect on these ratios, and (3) the 'sex ratio' at birth tends to vary a little over the different regions (for example, the excess of males at birth seems to be rather less in sub-Saharan Africa than in Europe and Asia).

life and death (on specified 'counterfactual' assumptions), and (2) the actual number of women in that country (as observed).

For example, with China's female-male ratio of 0.94, there is a total difference of 8 per cent (of the male population) between that ratio and the sub-Saharan standard used for comparison, viz. 1.02. Taking the total population of China as 1,162 million in 1992, there are about 563 million females and 599 million males. The number of 'missing women' would then be 8 per cent of the male population of 599 million. This gives us a figure of 48 million missing women in China in 199217.

The stark statistics of dramatically large numbers of 'missing women', and of the variations in the female-male ratios in different parts of the world, draw our attention irresistibly to the need to address the causation of this process. The immediate reason is, of course, the neglect of the interests of women (in health, education and other means of good living) in allocating care in the family and in the society. But what causes that relative neglect? Some see it as resulting from a lower 'bargaining power' of women in family arrangements, and some would trace that difference — all the way — to the organization in very primitive societies, which, it is argued, attached a lot of importance to physical strength and to the ability to hunt and gather food from outside. Others want to take account of the greater vulnerability that arises due to pregnancy and nurturing of babies.

None of these explanations is quite satisfactory, and some of them tend to rationalize what may be nothing more than customs and prejudices surviving from a not easily understood past. In explaining the preference for boys over girls in contemporary societies, some have pointed to the higher earning potential of boys and also to the possibility that parents may get more support from male children18. Here again, it is very hard to be sure that we have anything like a good explanation of the terrible inequities observed in gender relations.

It is important, I think, to distinguish between the origin of gender bias and its continued survival. It is very hard to speculate on the

17. See Drèze and Sen, *Hunger and Public Action*, cited in note 2. Other techniques can also be used to make this calculation, some involving the use of historical information. Age-specific mortality rates can be obtained from historical data — perhaps from 19th century Europe — to get some idea of the excess of female mortality because of gender bias in health and other care in Asia and North Africa today. On this see Coale, 'Excess Female Mortality and the Balance of the Sexes: An Estimate of the Number of "Missing Females"', 1991; and Klasen, "Missing Women: Reconsidered", 1994. While the use of the sub-Saharan Africa ratio yields a total number of missing women in the world that exceeds a hundred million, Coale's and Klasen's estimates give figures around 60 million and 90 million respectively. These are, in any case, very large figures, and the rankings of countries in terms of the proportion of missing women are rather similar under the different procedures.

origins of a phenomenon like this when it has gone on, it appears, for many thousands of years. However, the continued survival of this bias is more discussable. In this context, in my own attempt to understand these phenomena I have tried to take note of both (1) the social influences of established conventions and prejudices and (2) the economic influences of disparate opportunities that men have vis-à-vis women, especially given the way society is currently organized¹⁹. The importance of cooperation in making a success of family living (an efficiency-based argument) can be used in a situation of social asymmetry and prejudice to make women cooperate in very unequal terms (with great inequity). This is a general problem that applies even in Europe and North America in a variety of fields (such as division of family chores, the provision of support for higher training, and so on). But in poorer countries the disadvantage of women may even apply to the basic fields of health care, nutritional support and elementary education. The neglect of girls and female infants can be, in general, related to the lower social status of women²⁰.

From a policy point of view, what has to be examined is not just the genesis of the anti-female bias, but the possible influences that can help to change the situation. A big difference, it appears, is made by the spread of education, especially female education. In the historical change of the standing and station of women in Europe, the spread of education did play, it appears, a major part. Another factor is women’s economic independence, which depends both on the nature of property rights (including land ownership) and on the opportunities for remunerative employment open to women. Mortality statistics related to gender differences suggest the need to examine and scrutinize these different relations.

