CHILDREN OF MIGRANTS AND ETHNIC MINORITIES: AN OVERVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

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*/ This paper has been prepared by the authors in their personal capacity.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the UNICEF International Child Development Centre.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since the 1970s, there has been a growing awareness in Western Europe that internal and international migrations have generated particularly vulnerable populations, especially in large urban areas where migrant groups have concentrated in search of work, urban life styles, and better income opportunities. Among these groups are an increasing number of children and young people of "foreign" parentage, who were either born in the receiving country or migrated to it as small children. Many have reached adolescence and the start of their working lives, and find themselves exposed to problems which are not specific to one ethnic group or culture of origin, but derive from socio-cultural processes at work, in their new society and from situations of social relegation. Although the young people may have legal citizenship, this has not ensured them social citizenship.

Cultural assimilation, which occurs when individuals or groups completely adopt cultural practices of their new home country, was once thought to be a precondition of social integration. It is now realized that many populations maintain a separate cultural identity in their private, everyday practices, without jeopardizing their effective integration into a new society. Western Europe is thus moving towards a multicultural society that is looking for new reference points and is facing new challenges. In order to understand what will happen in the third and future generation of children, it is important to monitor the situation of different ethnic populations in their new countries.

There are many variables affecting each migrant population's ability to "integrate" or be "incorporated" into a new society, that is, to become progressively undistinguishable from the local population in terms of educational attainment, employment, effective access to housing, and other aspects of their social position. A framework for understanding the situation of children of migrant background is discussed in Section III.

In Sections IV to VII, case studies, based on a review of secondary literature, provide quick "photographs" of the situation of migrant families and their children in three countries which have a long experience of immigration - the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom - and in Italy, a country for which immigration is a very recent phenomenon. Each study discusses the way immigrant groups are perceived politically and ideologically, places migrations in their historical context and outlines key aspects of relevant legislation. Different aspects of the current social position and ethno-cultural situation of the major immigrant groups and their children are also highlighted, with particular emphasis on family and household situations, school performance, nutrition and health status, youth employment, and encounters with the law.

A concluding section discusses preliminary lessons learned from this first cross-country assessment, and future policy directions that could be taken. More in-depth data than what is available in many countries is required in order to fill the lacunae, substantively monitor conditions of child immigrants, and construct valid in-country and cross-country comparisons. The lessons learnt from the policies adopted by the major immigrant-receiving countries to facilitate the migrants' access to urban housing, education and employment call for a more thorough assessment. Finally, the common experience of migration, its new multi-cultural base, and the move toward European unification all point to an urgent need for the European community to adopt a new social agenda in which migrants and their children figure prominently. The paper ends with an appeal for a new international ethos that recognizes the uneven distribution of wealth and power between North and South and creates a new and heightened sense of joint responsibility in sharing problems and identifying common solutions.
I. INTRODUCTION

Because of population pressures at particular moments in their history, many Western European countries have provided migrants to newly-opened frontiers that were underpopulated and/or industrializing. It has been calculated that 50 million Europeans emigrated to North and South America, Australia and South Africa between 1840 and 1940. This figures represents one-fifth of the total population of Europe at the beginning of the period (Melotti 1991).

Since the Second World War and particularly after the 1960s, many Western European countries have been experiencing positive immigration. Migrations to each specific country have differed in origin, and have been influenced by the historical ties between the sending and receiving countries, particularly in the case of migrations from ex-colonies. However, international economic conditions and political situations have also caused similar migration trends across countries, in particular the "contract work" migrations of the 1960s and the new waves of immigrants from developing countries of the 1970s and 1980s. For comparative purposes, the post-war migrations to Western Europe can be divided roughly into three phases:

1. Post-war reconstruction and structural expansion (1950s-1960s).

Internal migrations from less-developed rural regions to rapidly expanding urban areas were common in all Western European countries in the post-war period. The large-scale migrations of Southern Italians to the industrial cities of Northern Italy are one impressive example of this phenomenon. The migrants’ difficult living conditions, their limited access to health services, good educational facilities and other services, as well as their coping strategies have been well documented.

Labour migrations from the Southern Mediterranean countries involved mostly Southern Italians, Spaniards, Portuguese, Greeks and Turks. Mainly single and male, these migrants responded to the Northern European call for manpower to help rebuild war-scarred nations or fill the labour needs of rapidly expanding economies. They were hired as "contract workers" or "guestworkers" under special work agreements, and worked in most of the highly industrialized Northern European countries (Sweden, Denmark, France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Austria). One exception was the United Kingdom which could count on colonial workers from the Caribbean and workers from Ireland to fill
its labour requirements. Guestworkers usually had non-immigrant status, limited social and labour-market rights, and were expected to return home after their contracts had terminated. Behind the guestworker concept was the belief that labour shortages were a transitory phenomenon resulting from conjunctural rather than structural factors (Papademetriou 1988).

Migrations from non-European countries. The majority of non-European migration in this period was from colonial or ex-colonial countries to colonizer countries where migrants had special rights of entry and settlement. Early colonial migrations to the United Kingdom and the Netherlands were often undertaken for schooling and professional qualification, and were basically temporary. Colonial workers were sometimes recruited to fill specific jobs, as were, for instance, the West Indians who migrated to the United Kingdom in the early 1950s in response to critical labour shortages, the Eritrean and Somali domestics who accompanied Italian families returning to Italy from the former Italian East Africa at the beginning of the 1960s, or the Antillean workers brought to the Netherlands by Dutch companies in the late 1960s.

The political instability of newly-independent nations was also a determinant factor. Depending on government policies towards them and their citizenship rights, soldiers from former colonial armed forces often took refuge abroad waiting for an opportune moment to return to their homeland. One striking example is provided by the 12,500 Moluccan soldiers and their families who arrived in the Netherlands in 1951. Algerians also fled to France in the tumultuous post-Independence period, reaching almost 650,000 by the end of the 1960s.

2. Structural crisis and the internationalization of labour (late 1960s to early 1980s). Worldwide recessions (1967, and from 1973-4) and increases in the price of oil (1971 and 1973) had serious repercussions on industrialized and developing countries alike. With the economic slowdown, contract work arrangements diminished considerably in many European countries, and completely disappeared in others, to be replaced by new patterns of immigration. Between 1973 and 1974, most Northern European countries adopted policies to halt primary migration and to encourage return migration.

The immigration restrictions in the North and the new economic growth in some Southern European countries were two principal causes of the shift in migration patterns that took place in the 1970s. Italy, Spain and Greece gradually began changing their role from labour-exporting to labour-importing economies. These countries were essentially unprepared
to handle migration from developing countries, and have only recently begun to address the legislative, infrastructural and other problems connected with it (Caggiano de Azevedo and Di Prospero 1991).

While measures were being taken to block migration in the North, non-European migrations continued to arrive from the South. "Push factors contributing to the flow", identified in the case of migrations from the Caribbean to the United Kingdom, but applicable to developing regions in general, were "widespread poverty, pressure of population on scarce resources, lack of opportunities for advancement, uneven distribution of wealth, very high unemployment rates and the absence of welfare and social-service support programmes" (Hall 1988). In many countries, the severe economic restrictions caused by the structural adjustment requirements of the international financial community were also precipitating factors. Migrants from developing countries continued to enter Europe, but mainly in connection with the reunification policies which allowed immigrants to be joined by their dependents. By 1979, secondary migration (women, children and elderly males) accounted for more than 90 per cent of all arrivals to the United Kingdom from the New Commonwealth (Ibidem). Non-EEC migrants also entered Western Europe as refugees or illegal immigrants.

The employment of migrants from developing countries represents one important aspect of what has been termed the internationalization of labour. Starting from this period, foreign labour was imported from an increasingly wide range of developing countries, while, conversely, production activities began to be exported to developing countries. Factories, for example, were set up by multinational companies in countries where labour costs were extremely low (notably, Hong Kong, Singapore, Formosa, South Korea, and Haiti); agreements were also made to provide technology and management skills to developing countries, enabling them to produce goods for their own internal markets or neighbouring ones (Brazil, Iran, India).

3. *The current situation: new and old immigrant groups (1980s and early 1990s).* Since the 1980s, there has been a generalized crisis in the developing world leading to migrations which are governed less by the effective demand of manpower in the receiving countries than by the increasingly compelling push factors in the sending countries (see "Refugees" and "Undocumented Migrants" below). In addition, these "new" migrations are no longer aptly termed "labour migrations". They are more broadly-based, motivated, for example, by the
hope of betterment, the attraction of a more consumer-oriented or urban way of life, the search for alternative sources of family mobility, or the wish to join family members already abroad. New migrants maintain fluid relations with their homeland, often engaging in "commuter" migration. Mobility is facilitated by vast "transnational" networks.

In search of better opportunities, migrants have converged on industrialized countries which have themselves been experiencing somewhat milder forms of recession. The growth of this new wave of immigration has been very clearly documented in the United States; in Europe, it is just beginning to be documented numerically across the region, and its social, political and economic implications assessed.