8. Public Policy Possibilities: The Case of Kerala

An extremely important case to examine in this context is that of the state of Kerala in India. It is a sizeable state, with 29 million people (rather more than in Canada), and its experience should not be dismissed as being numerically unimportant just because it is a state within a large country rather than a country on its own (the Kerala population is, in fact, larger than those of most coun-

¹⁹. I have discussed this subject in my paper, ‘Gender and Cooperative Conflict’ in I. Tinker, Persistent Inequalities, 1990.
²⁰. Other lines of explanation are also possible, some of which are discussed in Drèze and Sen, Hunger and Public Action, 1989, Chapter 4, see also the extensive literature cited there.
tries in the world). As is seen in Figure 4, the female-male ratio in Kerala is 1.04 (rather like what we see in Europe and North America and in fact higher than the ‘standard’ provided by sub-Saharan Africa), and there are really no ‘missing women’ there in the sense defined⁴¹. And yet the level of per-capita GNP or GDP is not particularly high in Kerala. In fact, the gross domestic product of Kerala is lower than the very low average for India as a whole. There is an economic and social question here of very great interest, which is captured by the statistics on mortality and survival, and this takes us well beyond the picture of achievement in terms of standard economic variables, such as GNP or GDP per head.

Various lines of explanation of the absence of gender bias in Kerala have been discussed in the literature²². It is plausible to argue that Kerala’s success relates to its high level of basic education. Literacy among all adult women is around 86 per cent, and that among young adult women is close to 100 per cent²³. It has a high ratio of female employment in responsible and remunerative jobs. Furthermore, a part of the Kerala community — the caste of the Nairs — has had matrilineal inheritance of property for a long time²⁴. Also, the politics of Kerala have had a strong dose of radicalism for a long time, with a direct impact on this subject. The educational movement in Kerala has also been much helped by the activism of left-wing politics (the communist movement, which has been strong in Kerala, has been more pro-education than elsewhere in India)²⁵. These different lines of explanation — with their respective policy interests — are brought forward for consideration by the nature of the distinguished mortality statistics from Kerala²⁶.

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²¹ On this see also Klasen, “Missing Women” Reconsidered, 1994.
²³ Interestingly enough, the most spectacular move towards widespread education, including female education, was initiated by the ruling monarch of the native kingdom of Travancore, a very young queen, called Rani Gouri Parvathi Bai, who made a great pronouncement in 1816 outlining a programme of public education. Kerala benefited in this respect, from being outside the British Empire at that time, since the local monarchs of both Travancore and Cochin, which make up the bulk of today’s Kerala, were very pro-education.
²⁴ The fact that Kerala had been open to international contact for a long time may also have been important in this. There have been Christians in Kerala at least since the 4th century (well before there were any in England), Jews have lived there since shortly after the fall of Jerusalem, and Arab traders have been visiting for over a millennium. Kerala has also benefitted from the activities of missionaries (about one person in five in Kerala is Christian).
²⁶ The better relative position and power of women is thought to have been influential in bringing about a lowering of Kerala’s fertility rate, a ‘total fertility rate’ of about 1.8, well below the replacement level, and also lower than China’s 2.0 (without any attempt at coercion, as in China’s ‘one-child family’ and related policy measures), and lower than the fertility rates of, say, the US and Sweden (both around 2.1). The importance of the agency role of women in reducing the fertility rate is fairly well supported in development literature, though questions on this have been raised in recent studies. See the collection of papers in Jeffery, R. and A. Basu, (eds.), Girls’ Schooling. Women’s Autonomy and Fertility Change in South Asia, Sage, New Delhi, forthcoming.
Kerala’s experience suggests that ‘gender bias’ against females can be radically changed by public action — involving both the government and the public itself — especially through female education, opportunities for women to have responsible jobs, women’s legal rights on property and by activist, egalitarian politics. Correspondingly, the problem of ‘missing women’ can also be largely solved through social policy and political radicalism. Women’s movements can play a very important part in bringing about this type of change and in making the political process in poor countries pay serious attention to the deep inequalities that women suffer. It is also interesting to note, in this context, that the narrowly economic variables, such as GNP or GDP per head, on which so much of standard development economics concentrates, give a very misleading picture.

9. Mortality Statistics and Racial Inequalities

Data on mortality and survival can also be used to raise pointed questions on the nature and reach of inequality between racial groups, for example in the United States. The extent of the deprivation of African-Americans in the US can come as a surprise, especially to those who tend to concentrate mainly on economic data such as per capita income. Figure 5 shows the frequencies of survival, up to different specified ages, of (1) African-American males (that is, of US black men) and (2) the male residents of Harlem (a largely ‘black area’ in Manhattan), compared with those not only of US whites, but also of the residents of China, Kerala and even Bangladesh. It is not surprising that the survival chances are much worse for African-Americans in general, and for the Harlem residents in particular, compared with the US white population; but both groups fall behind the corresponding populations of China and Kerala soon enough. The Harlem men are overtaken in terms of survival even by the famished Bangladeshis. While the high levels of infant and child mortality make the probabilities of survival worse for a Bengali initially, Harlem’s higher age-specific mortality rates make the cumulative survival chances sink below those of Bangladeshis men by the age group of the late 30s. In contrast, any comparison with income per head shows the Harlem residents to be a great many times richer than the Bangladeshis (as well as the Chinese and the Kerala populations).

Figure 6 presents similar comparisons for females. Here Harlem does better than Bangladesh, though much worse than the US whites and also substantially worse than the people of China and
Kerala. Harlem's edge over Bangladesh is closely related to the latter's high female infant and child mortality rates (an aspect of the phenomenon of gender bias, which was discussed earlier). The gap between the women of Harlem and Bangladesh steadily narrows as we move to higher age groups. Harlem residents fall behind the people of Kerala and China soon enough, as eventually do US blacks in general.²⁷

The residents of Harlem combine the disadvantages of race with special problems of inner-city deprivation. While it is still remarkable

²⁷ Kerala, incidentally, stays ahead of China in terms of survival rates for women (though the ordering is the other way round for men), and this again relates to the already discussed phenomenon of the absence of gender bias in Kerala.
that their survival chances fall behind those of Bangladeshi men, it is perhaps more surprising that the US black population in general has lower chances of reaching a mature age than do the immensely poorer people — women as well as men — of Kerala or China. In terms of chances of survival to a ripe old age, an aspect of race-based deprivation is identified here that is missed completely in analyses based only on income data.

Figures 5 and 6 indicate that the deprivation is particularly serious for males in Harlem and for US black males in general. The higher
risk of death from violence of young black men is a factor that is much discussed in this context. But it would be wrong to presume that the inequality between blacks and whites is stronger among men in general than among women in the US. Figure 7 presents the ratios of the mortality rates of blacks and whites for the country as a whole (based on a sample survey). While US black men have 1.8 times the mortality rate of whites, black women have nearly three times the mortality of white women. It is also important to note that while the mortality rate — adjusted for differences in family income — is 1.2 times higher for black men, it is as much as 2.2 times larger for black women. It thus appears that even after full note is taken of income levels, black women die in very much larger proportions (in childbirth and in other ways) than white women in the contemporary United States.

Comparisons of this kind based on mortality data are important because of the light they throw on existing inequalities in life chances. They are also important for the questions they raise about policy issues. If the relative deprivation of blacks transcends income differentials so robustly, the remediating of this inequality has to go into policy matters that go well beyond just creating income opportunities for the black population. It is necessary to address such matters as public health services, educational facilities, hazards of urban life and other social and economic parameters that influence survival chances. The picture of mortality differentials presents an entry into the problem of racial inequality in the United States that would be wholly missed if our economic analysis were to be confined to only traditional economic variables.

10. Why Not Morbidity rather than Mortality? 

In arguing the case for a much wider use of mortality statistics in economic analyses, we have to consider its relative advantages not only over traditional economic variables such as income, but also over health data which could appear to be an even more promising informational source about well-being than death statistics. It is natural to think that it may be better to look at morbidity rather than mortality, since the suffering of people relates to illness, and, once dead, there is — we presume — no further agony (even though I don’t have to remind Florentines that Dante Alighieri would not have quite agreed with this).