Refugees are becoming increasingly numerous in many European countries. The distinction between refugees and migrants has always been a difficult one to sustain both legally and sociologically. Although there is a stronger element of compulsion involved in the refugee-generating areas (war, civil unrest, natural disaster), all large-scale migrations are motivated by compelling forces (economic circumstances, religious and ethnic persecution, and so forth). Literature concerning refugees has increasingly analysed the tension between political and economic refugees (Cohen 1991). The crucial difference between a refugee and an economic migrant often rests on definitions given by the host country.

The majority of the world’s 18.5 million refugees live in the developing world, usually in the countries bordering the ones where push factors exist. However, Europe, which not too long ago was itself a major generator of refugees and displaced persons (Zohberg et al. 1989), is now receiving a modest percentage of refugees, and with the expected influx from Eastern Europe, this percentage is likely to grow, at least temporarily. Generally, the more heavily-regulated migrations tend to be permanent. Refugees may also be illegal in the sense that they claim a refugee status that has not been allotted to them by the receiving country, as was the case of the Albanians who requested asylum in Italy in 1991.

Undocumented migrants. Experience in the United States has shown how difficult it is to control both the illegal entry and the unauthorized stay of migrants. Never a pressing problem in Western Europe in the past, illegal migration is now intensifying in reaction to the efforts of the European Economic Community (EEC) to defend its borders and - some believe - to create a "Fortress Europe". With the crisis in Eastern Europe, growing numbers of migrants appear to be crossing over Western European borders clandestinely, although not in the massive numbers predicted in some quarters (Cohen 1991).
1. Estimated Numbers and Urban Concentration. Estimates of the overall immigrant population in the EEC vary widely. Moreover, there are only limited estimates of the child population because of different, and often changing, census policies (OECD 1991). The relative percentage of children of "foreign" background in each country is however considerable and concentrations are clearly urban.

The absolute number of immigrants residing in the EEC since the 1940s ranges from a low estimate of 13 million to a high estimate of 20 million (Beauthier 1991, Widgren 1990). Official data from member countries, collected between 1981 and 1988, show about 13 million legal foreign residents (Lebon 1990, others). These numbers include approximately five million foreigners from within the EEC and almost eight million of non-EEC origin (Table 1). The numbers exclude immigrants who have sought and gained, or have a right to, the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Numbers</th>
<th>% of Total Population</th>
<th>Number of EEC</th>
<th>% of Foreign Population</th>
<th>Number of non-EEC</th>
<th>% of Foreign Population</th>
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<td>1 577 900</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>2 102 200</td>
<td>57.1</td>
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<td>4 630 300</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>1 377 600</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>3 252 700</td>
<td>70.2</td>
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<td>193 400</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>110 900</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>82 500</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland c</td>
<td>83 600</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>66 500</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>17 700</td>
<td>20.4</td>
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<td>173 000</td>
<td>30.2</td>
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<td>69.8</td>
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<td>7 200</td>
<td>7.5</td>
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<td>159 700</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>408 300</td>
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<td>23 900</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>65 900</td>
<td>73.8</td>
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<td>Spain *</td>
<td>334 900</td>
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<td>193 300</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>141 600</td>
<td>62.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>U.K. *</td>
<td>1 736 000</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>752 000</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>984 000</td>
<td>56.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12 965 500</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5 088 200</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>7 877 400</td>
<td>60.5</td>
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</table>

Source: Lebon 1990:188
citizenship of their host country, or children of migrants who are entitled to citizenship either by birth or by residence. They also exclude undocumented immigrants, and the extent to which they include refugees is not clear. The foreign populations of three countries (the Federal Republic of Germany, France and the United Kingdom) accounted for more than three-quarters of the entire foreign population within the EEC in 1987. With the exception of Luxembourg, the total immigrant population of no country exceeds 9 per cent, and the median for the EEC as a whole is 4 per cent. The percentage drops even further for non-EEC immigrants who account for 2.4 per cent considering both EEC and non-EEC nationals, and 1.9 per cent considering non-EEC nationals only. The relative percentages are much higher in urban areas where migrant groups tend to converge and where they continue to reside in large numbers. Studies carried out in the 1980s show large and growing immigrant populations in several large West German cities (11.3 per cent) (Jurgen and Gans 1990), and Paris (21.2 per cent) (White 1987).

Children of migrant background. Although immigrants do not represent a conspicuous portion of the total EEC population, they are over-represented among the younger generations, especially in the 0-4 and 5-9 age-groups (Table 2). It has been estimated that between 40 and 50 per cent of the foreigners legally residing in the EEC are under 25 years.

Table 2: Total Population and Foreign Population by Age Group
in Selected European Countries
(Most Recent Figures)

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<tbody>
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<td>Total 000s</td>
<td>Foreign 000s %</td>
<td>Total 000s</td>
<td>Foreign 000s %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>610.0</td>
<td>96.6 15.8</td>
<td>3 561.0</td>
<td>409.5 11.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>644.2</td>
<td>92.9 14.4</td>
<td>2 604.0</td>
<td>326.0 12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14</td>
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<td>88.6 12.3</td>
<td>4 638.0</td>
<td>360.0 7.8</td>
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<td>15-19</td>
<td>794.5</td>
<td>80.5 10.1</td>
<td>4 268.5</td>
<td>218.0 5.1</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>9 849.0</td>
<td>878.5 9.0</td>
<td>1 682.0</td>
<td>630.0 7.5</td>
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</table>


* 0-5 years (and not 0-4 years); 6-9 years (and not 5-9 years) 15-18 years (and not 15-19 years)
of age (Charbit 1988). Most entered Europe under the auspices of family reunification policies, or were born in the new country of residence.

These statistics are indicative of the shift in the composition of the migrant populations from single, adult males to entire families. This shift is the result of integrationist policies, adopted primarily in the late 1970s by major Western European receiving countries, which specifically took the needs of children into consideration. In view of the extent of the problems faced in the less developed regions of the world today, migrations are unlikely to stop in the near future and the number of children can be expected to multiply as a result of chain migration. Moreover, even if immigration numbers fluctuate, immigrant children are still likely to represent an important percentage of the child population in each country, at least for the next decade or two, because of the general decline in European fertility rates and the higher fertility rates among recent migrant populations (OECD 1991).

Another important change in the composition of the immigrant population in Western Europe is the predominance of immigrants from outside the EEC. Approximately 60 per cent of all migrants originate from non-EEC areas, 44 per cent from non-member European countries and 56 per cent from Africa, Asia and the Americas (Tables 3 and 4). Migrations

<table>
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<th>North America</th>
<th>Other</th>
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<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>31.2</td>
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<td>12.1</td>
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Source: Lebon 1990:195
* Add number of stateless persons to reach 100 per cent.
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<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>Others</td>
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<td>Maghreb</td>
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<td>1 573.8</td>
<td>1 416.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland(^b)</td>
<td>(1.2)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.3)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(10.0)</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(5.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>(98.7)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>91.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>141.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg(^c)</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>185.0</td>
<td>160.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>136.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>73.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>81.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.(^d)</td>
<td>121.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>109.0</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>142.0</td>
<td>114.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>622.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lebon 1990:190 quoting Eurostat (except for Ireland and Italy)

\(^a\) 1982, \(^b\) 1988, \(^c\) 1982, \(^d\) average 1984-6
from the Southern Mediterranean basin and Asia are currently the most numerous, although the developments in Eastern Europe are expected to change the future balance of migration, at least temporarily (Cornia and Sipos 1990).

Statistics thus indicate a progressive differentiation in the population of EEC countries, with an apparent movement towards multi- or pluri-cultural societies. There is also a tendency for immigrants to maintain transnational links of a cultural, social, and economic nature with their country of origin. The consequences of this new tendency are particularly felt by the younger generations who grow up with multiple cultural allegiances. EEC countries are currently debating how to adapt to this situation and develop not only a multi-cultural society, but also adequate social structures to cope with multi-culturalism.

**Issues Related to Terminology and Definitions**

Statistics are useful as an introduction to the problems connected with migration, but they are partial and not always easily comparable. This is particularly true for the statistics relating to children, who may be prominent in the statistical records of some countries and relatively absent in others. There are a number of reasons for this.

First, differences in national policies have often translated into differences in statistical techniques and in the kind of records kept. In some countries, when migrants settle and become legal nationals of their new home societies, they may also merge statistically with the rest of the population. Data for second- or third-generation children may be sketchy or unavailable. Secondly, the absence of an integrated immigration policy at the level of the EEC has meant that statistics have also not been integrated. A related problem is that there is no common agreement among member countries of who should be defined as an immigrant. This makes it very difficult to compare the social and economic welfare of immigrants across countries as well as across generations.

Different, and more or less ambiguous, terminology is used to identify children of migrant background in each country, reflecting how these children are perceived politically and ideologically:

- **Second-generation immigrant** is usually used to identify children whose parents were immigrants. The term is somewhat misleading because it does not clarify whether the children were themselves immigrants, or whether, as in many cases, they were born in their country of residence and have settled there permanently (Tabbarah 1984, others). Moreover,
a purely generational approach can be very distorting. All second-generation children do not face the same problems, and children of the fourth generation may still be struggling for acceptance and integration in the country in which they, their parents, and their grandparents were born.