There can be no question whatsoever that good information on morbidity would be extremely useful. The trouble, however, is that morbidity data — gathered through questionnaires — tend to suffer from major biases. People’s perception of illness varies with what they
are used to and also with their medical knowledge. In places where medical care is widespread and good, people often have a higher perception of morbidity, even though they may be in much better general health. Receiving medical diagnosis and care tends to reduce actual morbidity, while at the same time increasing one's understanding of illness (including knowledge of one's ailments). In contrast, a population that has little experience of medical care and widespread health problems as a standard condition of existence can have a very low perception of being medically ill.

Figure 8 presents the comparative rates of perceived morbidity in the US and in India as a whole, as well as in two Indian states: Kerala (a state with much education and health care — discussed earlier), and Bihar (a very backward state with much illiteracy and lack of medical facilities). It turns out that the rate of reported morbidity is much higher in Kerala than in India as a whole (despite all the medical care and high life expectancy in Kerala), and much lower in Bihar than the Indian average (despite the medical backwardness and low life expectancy in Bihar). Indeed Kerala, which has by a long margin the highest longevity among the Indian states, also has incomparably the largest rate of reported morbidity. At the other end, the states in the northern part of India (Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan) have by far the lowest longevity and also the least reporting of morbidity.

This apparent perversity persists in international comparisons with the United States as well. Indeed, as Figure 8 indicates, the
US has even higher rates of reported morbidity than Kerala. Once again, high life expectancy and high levels of reported morbidity move together — not in opposite directions.

These observations relate to a general methodological question, that of ‘positional objectivity’, which I have tried to discuss elsewhere. The objectivity of positional observations plays a crucial part in the process of acquiring knowledge, and thus it serves as the building block of our understandings and perceptions. When we observe the world, including ourselves, what we discern and appreciate is strongly influenced by what else we know and the other experiences we have. Our observational analyses from particular ‘positions’ can be ‘objective’ enough from that position and yet very far from what we could know had we been differently placed.

The morbidity information that is obtained from our own perceptions of illnesses and ailments is mediated through our positional understandings and interpretations. When a community has few health facilities and little general and medical education, the perception of ill health can be very limited, and knowledge of specific ailments may be particularly lacking. And yet the members of that community may have a good deal of illness in terms of more general medical criteria. When high mortality rates go with low perceptions of morbidity, the case for questioning the morbidity data is indeed strong. We may get a much better idea of people’s ability to avoid death and severe illness by looking at actual mortality information rather than from self-perception of ailments.

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28. The comparison with the US is based on surveys of the same diseases, on that see Chen and Murray, ‘Understanding Morbidity Change’, 1992, cited earlier.


30. It has been pointed out that in the US the higher self-perception of morbidity, despite lower mortality, may reflect the fact that people who survive the prospect of early death frequently remain open to suffering from illnesses, and some of these conditions may require a good deal of medical attention and care. Thus, it could be argued that medically recognized morbidity may not be as different after all from self-perception of morbidity. There is certainly a need to look at this aspect of the actual medical experiences of different societies, but it does not eliminate the difficulty of interpreting self-perceived morbidity when the understanding of illnesses varies widely (for example, with medical and educational facilities). Furthermore, while it is undoubtedly correct that a person who dies from an illness (rather than surviving it) needs less medical attention — indeed none — in the future, the seriousness of the illness in question that kills the person need not be lightly dismissed just because a finiteness of medical attention has been reached. In terms of the well-being of the population, the morbidity information has dual relevance in that (1) it tells us about the misfortune of death, and (2) it quite possibly serves as a reasonable signal of the presence of a significant illness (with negative features other than death, such as suffering and misery).