- *Ethnic* is a qualifier that is widely used to refer to specific migrant populations, especially in countries that follow a pluralistic model which, as discussed more fully later in this paper, acknowledges diversity (the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and more recently the United States). In these countries, it is felt that the term "immigrant" does not acknowledge that many of these migrant-descended populations are fully settled and should be considered an integral part of the country's citizenship.

- *Minority* is a concept which may be used quite differently in the policy documents of different countries. The definition of the term therefore needs to be tested in each country. In the Netherlands, the term "ethnic minority" is used officially to signify particularly deprived populations with a separate culture which, because of the combined effect of poverty and diversity, are in danger of marginalization and stigmatization. Policies have mainly targeted Mediterranean workers and their families, Surinamese and Antillean immigrants, Moluccan refugees, gypsies and even caravan dwellers (Penninx 1992). Some of these groups are non-immigrants. Conversely, some immigrant populations are excluded from the category (for instance, EEC nationals or the Chinese) because they do not represent a potential problem. In countries with indigenous ethnic minorities (the Tyrolese and Ladins in Italy, the Scots and Irish in the United Kingdom), the use of the term to indicate migrant groups is problematical. In other countries, the term "ethnic group" is often preferred to "ethnic minority" which has connotations of inferiority. Some countries resist classifying by ethnic origin, especially after citizenship, in order not to be perceived as being discriminatory; others may resist because of their strong assimilationist stance. The term "minority group" is discussed further in the next section.

- *Foreign* is a term which is commonly used in Italy and other countries that have a relatively uniform population, but is inapplicable in the Netherlands, for example, where many past immigrants have been Dutch citizens.

In this paper, the term *children of migrant background* is used to accommodate the many different terms applying to children who themselves, or whose parents or grandparents, have immigrated to an EEC country, and is here defined as (1) the descendants of the supposedly temporary colonial and contract migrant workers who settled in select European countries
primarily after World War II (Miles 1986); (2) children of refugees and, importantly, (3) the increasing number of "new" immigrants who have left their home countries to escape economic and political hardships. For general purposes they will be taken to range from 0-18 years. In some of the quantitative analysis, however, data for the 0-25 age-group will need to be incorporated to identify trends, especially in employment.

**Staying On: The Myth of Return**

In the 1950s, some countries based their guestworker policies explicitly on the principle of rotation (Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland), while others did so less explicitly (France, Belgium, Luxembourg). In periods of economic growth, however, those policies were often poorly enforced. Although some voluntary or policy-structured return migration did occur, by the early 1980s it was clear that migrants were staying on. In 1975, for instance, only 12.0 per cent of all Turks living in the Federal Republic of Germany had a residence record of eight years or more; by 1981 this percentage had increased to 48.5 per cent. For the Yugoslavs, these percentages stood at 12.9 in 1975 and at 71.8 in 1981. For the Spaniards, the third largest national group in the Federal Republic after the Turks and the Yugoslavs, it went up from 37.2 per cent in 1975 to 81.6 per cent in 1981. (Entzinger 1984 and 1985, Hammar 1985).

In the wake of the world economic problems of the early 1970s and the decreased need for foreign contract workers, all countries with significant immigration adopted policies designed to encourage foreigners to return to their homelands. The policies included forced returns as well as voluntary returns encouraged through (1) financial incentives (return bonuses or repatriation allowances in the Netherlands, France and Germany); (2) training facilities for better reintegration in the work market at home (Germany, France); (3) support of development programmes as well as of business initiatives by migrants in their home countries (Germany in Turkey, Greece in Yugoslavia, Sweden and France in various countries). As a general rule, despite some successes and possibly because of the limited funds and scope of the initiatives, both forced and voluntary returns remained well below expectations. In some cases, return policies actually provoked increases in illegal re-immigration (Entzinger 1985). Migrants who did return to their countries of origin found reintegration to be very difficult.
The immigrants of the 1980s and 1990s, unlike guestworkers of the past, arrive in Western Europe in less structured ways, and generally move into low-paying jobs in the manual and service sectors (domestics, manual labourers, cleaners), or are self-employed in the informal sector (street vending, for example). However, like those who came before them, most have settled in the host country, married or brought in their families, and generally show few signs of returning to their homelands.

The migrant's perspective. The myth of return has a reverse side. Immigrants and their children often express a strong wish to return home even long after they have settled. This seems to be, among other things, an expression of their general dissatisfaction with their level of integration in the new society and with their sense of self. The wish to return reappears in the second generation as well. Research on migrant groups in the Netherlands, for example, has documented this phenomenon among Moroccans (Shadid 1979), Turks (Mehrländer et al. 1981), and Portuguese (Van Schelven and De Vries 1983).

In comparison with international migrants of the past, today's migrants remain much more closely and continuously tied to their countries of origin because of the greater facility, and lower costs, of transportation and communications. Relationships, exchanges, and contacts are also actively established among migrants across neighbouring host countries, creating diasporas that are increasingly being analysed in the literature (Cohen 1992). However, other relationships may suffer as a result of this new "transnationality". Families are being split with one member or two opening the way for future migrants, often leaving behind, or shuffling back and forth, some very unsupported members, including children.

II. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING THE SITUATION OF CHILDREN OF MIGRANT BACKGROUND

Legal and Social Citizenship

The first hurdles international migrants face are usually legal: immigration papers, residence permits, work permits, applications for legal citizenship are some of the many barriers set up to exclude the outsider. Subsequently, immigrants face a whole new set of problems including lack of social integration, limited access to urban services and needed infrastructures, and fewer educational and employment opportunities than the indigenous
population. In the case of immigrant children, and especially adolescents, social discrimination may be coupled with legal discrimination, for instance by the police or within juvenile courts.

Both internal and international migrants to urban areas encounter initial and long-term problems of integration. Even if they have followed networks and have some adequate support in their new setting, migrants must still undergo a whole process in order to become more fully "integrated" into their new setting, that is to become progressively undistinguishable from the local population in terms of educational attainment, employment, effective access to housing and other aspects of their social position. In the adaptation models developed by sociological literature in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, it was assumed that migrants would ultimately be incorporated. Resistance to such incorporation was then defined in terms of cultural assimilation, a process which occurs when individuals or groups adopt the cultural practices of their new home country, thus becoming culturally similar to the majority group. It was believed that cultural factors continued to set the migrants apart and make integration more difficult.

While many examples can be cited of individual migrants to urban areas who have become integral members of that urban society, or entire migrant groups which have similarly been incorporated, there are also significant examples of continued marginalization along a whole series of dimensions, even with respect to the more long-term and well-established, but economically deprived, local populations.

Integration is further compounded in the situation of international migrants. By settling next to other migrant co-nationals, they become highly visible in the urban milieu where they put pressure on existing services and infrastructures, and where their concentrated presence easily leads to discrimination. Subsequently, there is a gradual process of relocation and dispersion over the urban territory. Migrants may try to become "invisible" by settling in a scattered pattern. This may facilitate their integration at times, but does not automatically entail full social citizenship.

The framework presented in this section is an important first step in understanding the degree of social integration ("social citizenship") experienced by migrant, or migrant-descended, families and their children. It is based on the distinction between social integration and cultural assimilation and is composed of: (1) three dimensions that help analyse the situation of adults of migrant background, and (2) a second level that translates those three dimensions into areas of deprivation for children of migrant background (Table
5). Two of these three dimensions - social position and ethno-cultural situation - have been described in Penninx (1992) and are presented here with only minor modifications; they represent the end-results of complex dynamics and establish the current situation of each recent migrant population. A third dimension has been added for comparative purposes.

The Situation of Adults of Migrant Background

1. *Social position.* The first dimension is what Penninx calls the immigrant’s *social position*, defined as the position of the minority population as a whole in the social stratification of society. Indicators for this position can be found in various attainment and participation levels, as was illustrated in a model designed by Van Praag in 1984 (Figure 1). Thus, having a paid job or not, the kind and level of work, and the level of income derived from work and

| Table 5: Framework for Analysing the Situation of Children of Migrant Background |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------|
| **Level One (Adults)**          | **Ethno-Cultural Position**     | **Minority-Group and Identity Formation** |
| **Social Position**             | **National Model of Citizenship** | **Current dynamics** |
| - Education                     | - Background                    |                  |
| - Housing                       | - Time of Arrival               |                  |
| - Employment                    |                                |                  |
| - Social Security               |                                |                  |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Level Two (Children)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Causes of Maladjustment</strong></th>
<th><strong>Children’s Attitudes</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicators of Maladjustment</strong></td>
<td>As evidenced in children’s interactions (and their perceptions of these interactions):</td>
<td>Analysis of children’s -sense of hope -sense of future direction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Poor school attendance</td>
<td>- With institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- High incidence of drop-out</td>
<td>- At home</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Presence in prisons</td>
<td>- Within the community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Poor nutrition and health status</td>
<td>- At school</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Exposed to risks of exploitation and abuse</td>
<td>- At work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Lack of effective or prospective employment</td>
<td>- Among peers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- At leisure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

other sources are some of the factors which affect the position in society of a migrant population or any one of its members. They also determine the individual’s position in other domains which are strongly influenced by consumption and purchasing power. Education is a primordial factor in the causal chain that determines social position, affecting not only employment and income attainment, but also the opportunities that an individual has to participate in other spheres of society.

Housing is largely related to consumption behavior and represents a yardstick for social position. At the same time, the location of housing very significantly affects the migrants’ futures and those of their children because it has a direct relation to the level of services and opportunities available to them, including the accessibility and quality of schools, the range of social relations, and the levels of street dangers for the children. Living in a certain area also influences the degree of marginalization of parents and their children.

2. Ethno-cultural position. The second dimension emphasized by Penninx is ethno-cultural. It relates to the process of categorization of individuals as primarily members of a population which is perceived as being different from one’s own population (Figure 2).

Figure 1: Indicators of the Social Position of Adult Migrants

Source: Van Praag (1984)
Two qualifications are necessary here. Identification with, and loyalty to, an ethno-cultural population is always relative. The ethno-cultural position is thus somewhere on a continuum between two poles. At the one extreme are individuals who only occasionally and in certain specific circumstances regard themselves, or are regarded by others, as being members of a specific ethno-cultural group (for example, at parties held to celebrate their common origin). At the other extreme are individuals who share a consistent group culture and loyalty, and whose ethnicity is more constantly perceived by themselves and others. They tend to have most of their primary relations and social contacts (nuclear and extended family, acquaintances and neighbours), and often also their secondary social contacts (at school, work, religious institutions and recreational associations), within their own group. This is a question of degree since all individuals use facets of their many identities differently at different times or in different situations. Thus, individuals present themselves as ethnic or not, as representing one role or another, and always do that to some extent according to the situation (Vincent 1978).

Figure 2: HEURISTIC MODEL OF POSITION OF IMMIGRANTS

Source: Penninx 1992
It is also important to realize that ethno-cultural position is grounded in the classification of persons as members of a certain population which is perceived as representing a group and as being different. The basis for that perception may be real or subjective. An integral part of those classifications, implicitly or explicitly, are often differences in cultural norms and values, as well as physical (racial) characteristics. Moreover, ethno-cultural position is determined by the perceptions of both the migrants themselves and the members of the receiving society, two points of view which constantly influence and reinforce each other.

An understanding of the ethno-cultural position must therefore include an analysis of not only the extent to which migrants and their descendants view themselves as being different, organize themselves separately and build their own institutions, but also the way the members, organizations and institutions of the receiving society define and treat these individuals or groups. Finally, although analytically distinguished, the social position and ethno-cultural position are actually closely interrelated.

Some other clarifications may be useful. A population is not necessarily a group (as assumed by Penninx), although it may become one in certain circumstances. Obviously, it becomes most clearly a group when it is mobilized around an issue for defensive purposes, or to obtain certain advantages.

Social and ethno-cultural positions may be acquired by individuals who actively make choices and adapt strategies, or they may be allocated by society which delineates and limits the scope of individual actions and paves pre-structured paths for individuals. In other words, the process may be seen from an individual or a macro-structural point of view. The two levels are complementary and in constant interaction. For example, individual choices are often responses to partially prescribed paths.

Position acquisition and allocation may be both positive and negative. The establishment of immigrant quotas for jobs (in the United States), educational opportunities, or housing (the Netherlands) are examples of positive allocation, irrespective of their ultimate effectiveness. Negative allocations may become very important in affecting processes of minority-group formation.

Immigrant groups and individuals acquire their social position, and the receiving society allocates it, through the filter of institutions and institutional practices (such as health care, education, commercial activities and politics) that operate with certain predetermined concepts. The effect of institutions becomes visible in the acts of organizations and
individuals. All of these factors establish the structural context that shapes, in part, the social and ethno-cultural position acquired by, and allocated to, that particular population and the individuals within that population.

In order to analyse the position of migrants comparatively and across countries, it is also important to add other, often implicit, elements to Penninx’s model:

*The national model of citizenship incorporation characteristic of each particular nation.* Two main models can be distinguished: (a) the cultural pluralistic model adopted by the United States (in the late 1960s), by the Netherlands, Canada and Australia or, in more colonially-structured ways, by Malaysia; and (b) an assimilationist model (which is based on the belief that immigrants are historically destined to integrate their strong regional differences), such as the republican model in France, the Vaterland model in Germany, the Nordic model in Sweden, as well as models in some developing countries, notably Thailand. The models in Italy and Spain are hybrids, drawing elements from the assimilationist French-republican model in their approach to internal migrations, and adopting a more cultural pluralistic approach towards their very new immigrant populations.

Some of these models have shifted over time under the impulse of changed demographic and immigration circumstances, without, however, dramatically changing their constitution or legal codes. Sweden, for example, has moved from an initial emphasis on Nordic descent towards a more accommodating pluralistic approach, supported by strong social welfare ideology that emphasizes universalism, egalitarianism and comprehensiveness (Krane 1979). Usually, however, models preserve some key historical and symbolic characteristics. They are related to a whole way to approach the concepts of citizenship engrained in the law, and determine what kind of census data is collected, the extent to which ethno-cultural differences are studied, and consequently the types of policies and programmes that are developed, as well as how they are monitored.

The development of models of citizenship is closely linked to processes of nation-forming and to the historical need to construct the national "imagined communities" which are now called nations. That need emerged as early as the 18th century, but gained force during the 19th and 20th centuries when new nations were faced with the problem of unifying very diverse ethnic populations which were no longer held together by the symbols of monarchy (for example, at the end of the Austro-Hungarian empire) (Anderson 1983).

These models of nation-forming affect conditions set for the acquisition of citizenship. They also have some bearing on the underlying philosophy of each country’s legal system
and, to some extent, its potential and ability to change. Some countries (Great Britain, France, Netherlands and Belgium) have operated on the general principle of *jus soli*, that is, any person born on the national territory automatically becomes a citizen. Other countries (Sweden, Germany, Switzerland) have based their policies on the principle of *jus sanguinis*, that is, citizenship is given automatically only to offspring of citizens. Policies for granting citizenship to migrants are now particularly liberal in Sweden (although still differentiated according to Nordic or non-Nordic descent), and particularly restrictive in Switzerland and Germany. Other Western European countries occupy an in-between position and have often modified qualifying conditions over time. Those modifications, however, still reflect a history of underlying concerns for *jus soli* or *jus sanguinis*.

The models of nation-building ultimately affect the migrant’s social citizenship. Being legally a citizen, however, does not make an individual automatically acceptable as such. The migrant and his or her family do not necessarily "belong", nor are they necessarily considered as having the same entitlements as others.

Some of the most important elements of the constructed concept of national citizenship as it relates to migrants are shown in Figure 3. The constitution's symbolic base (A) provides the underpinning for definitions, policies, programmes and their implementation (B, C, D, E). The constructed concept of citizenship also creates informal practices (F) such as the use of space in the city, the monuments, the organization of different public offices,

**Figure 3: Elements of the Constructed Concept of Citizenship**

- a) Constitution and its symbolic base
- b) Codified legal system
- c) Immigration/civil rights policies and practices
- d) Use of terms "immigrants", "refugees", "ethnic minorities"
- e) Population definitions used, or not used, in census collection
- f) Informal practices

and even the jokes, body language and the style of television personalities. These practices will carry subtle messages, often unconsciously, and thus powerfully shape, day after day, the way the core society perceives migrants and their children and the way they perceive themselves.

*Initial background and historical context.* Issues related to the initial background of the immigrant group and the historical context in the host country ultimately affect the social and ethno-cultural position of the group. Fellow countrymen, for example, may experience very different modes of entry into a new homeland, depending on a number of factors (Figure 4). Distinctions also have to be made between different waves of migrants from the same country because their trajectories and current position in the new society may be quite dissimilar.

3. *The dynamics of minority-group formation or undoing.* A third dimension for analysing the situation of immigrants has to do with the dynamics of minority-group formation. A population is considered a minority, according to the definition used by Penninx, if (a) its social position is homogeneously low; (b) its ethno-cultural position is perceived as markedly different; (c) its numerical position prohibits the exertion of power and influence; and (d) these three conditions continue to exist over generations (Van Amersfoort 1982, Penninx 1992).

Figure 4: OTHER TIMED (HISTORICAL) ELEMENTS CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE CURRENT SOCIAL AND ETHNO-CULTURAL POSITION OF MIGRANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial Background of Migrant Population</th>
<th>Historical Context in Host Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of Education</td>
<td>Political and economic conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic status</td>
<td>Employment policies at time of arrival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural beliefs and practices</td>
<td>Presence of other migrant newcomers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ family structure and mode of operation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ gender system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ social organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ habits and practices</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic composition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Minority-group formation is defined as the process which leads to a minority position. If such a process is reversed and moves in the opposite direction, it leads to openness. The central questions then are: Has some minority-group formation taken place in each country during the last decades? Which groups have been involved in this process? Which factors have determined minority-group formation?

On the basis of the distinction already made between the social and ethno-cultural position of migrants and their descendants, one can analyse how the two aspects influence each other, and thus unravel some of the dynamics of their interrelationships. At least two directions can be distinguished:

"The homogeneous and permanent low social position of immigrants and their descendants may create, or reinforce, negative images and perceptions among dominant groups and in the receiving society at large, possibly culminating in stigmatization of immigrant (populations) and (attribution to them of a) different - inferior - character. Among the immigrants themselves, it may lead to strong in-group feeling, explicit development of a strong and specific ethnic identity and group formation, factors which in turn may hinder, or even block, integration and social mobility in the new society.