31. In defending the use of self-perception of morbidity, it is sometimes pointed out that we may be as ill as we think we are, and it is hard to dispense with self-perception in understanding ailments. For a powerful philosophical defence of a similar position see Arthur Kleinman’s paper in Chen and Kleinman, (eds.), Health and Social Change in International Perspective, cited earlier. See also his ‘Uses and Misuses of the Social Sciences in Medicine’, in Fiske, D.W. and R.A. Shweder, (eds.), Metatheory in Social Science: Pluralisms and Subjectivities, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1986. There is force in this argument, but the point at issue is not that of ignoring the self-perception of illness, but of interpreting such information.
Even when the morbidity data are not based on subjective assessments, but on the actual care of the ill, that again tends to reflect the availability of medical care (lower in Bihar than in Kerala, which is lower than in the US, and so on). If a village acquires a hospital, more people are treated, and thus more statistics become available about how many people are ill and are being treated. But that must not be seen as an increase in morbidity itself.

11. Sluggishness and Speed of Movement

Finally, I come to the argument that even if mortality is a sensible thing to look at for economic analyses, is it not too sluggish a variable to be of much use as an economic indicator? Variables like national income or employment can move quite quickly and can thus serve as guides for policy change. In contrast, it is argued, mortality moves slowly since it depends on many variables that are hard to change, including human constitution (the expanding of the average life expectancy beyond the age group of the 80s does not seem to be even on the cards for the foreseeable future). This must be a drawback for the use of mortality statistics as an economic indicator.

This line of reasoning is defective for several distinct reasons. Perhaps the most immediate issue concerns the fact that mortality rates can shift very quickly indeed when they move in an upward direction due to an economic crisis. Famines provide a class of examples in which the movement of mortality can be disastrously rapid, and they certainly do call for immediate economic response. But there are also examples of other kinds of economic and social change in which mortality rates have gone up extremely fast. The recent experience of the former Soviet Union and of Eastern Europe provides many such terrifying cases.

Figure 9 presents the time series of crude death rates in Russia, with a sharp rise from 1989 and an extremely speedy escalation from 1992. Life expectancy figures have also correspondingly

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In this interpretation, the positional features have to be considered. Mortality data help us inter alia to identify the positional characteristics and thus enrich the interpretation of self-perception of illnesses.


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fallen with great haste in these countries. While the nature of the economic crisis in these countries has received much attention lately, the mortality information points to aspects of the crisis that other data may not bring out. In particular, the rapid deterioration of health services and medical facilities, the collapse of the general system of social security, and changes in social and physical environments are natural candidates for immediate investigation in this context.

To move to a different aspect of the speed issue, what is regarded as 'speedy' must depend on the space we consider and the normalization we use. GNP growth rates look rapid enough, but if we consider speed by the rate at which international gaps can be narrowed, these may not be at all as fast as the movements of life-expectancy figures that are actually observed.

Figure 9: Actual and Expected Crude Death Rate in Russia, 1980-1993


In a striking and insightful passage in his 1963 book, the basic issue was identified by Mahbub ul Haq, then a leading economic planner in Pakistan:

If India and Pakistan manage to maintain an annual growth rate of 5% and pass through roughly the same ‘take-off’ period as Rostow identifies for many of the Western countries, the per capita income after another twenty years will be no higher than the present-day per capita income in Egypt.\(^{36}\)

While that recognition of ‘slowness’ in moving per capita income has not changed, in matters of life and death many developing countries have made great and — in the relative scale — extraordinarily rapid progress. Almost all the poor countries today have higher life expectancy than most of the richer countries had not long ago.\(^{37}\) Considerations of speed do not give us ground for moving away from our basic interest in matters of life and death.

12. Concluding Remarks

I shall not try to summarize this lecture, but will take this opportunity to point to a few features of the analysis presented. The basic focus has been on showing why and how mortality statistics can be helpful in the formulation of economic policy decisions over a large field, covering overall performance as well as distributional concerns over class, gender and race.

I have argued that mortality information has (1) intrinsic importance (since a longer life is valued in itself), (2) enabling significance (since being alive is a necessary condition for our capabilities), and (3) associative relevance (since many other valuable achievements relate — negatively — to mortality rates).