Analytically, such a process may also develop in the inverse direction. If such (populations of) immigrants and their descendants are regarded from the very beginning as essentially different and not belonging to the receiving society, such views and the concomitant negative attitudes and stigmatization may lead to a situation in which these immigrants are denied any possibilities through systematic (and perhaps institutionalized) discrimination." (Penninx 1992:6-7).

The Dilemmas of Identity. A minority group in Penninx’s definition is a population that is being considered by others, or considers itself, marginalized along many variables. The minority group measures the extent to which minorities view themselves as being members of their new home society, or, inversely, set apart and different. It also describes the sense of self that is emerging from the sum of its individual members, and what they do about it.

Transnational migrants face problems of identity in a somewhat different way than internal migrants do. While the latter know that they are part of the same nation and may thus feel considerable resentment for being marginalized, the former are actually part of two or more nations. They may have grown up in one, with its history, structures and practices, and are now exposed to another which proposes new values and norms, and attempts to impose an identity on them. Even when born in their "new" country, they still feel some connection to the "old" one. They tend to develop behaviours that are mixtures of both worlds, creole-like adaptations that are unique to them and that make them somewhat
different from the populations of both their country of origin and their new home country. Being transnational is thus a slightly different phenomenon than the actual expression of ethnic behaviors which is common for citizens of the same nation.

More generally, the European nationals in each country have found that their national identity has been weakened, especially with the possible emergence of a new "European" nationhood. At the same time, the new migrants are facing personal crises caused by their condition of partial uprootedness and by changes in important reference points. Local and regional identities, often with an ethnic base, are emerging with particular strength, counterpositioning themselves to national identities. This is lived as a dilemma by the individuals involved. In a modern world where a person's complex identity faces many continuities and discontinuities (Demetrio 1990), these identity dilemmas tend to lead to two responses: (a) either towards a "closure" into isolated self-fulfillment, and thus easy conflict and diminished communication with others, or towards (b) the acceptance of the precariousness of one's identity that can then become an incentive for change and for a "common" search of new reference systems.

The Situation of Children of Migrant Background

A second tier of models is needed to interpret the situation of children of migrant background. The children are affected by what has had, and continues to have, an impact on their parents, including their social and ethno-cultural position and trends of minority-group formation. Their family situation, where they live, or the schools they attend, are all factors that ultimately act as filters of their experiences. At the same time, the children are affected by their direct encounters and experiences in school, at work, with peers and during moments of leisure. Their perception of the situation is also historical and future-oriented. It includes the role model established by their parents who travelled that same route before them, experienced different degrees of success or frustration, and attained a certain social and ethno-cultural position. It also includes a sense of potential future seen in relation both to the present reality of their parents and to the futures of other members of the core society, or of other immigrants (Figure 5).

In addition to the framework summarized above, an overview of how different models of national citizenship have influenced policies and programmes towards migrants
in specific countries would be required for comparative analyses, together with a brief discussion of current in-country definitions of ethnicity and identity and their changes.

This framework hopes to provide the basis for a systematic and integrated model for analysing the problems children of migrant background face across countries, and for identifying some of the common root causes of these problems. It assumes that each country needs to monitor the levels of integration and/or minority-group formation of their immigrant populations through successive generations. This does not automatically imply that the policies adopted should be shaped by pluralistic, as opposed to assimilationist, concerns, but it does suggest that whichever approach is taken should be well-grounded both sociologically and economically in order to permit the successes (or failures) of these policies to be monitored and adjustments to be made over time.

The Case Studies

Although national models are closely related to their historical development and experiences, recurrences and patterning can also be identified. Many western European countries have been dealing with problems of migration for a long time. Therefore, the lessons learned by
trial and error in these countries could be useful for the countries that are just entering that process and are searching for guidelines. Moreover, although it is difficult not to become stymied by the often very different and changing definitions adopted in each country of the problems, of the people, and even of the solutions, some comparative work is indeed possible and useful.

As a first step in this direction, the case studies in the following four sections summarize information and briefly review secondary literature relating to the situation of immigrant families and their children in the Netherlands, France, Great Britain and Italy. They detail some of the major issues regarding children of migrant background in order to establish a starting point for comparative discussions of their current situations in each country, and the policies and programmes affecting them. The case studies represent, in other words, brief introductory "photographs" of country situations according to many of the dimensions mentioned in this section.

The case studies will first discuss the terminology used in each country to define migrant groups, and trace the backgrounds and times of arrival of the migrants, placing migrations in the time frames outlined in the Introduction. The numerical presence of the migrants, their geographic distribution, aspects of their social and ethno-cultural position (education, housing, employment, discriminatory practices), as well as some of the major problems faced by their children will be briefly examined. The case studies will also summarize some key aspects of policies and programmes. Not all subject areas have been given the same coverage in the four case studies. Focus and particular areas of concern differ by country and are reflected in the extent of literature available.

III. THE NETHERLANDS

Terminology

The Netherlands has historically been at the forefront in creating concepts such as "polarization" and "plural" society. The adoption of the term "ethnic minority" to refer to disadvantaged groups within Dutch society carries some implications for the type of policies developed to foster integration and combat marginalization. During the recent debate on immigration, the need to develop a pluri-cultural society that would respect the various
cultural heritages of immigrant groups has often been stressed.

However, at the level of public discourse, the many terms underscoring the temporary nature of immigration function as mystifiers, often masking the real issues. Thus in the Netherlands there is an "Emigration Office" but no "Immigration Office". There is also a tendency in official publications to substitute the word "immigrant" with a number of euphemisms, including "Repatriates", "Overseas Citizens", "Foreign Workers" and "Minorities" (Van Amersfoort and Surie 1987). The National Council for Scientific Research, commissioned by the Government to provide a report on the situation of migrants, opted in favour of the term "immigrants" as the one which best encompassed the different categories of residents of non-Dutch origin. The term also makes it perfectly clear which groups are being targeted by government policies (Netherlands Scientific Council 1990).

The Historical Context

Post-war reconstruction and structural expansion (1950s-1960s). Although immigration has been a common feature of Dutch society since the mid-1940s, the Netherlands did not consider itself an immigration-receiving country in the aftermath of the Second World War. In fact, it actively encouraged its citizens to emigrate (Graaf et al. 1988, Penninx 1992).

Migrations from former colonies were very important during this period. From 250,000 to 300,000 individuals of Dutch or mixed Indonesian-Dutch descent "returned" home between 1946, the year Indonesia became an independent State, and 1962. These "repatriates", as they were then called, were not considered immigrants and, given their strong orientation towards the Netherlands as well as the favourable economic conditions present in the country at the time, they integrated into Dutch society almost effortlessly (Graaf et al. 1988). This migration was atypical in that it involved entire families as did the Moluccan migrations in the early 1950s.

In 1951, approximately 12,500 Moluccans settled temporarily in the Netherlands, expecting to be repatriated to a free South Moluccan Republic which they believed would soon be instituted in their homeland (Penninx 1979). They were mainly former Royal Netherlands Indies Army soldiers and their families who believed they risked political persecution if they returned home after Independence. Much more than other immigrant groups, the Moluccans remained at the margins of mainstream Dutch society, resisting integration, and nourishing a myth of return to a new political order (Graaf et al. 1988).
The post-war recovery of the economy created sectoral labour shortages, especially in jobs known to be dangerous and poorly paid. Immigrants from within Europe were initially recruited for work which nationals no longer wanted to do. Between 1960 and 1966, labour-recruiting agreements were signed by the Netherlands with Italy (1960), Spain (1961), Portugal (1963), Turkey (1964), and Greece (1966) (Penninx 1979).

Structural crisis and the internationalization of labour (late 1960s to early 1980s). An economic recession in 1967 led to a reformulation of the Government’s attitudes towards migration, and to a tightening of immigration policies. However, these measures were relatively short-lived since the economic crisis revealed that, even at a time of economic recession, foreign workers were indispensable.

To compensate for declining migration from traditional source countries such as Italy, the Government established labour agreements with Morocco (1969), Yugoslavia (1970), and Tunisia (1970) (Penninx 1979). Consequently, from 1967 to 1972, labour migrations to the Netherlands were predominantly from the Southern Mediterranean basin (de Graaf et al. 1988, Entzinger 1985). Hired on temporary contracts, these foreigner labourers, officially called "bachelors" and presumed to be single, were expected to leave their families in their home country.

Migrants from the West Indies generally fared better than their Southern European counterparts during this period. They spoke Dutch, had full participatory and political rights in Dutch society, and access, at least in principle, to all social services. The Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, promulgated in 1954, had, in fact, extended Dutch citizenship to the inhabitants of Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles (Penninx 1979) (In the case of the Surinamese, this privilege was revoked when Surinam achieved independence in 1975).

Typically, the Surinamese formed part of a rural to urban continuum, travelling from Surinam’s rural areas into its cities, and then abroad to the Netherlands. The Surinamese who had already settled in the Netherlands established informal networks which newcomers relied on for employment, lodging, and other support. Many migrants were indebted to friends and relatives who had financed their journey to the Netherlands (Penninx 1979).

A peak in migration from Surinam occurred in the mid-1970s. Fear of persecution led many to flee the newly independent and politically instable Surinam, as was evident from the increasing number of Hindustani and Javanese migrants. However, animosity between different ethnic groups within the country fuelled discontent and apprehension, causing many migrants to return to Surinam on the first possible occasion. In 1979-80, the impending
expiration of the post-independence agreement granting preferential status to Surinamese nationals was the cause of an exceptional wave of immigration as many Surinamese rushed to take advantage of the relatively more permissive laws while they were still operative (Graaf et al 1988). The impact of this influx was strongly felt in the Netherlands.

 Immigration from the Dutch Antilles increased significantly in the late 1960s, prompted by the active recruitment of unskilled and semi-skilled workers by Dutch companies during a period of economic recession in the islands (Penninx 1979). Previously, the United States and Latin America had represented the traditional poles of attraction for migrants from Curacao and Aruba, but, following initial recruitment campaigns, a process of chain migration towards the Netherlands began.

 The Antilleans enjoyed freedom of movement between Aruba, Curacao and the Netherlands, often going back and forth between the Antilles and the Netherlands in what has been termed "commuter migration" (Entzinger 1985). The number of Antillean women migrating to the Netherlands between 1968 and 1974 exceeded that of men (Lemur in Penninx 1979). Like contract workers from Southern Europe, both men and women tended to be single with no dependents. Although return migration was still high with respect to other immigrant groups, Antilleans, entitled to citizenship as Dutch from overseas, began to settle permanently in the Netherlands.

 The Current Situation: New and Old Immigrant Groups (1980s and early 1990s)

 Currently, although the immigration policy of the Netherlands is one of the most restrictive in Europe, the influx of migrants remains significant. Many immigrants enter the country under the aegis of family reunification. The number of refugees is also increasing at a steady pace (from 7,500 in 1988, to 13,900 in 1989 with projections of from 16,000 to 20,000 in 1990 (Muus 1990). Illegal immigration is considered a serious problem.

 To counteract abuses of the system, the Dutch government recently introduced a new policy, especially aimed at curbing the immigration of Eastern Europeans claiming refugee status (Muus 1990). Many would-be refugees, however, extend their stay in the country illegally when their applications are rejected, joining the ranks of the disadvantaged and the marginalized in the major urban areas.

 Numerical Dimensions. Reliable data on the actual numbers of immigrants residing in the Netherlands are not available. Estimates range from 592,000 documented immigrants or
4.4 per cent of the total population (Melotti 1991), to 641,900 (Muus 1990). It is believed that over one million people of foreign extraction live in the Netherlands today, subdivided as follows:

- Dutch citizens of non-Dutch origin (33 per cent or 326,889). This category includes first generation migrants who have acquired, or have a right to, Dutch citizenship, as well as the second and third generations. Dutch citizens of Surinamese origin are the largest group (194,189) followed by Dutch citizens of West Indian (66,000), Moluccan (40,000), Chinese (23,000), and Gypsy (3,700), origin (Netherlands Scientific Council 1990).

- Foreigners from EEC-member countries (25 per cent).

- Foreigners from non-EEC countries (42 per cent). The majority of this group (32 per cent) are from non-member European countries. Other major groups are from Turkey (177,297) and Morocco (139,749); 26 per cent from Africa; and 8 per cent from Asia. Disregarding Dutch nationality, individuals of Surinamese descent form the largest group. However, because the majority hold Dutch citizenship, the official population figure (210,000) is low. Dutch of Indonesian descent are omitted from these figures, but they form a significant proportion of the population. Finally, no statistical records are kept of the considerable number of children with one parent of foreign extraction. Increasing diversification of the immigrant population has come about as a result of an upsurge in the number of illegal immigrants and of refugees seeking asylum.

Geographic distribution. It was estimated in 1988 that up to 42 per cent of all minorities live in the Randstand, the western provinces where Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht are located. The largest concentration is in Amsterdam where minorities represent 21.4 per cent of the urban population (Netherlands Scientific Council 1990).

Social policies. The Government was extremely slow in adopting an interventionist policy aimed at integrating migrants into Dutch culture and society. Policy in the late 1960s was based on the underlying principle that 'the assimilation of groups is primarily a local matter' (Explanatory Memorandum, CRM Budget 1969 in Penninx 1979). Thus, the Government tended to deflect responsibility for the migrants’ welfare to local authorities, which in turn diverted it back to the central Government or towards industries hiring foreign labourers (Van Praag in Penninx 1979).

Problems of the "reception and housing" of migrants were addressed in 1972, but with specific focus on colonial migrants (Rapport van de Adviescommissie 1972 ct. Penninx 1979). A dispersed settlement pattern was advocated, and the Ministry of Housing agreed to
provide a 5 per cent housing quota for Surinamese and Antilleans. No provisions were made for other categories of contract worker categories. The absence of consistent and realistic guidelines led to abuses, and deficiencies in the provision of social services were particularly felt.

In 1979, the Government commissioned the Netherlands Scientific Council to provide a report on the situation of migrants in the Netherlands. In 1983, it responded to the Council's recommendations by issuing the Minorities Policy Document which called for immediate action (a) to reduce social and economic deprivation by effectively extending social welfare to all minorities (the anti-deprivation policy); (b) to prevent and combat discrimination in the work place and within the community through media campaigns and, where necessary, by legislating improvements in the status of minorities (the anti-discrimination policy); and (c) to create conditions fostering the participation, emancipation and cultural identity of ethnic minorities, for example by allowing immigrants with at least five years legal residency to vote in local elections, and by extending citizenship rights to Dutch-born children of foreign parentage when they reach the age of adulthood (Netherlands Scientific Council 1990).

Unfortunately, the anti-deprivation and anti-discrimination laws have often been poorly implemented and generally ineffective. Moreover, the strong emphasis on an "ethnic group" approach has at times produced separation rather than integration. Policies and programmes aiming at bridging the socio-economic gap between indigenous Dutch and immigrants have failed to make significant improvements in either the education levels of immigrants or their employment opportunities during the past decade. This failure has been attributed to the poor implementation of social policies targeting immigrants, and, to a lesser extent, to the instability of the economy during this period.

A more individual-oriented focus was developed in the late 1980s. Social welfare became less of an issue, and the economic integration of individual migrants resurfaced as a priority. In 1990, the Netherlands Scientific Council published a new report recommending that particular attention be paid to the employment situation of minorities and incoming immigrants. The premise is that their effective integration into the labour system is a prerequisite for cultural and social assimilation (Netherlands Scientific Council 1990).

*Employment.* Since the 1970s, the Netherlands has undergone a restructuring of its economic base. From the labour-intensive industries prevalent in the post-war period for which immigrant labour was actively recruited, there has been a shift towards capital-
intensive industries which have not offered comparable openings to migrant groups. The enormous decline in the number of unskilled and semi-skilled jobs on the labour market, the immigrants' low educational levels, and discrimination by indigenous Dutch are some of the factors determining the disadvantaged position of ethnic minorities in contemporary Dutch society. Their unemployment rate is, on average, three times higher than that of indigenous nationals (Roelandt and Veenman 1989).

Housing. In the early migratory phases, companies, almost without exception, took no responsibility for finding suitable housing for the contract workers they had recruited from abroad. Moreover, housing corporation properties, which constituted most of the better class of rented housing in large cities, were not available to foreign contract workers. First, it was necessary to possess a rent permit, which municipal authorities would only issue after an applicant had lived in the city for several years; and, secondly there were the housing corporation’s waiting lists to contend with. Migrant workers therefore had little option but to settle in housing in the old districts where the rent was low and the only requirement was an occupancy permit, to which anyone who was legally resident in the Netherlands was entitled. Because the immigrants were unfamiliar with Dutch law and also because there was so much demand for this type of housing, landlords often charged higher rents than legally permitted, or added clauses to contracts making the tenant liable for maintenance expenses which should be the owner's responsibility (De Jong 1989).

To qualify for family reunification, an immigrant had to find "family accommodation approved by the municipality", which was by far the most difficult requirement among the many to be met. Even though it was evident in the mid-1970s that the demand for family-allocation units had increased considerably with the implementation of family reunification policies, unfortunately, even as late as 1979, this new reality was not taken into consideration (Penninx 1979).

Children of Migrant Background and their Families

Family/household situations. Children represent a high percentage of the total minority population in the Netherlands. This is evidenced in population profiles for the major immigrant groups. Especially in the case of the Surinamese and the "new" immigrants (Turks and Moroccans), the young people themselves are often the first-generation. They tend to experience the process of immigrating in much the same way as their own parents, although
children under 12 years of age at the time of immigration may come closer to a second-generation experience.