It is not suggested that the use of more traditional economic variables should be abandoned in economic analysis in favour of relying on mortality information only. Rather, it is a question of supplementing that traditional informational approach by another outlook that can be epistemically rich and practically important.

\(^{36}\) Mahbub ul Haq, The Strategy of Economic Planning: A Case Study of Pakistan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1963. Later he would pioneer and develop the influential Human Development Reports from 1990 onwards for UNDP. The need to shift the focus of attention from GNP growth rates can already be seen in Mahbub ul Haq’s insightful observation more than three decades earlier.

\(^{37}\) Some have even come fairly close to contemporary European life expectancy, including Costa Rica, China, Sri Lanka, and Kerala, even though they have not got anywhere near the European per capita GNP.
Personal income is certainly a basic determinant even of survival and death, and more generally of the quality of life of a person.

Nevertheless, income is only one variable among the many that affect our chances of enjoying life, and some of the other variables are also influenceable by economic policy. Quality of life depends on various physical and social conditions, such as the epidemiological environment in which a person lives. The availability of health care and the nature of medical insurance — public as well as private — are among the important influences on life and death. So are the other social services, including basic education and the orderliness of urban living, and the access to modern medical knowledge in rural communities. The statistics on mortality draw our attention to all these policy issues.

Mortality information can throw light also on the nature of social inequalities, including gender bias and racial disparities. Biases in economic arrangements are often most clearly seen through differential mortality information.

While mortality statistics can be, in principle, well supplemented — and to some extent even supplanted — by morbidity information, the typical morbidity data are, for this purpose, very unreliable indeed. The objectivity they reflect is positionally contingent and can be hard to use for comparative purposes. Mortality statistics can sometimes give us a better idea of the level of health and illness of a population than the morbidity data gathered in the usual way.

Mortality data are not only informationally rich, they can also move fast enough to provide guidance in a rapidly changing economic and social situation. The recent experience of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe brings this out. These mortality shifts can draw attention to the need for policy change that cannot be presumed exclusively from the statistics of incomes and other standard economic variables. Furthermore, in terms of long-run comparisons, when the mortality and longevity data are relatively scaled they can register more sensitivity than relative income levels provide.

James Grant was right to look beyond the standard statistics of incomes and earnings and into the real information on deprivation and hardship. Mortality statistics can form a major component of that rich approach to economic and social analysis. I have tried to discuss in this lecture the nature and reach of that informational approach.
The UNICEF International Child Development Centre, often referred to as the Innocenti Centre, was established in Florence, Italy, in 1988. The Centre undertakes and promotes policy analysis and applied research, provides a forum for international professional exchanges of experiences, and disseminates ideas and research results emanating from its activities. On a highly selective basis, in areas of programme relevance, the Centre also provides training and capacity-building opportunities for UNICEF staff and professionals in other institutions with which UNICEF cooperates.

The Centre’s core programme is currently concentrated in the following three areas:

- **Economic policies and mobilization of resources for children**, which aims to strengthen UNICEF efforts to document the impact of economic policies on children, women and other vulnerable groups and to formulate appropriate policies for preserving and mobilizing financial resources for human development strategies. Projects are currently focused on structural adjustment policies in sub-Saharan Africa: financing social services; child poverty and deprivation in industrialized countries; and the monitoring of public policy and social conditions during the transition to a market economy in Central and Eastern Europe.

- **The rights of the child**, which focuses on policy analysis and development for UNICEF and cooperating institutions, particularly in terms of mechanisms and strategies to support the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Several of its key provisions are the object of study, including those concerned with the best interests of the child, the maximum use of available resources and non-discrimination. Specific areas of concern include child labour, children of minorities and children in armed conflicts. Another project aims to set up an effective user-oriented children’s rights information base.

- **Decentralization, participation and local governance**, which seeks to identify, assess and advocate sustainable strategies for the decentralization of planning and action for children and for the improved provision of relevant social services at the local level. The main medium-term objective is to help develop better programming tools for UNICEF-supported action at the subnational level.
Mortality as an Indicator of Economic Success and Failure

by Amartya Sen