In comparison with the indigenous population, immigrant populations generally have a lower average age and higher fertility rates (Netherlands Scientific Council 1990). Approximately 61 per cent of all Moroccans are between 0-24 years of age, against 58 per cent of all Turks, and 50 per cent of the Surinamese (Centraal Bureau Voor de Statistiek 1991). Among Indonesians, a long-settled ethnic group, only 33 per cent fall between these ages (Centraal Bureau Voor de Statistiek 1991). In contrast with the situation in France and the United Kingdom, the majority of the second and third generations (notably the Moluccans) are still below the legal age (18 years).

Family reunification plans account for considerable increases in immigrant populations. During 1986, 10,765 children were born to foreigners within Dutch territory (Centraal Bureau Voor de Statistiek 1991), whereas approximately 30,000 children in the 0-19 age group entered the country as immigrants (Muus 1988).

Education. As the 1970s came to a close, the increasing number of children born in the Netherlands or entering the country as a result of reunification policies put a strain on the educational system. As one measure, the Government called for the differentiation between foreign pupils expected to settle permanently in the Netherlands and those who were likely, eventually, to "return" to their parents' countries of origin. However, in practice, this kind of distinction was impossible to make. Ethnic minority children remained severely disadvantaged by the lack of adequate educational structures to foster their entry and assimilation into the Dutch school system.

The Surinamese and the Antillean Dutch had a certain advantage over the other immigrant groups in that they spoke the language and were already familiar with the school system from their colonial experience. The Moroccans and the Turks had the highest incidence of absenteeism and drop-out, mainly because of their poor knowledge of the Dutch language, the ambivalent attitudes of their parents towards school, the attitudes of teacher's toward's their culture, and the marginal social conditions in which they lived (Rapportvande Adviescommissie 1972 ct. Penninx 1979, Pels 1991, Roelandt and Veenman 1989).

It has been estimated that almost 60 per cent of the Moroccans, 50 per cent of the Turks, 25 per cent of the Surinamese and 30 per cent of the Antillean youngsters who have participated in any form of secondary or higher education leave school without a diploma. The corresponding drop-out rate for the "indigenous" Dutch population is 10 per cent. The
drop-out rates are thus surprisingly high even for Surinamese and Antilleans whose educational level is substantially higher than that of Turks or Moroccans. Drop-out rates are much less noticeable for older Mediterranean migrants' youngsters (Italians, Spaniards, Greeks, Portuguese, etc.), although they may not reach as high an educational level as their Dutch counterparts (Roelandt and Veenman 1990).

Youth employment. The incidence of unemployment among ethnic minority youths is especially high, especially in periods of recession. This is not surprising since, to cite one example, within the Turkish and Moroccan communities, unemployment affects from 40 to 50 per cent of all able men originally hired as contract workers. Consequently, their children have low employment expectations and few positive role models to emulate. The labour market as an integrative factor for either the first or second generation is absent in this case (Entzinger, April 1991, personal communication).

There is a close correlation between school achievement and employment. The Turks (with a school drop-out rate of 60 per cent), the Moroccans (50 per cent), the Surinamese (30 per cent), and the Antilleans (10 per cent) are the groups with the highest unemployment rates. This "relationship between arrears in both the educational system and the labour market position of ethnic minorities" relates to three variables: (1) the high drop-out rates, (2) the limited flow of ethnic children to types of education with favourable labour market perspectives, (3) the higher average age of ethnic children at the end of their school careers. When they reach the age when school is no longer compulsory, they prefer to enter the labour market, despite particularly unfavourable qualifications. If they stay in school, they are inevitably channelled towards the least demanding school paths, and consequently the least useful school degrees (Ibid).

Other factors contributing to the high unemployment rates among minority youths are their cultural and linguistic background which apparently makes them less employable (Penninx 1992), and intentional and unintentional discrimination. Even when they have good qualifications, ethnic minority youths are less likely to find a suitable job than their indigenous Dutch counterparts (Muus 1990).

In the Netherlands in 1988, about 50 per cent of the Turkish, Moroccan, Surinam and Antillean youngsters were unemployed, compared to only 1 out of 8 "indigenous" Dutch youngsters. In general, the youth unemployment rate among migrant populations is four times as high as that of "indigenous" Dutch (Roelandt and Veenman 1990).
Marginalization and encounters with the law. With limited possibilities of stable employment, many minority youths "hang out" or follow special training courses which inevitably either lead nowhere or only to subsidized temporary jobs. Some, mostly male, resort to petty crime, or become members of gangs which are partly or wholly involved in violence, crime and drug-trafficking (Penninx 1979). Thriving sub-cultures have been formed in the ghetto-like neighbourhoods where many of these young people live. A certain degree of specialization occurs among these sub-cultures, with the Surinamese the most prone to traffick in drugs, perhaps because of their United States and Caribbean connections. The new generations of Moroccans and Turks are following suit.

IV. FRANCE

Terminology

In France, the terms "immigrant" and "second generation" go beyond standard definitions, referring without distinction to adults and children who originally immigrated and children born in French territory. Over time, these terms have become synonymous with Algerian, North African, Arab, non-European or Islamic (Begag 1990). Clearly, the terms are not simply a function of nationality, but also of social and cultural perception. They connote separateness and the possibility of return to a country of origin, despite the fact that the individuals in question are often French citizens, either by birth or acquired right. As they fail to assimilate into French society in a standardized way, the term "second generation" serves to reinforce their marginalized position (Costa Lascaux 1989). Throughout this section, the ethnic and national origin of particular groups will be specified where possible, otherwise the reference will be made in terms of foreign origin or migrant.

Historical Context

Immigration emerged as a primary social and economic force in France towards the end of the 19th century. It was linked to the process of industrialization and the lack of a stable and large enough labour force to support it within the country (LeClercq 1985). Potential workers migrated "spontaneously" or were actively recruited. By 1886, there were approximately one
million foreigners in France. In the following thirty years, migrants and their children accounted for more than half of France's population growth (Dignan 1981). Belgians, Germans, Italians, and Poles were the major groups entering France at this time. They were concentrated in the major industrial regions near Paris and in northern France, and occupied low-skilled jobs (Tripier 1991). France continued to accept migrants during both World Wars.

Post-war reconstruction and structural expansion (1950s-1960s). In the immediate post-war era, France had a de facto immigration policy which not only aimed at addressing labour shortages, but also at augmenting the nation's population. The nexus between demographic and immigration policies is evidenced in the creation of several interdependent organizations, in 1946, including the National Immigration Office (ONI). Migrants were encouraged to bring their families and, in principle, migration was intended to be permanent and of European origin (Costa Lascaux 1989).

A major wave of migration occurred in the late 1940s when primarily Italian and Spanish immigrants arrived in large numbers. Beginning in the late 1950s, a shift occurred in the composition of migrations as the end of the colonial era marked an increase in extra-European migration. However, migration as a function of colonization went largely unrecorded before 1963, particularly in the case of the Algerians. By the late 1960s, increasing numbers of Africans, primarily from the Maghreb, joined the population movements from Southern European countries such as Italy, Spain, and Portugal (Tripier 1991).

Until the 1970s, foreign workers had little difficulty entering France "illegally" to look for jobs, and were routinely issued residence permits if they could present a valid employment contract. This "post-entry legalization" of a migrant's status also facilitated family reunification, especially if both spouses found work. Amnesties for illegal migrants were frequent. However, because the policies were not de jure, they were subject to widely varying interpretations by the various agencies (Papademetriou 1988).

While the national population benefitted from a period of growth, migrants suffered from a series of drawbacks due to their uncertain legal position and the Government's failure to provide appropriate structures of reception. Especially affected were the North Africans, who became prey to chronic forms of indebtedness towards middlemen who arranged their passage to France, towards employers who hired them at below the minimum wage, and towards the marchands de someil (sleep dealers) who negotiated their housing arrangements (Costa Lascaux 1989).
Structural crisis and the internationalization of labour (late 1960s to early 1980s). The economic crisis of the mid-1970s strongly influenced immigration policies. Economic considerations became paramount, and different strategies were used to reduce migrant populations, including attempts to link residency permits to employment. Many migrants were laid off. Some opted for repatriation schemes. In 1974, the Government brought to a close the immigration cycle initiated through the policies enacted in the post-war era by officially closing the border to immigrants. In 1976, it enacted a liberal reunification policy administered by the ONI. As a result, government planners were faced with a growing number of dependents, primarily children, who swelled the ranks of an already disadvantaged and marginalized urban migrant population. The effects could be felt in all public service sectors, particularly housing and education (Costa Lascaux 1989).

The Current Situation: New and Old Immigrant Groups (1980s and early 1990s)

Current legislation. When the Socialist party came into power in 1981, initiatives were taken to limit administrative arbitrariness connected with immigration legislation. Strict controls of primary immigration came into effect, while liberal policies were adopted for immigrants who already lived in France. Expulsions of immigrants were suspended, and a regularization process was set up which enabled nearly 85 per cent of all illegal immigrants and their families to regularize their position. Children of immigrants who were born in France or lived there before they reached the age of 10 years could no longer be expelled. Immigrants who had lived in France for 15 years, who had been married to a French national for more than six months, who had children who were born in France, or who were on disability were similarly given legal status. Workers who had regularized their position were entitled to all social benefits with retroactive effect (Papademetriou 1988).

Numerical dimensions. According to official statistics, approximately four million immigrants have legal residence in France, representing 6 per cent of the population (SOPEMI 1990). The largest group (approximately 1.5 million) is identified as "Maghrebin", and consists of Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian nationals. Other large groups are formed by Portuguese (751,000), Italians (277,000), Spaniards (267,000), and Turks (146,000) (SOPEMI 1990). There are also significant numbers of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa, Vietnam, and Pakistan (Layton Henry 1990). Figures are lacking for immigrant populations from the Domaines et Territoires d'Outre Mer.
Of these four million official migrants, only 1.5 million are classified as foreign labourers. The majority are therefore dependents, prevalentiy young and unemployed (SOPEMI 1990). However, the figures cited are misleading since they exclude immigrants who have acquired French nationality through prolonged residence, marriage, or other legal means, as well as French-born children of immigrants who are automatically entitled to French citizenship.

*Geographic distribution.* Most immigrants reside in, or near, the major industrialized urban centres in Ile-de-France (where immigrants account for 12.9 per cent of the population) and the Rhone-Alpes regions (7.9 per cent). Smaller concentrations are also found in urban Alsace (7.8 per cent), and in the Provence-Alpes-Cotes-d'Azur configuration (SOPEMI 1990).

*Housing.* Immigrants and their descendants mainly live in poor, marginalized inner-city neighborhoods or in the *banlieus* or satellite towns on the outskirts of large French cities. Recently, there has been a tendency for immigrants to move to suburban areas as inner-city neighbourhoods undergo gentrification.

In the late 1970s, government housing policy consisted primarily of a financing scheme in which 1 per cent (later 0.1 per cent) of all industrial contributions to the construction of working class housing units was diverted to satisfy migrant needs. When the Socialists came to power in the early 1980s, new policy initiatives were taken to improve the living standards of disadvantaged groups in France within the framework of decentralization. Policy analysts tended to identify social and economic conditions, rather than ethnic and cultural factors, as the causes of differentiation. A ministerial committee was created with four primary objectives: to increase the solidarity and stability of towns; to foster neighbourhood projects; to take steps to reduce unsanitary conditions; and to carry out urban renewal projects. As a result of obstacles encountered at the municipal level, the Government's approach failed to affect those disadvantaged urban neighbourhoods which the measures were meant to target. Financing was slow and migrants were discriminated against through the enactment of measures determining the "tolerance level" of nationals towards migrants within the housing units, neighbourhoods, and schools (Costa Lascaux 1989). In 1991, Parliament passed an "anti-ghetto" law which required all municipalities to promote the creation of social housing on their territory.

*Employment.* European immigrants make up most of the skilled immigrant work force and have generally attained a better socio-economic position than their North African counterparts have. Portuguese immigrants, for example, have branched into the construction
industry. Many are self-employed and have created a ready pool of jobs for young immigrants who often drop out of school to join family ventures. In contrast, North Africans, and Algerians in particular, tend to depend almost exclusively on the industrial sector for work.

**Children of Migrant Background and their Families**

*Family/household situations.* Second-generation migrants under the age of 26 years made up approximately 45 per cent of the foreign population in 1980. The majority were of Portuguese origin, followed by Algerians and Moroccans. However, North African youths formed the largest sub-group, amounting to 41.9 per cent of the total number of migrant youths (Llaumet 1984). In 1985, an estimated one million children of foreign extraction were of school and preschool age.

The generation gap separating children of migrants from their parents manifests itself not only as a difference in values, but also in culture. The younger generation, socialized in a predominantly unifying French school system, tends to rebel against the more traditional world view of their families (Boulot and Boyzon-Fradet 1988). Although, adolescent girls generally stay in school longer than boys do and are more protected by their family environment, they encounter problems at home as their values diverge from those of their parents and begin to oppose traditional patterns of behaviour (Dubet 1987).

*Education.* As greater numbers of children of migrant background reached school age, the disparities between their level of academic achievement and that of their French counterparts came under scrutiny. The assumption that schools play an equalizing role in French society fell into discredit as it became clear that these children could not compete academically with their peers, often dropped out before completing secondary school, and generally did not acquire marketable skills. In addition, statistics clearly showed that these children were disproportionately represented in special education classes and vocational training schools (Boulot and Boyzon-Fradet 1988).

When the Socialists came to power in 1981, policy makers began to study the relationships between the students' social and economic position, socio-cultural environment and scholastic achievement. New policies specifically intended to help disadvantaged students were enacted. Although, in theory, the policies consider the ethnic or national origin of the student to be of secondary importance, in practice the priority zones the policies
identified coincided with areas where the "second-generation" immigrant population was highly concentrated (Ministry of Education 1981).

Within this new policy framework, the academic achievements of children of migrant background are evaluated and discussed as comparable to those of French children of similarly low social and economic status (Boulot and Boyzon-Fradet 1988, Dubet 1987, Llaumet 1984). Among the factors considered to affect educational achievement (for example, students' sex, the professional achievement and education of their parents, family size and environment), only place of birth was a differentiating factor between migrant and French children. Migrant children born abroad have greater difficulties than those born in France, and the older they are when they first arrive in France, the more pronounced these difficulties are (Boulot and Boyzon-Fradet 1988). Although framed in terms of social and economic status, the blame is ultimately placed on the school system for failing to integrate children of foreign origin into French society (Llaumet 1984).

A significant trend in the educational sector, one with specific policy and programme implications, has been the progressive lengthening of the educational process. It has been estimated that 96 per cent of children in France start school at the age of three years, even though compulsory education begins at four years of age. Moreover, 52 per cent remain in school until they are 18 years old. This phenomenon has not, however, resulted in an increase in the relative number of students of foreign background attending school, despite the decrease in birth rates among the French population and the increase in the number of incoming migrant students (Boulot and Boyzon-Fradet 1988).

Differences in levels of participation in the educational system by nationality reflect the different histories of immigrants groups. Moroccan children recently reunited with their families represent three-quarters of primary school students of foreign extraction. In contrast, two-fifths of the entire primary student population are of Italian descent, very few of whom are recent immigrants. The majority of the immigrant children are in primary school, while only 35 per cent are currently in secondary school (Boulot and Boyzon-Fradet 1988).

Youth employment. Since 1976, the labour force has become an increasingly younger one. Children of immigrants often enter the job market at the same level (ouvrier) reached by their parents (Llaumet 1984). In addition, there has been a feminization of the work force, especially in the case of the Portuguese, Spanish and Yugoslavian immigrants (much less in the case of migrants from the Maghreb): over half of immigrants from these groups entering the country with work permits are female (Llaumet 1984). Immigrant women have a
disproportionately higher rate of unemployment than both their French counterparts and immigrant men, and tend to take work "rejected" by others in the growing tertiary sector (Llaumet 1984).

Marginalization and encounters with the law. School drop-out among adolescents, coupled with the unavailability of steady employment, can lead some youth to intersperse periods of makeshift employment with petty crime (Dubet 1987). The majority of juvenile offenders are Maghrebin, followed by Portuguese, Spanish, and Italian youths. They tend to be younger than their French counterparts: 46 per cent are below the age of 16 years, in contrast to 36 per cent among the French. Despite their younger age, they are more likely to be held in temporary detention and for longer periods of time, especially if Maghrebin. The rate of recidivism among the Maghrebin is high and, more often than their French counterparts, they are given sentences rather than placed in educational programmes (Llaumet 1984). However, as a group, their rate of delinquency is not significantly higher than that of French youth of the same age and social and economic background.

Maghrebin youth figure prominently in the statistics, a fact which has been linked to their "visibility". Because of their physical characteristics and obvious ethnic origin, they are likely to be singled out by police and within the judicial system (Ibid).

V. UNITED KINGDOM

Terminology

Current terminology used in the United Kingdom identifies ethnic minorities, and not immigrants as in the past, as the focus of analysis for several reasons. First, problems associated with migration, such as language ability or familiarity with the culture of the host country, are not the only ones operative in the British case. Secondly, there are few young migrants in the United Kingdom, and those of migrant origin who are identifiable through cultural or racial characteristics are more numerous. In addition, the assumption that migration processes themselves have an effect on school performance, for example, will only be relevant for a small, and declining, proportion of those who are migrant-descended. In the United Kingdom, the term "second generation" is not part of the academic or public discourse (as in France, for example), and is considered to be problematic since most youth currently
entering the job market are actually "third generation". It is also a term that carries with it the connotation of foreigners, and assumes that the parent’s status affects the current status of their children which is not the case in the United Kingdom (Cross 1988).

The terms "black" or "Black British" are widely used in academic literature, and have strong political connotations. They include both African Caribbean and South Asian communities. Although the intent of these terms is to indicate that all non-whites face common experiences of racism, their use is controversial since they ignore differences between the various groups, and they do not include other non-white ethnic minorities, such as the Chinese. The use of the term "ethnic minorities" for only non-white groups is also problematic since the United Kingdom has its own native ethnic minorities, such as the Scots, Welsh, and Irish (Layton-Henry 1990). Throughout this paper, the ethnic and national origin of particular groups will be specified where possible; otherwise the term "ethnic minority" will be used.

The Historical Context

The current immigration to the United Kingdom is only the most recent of a long history of both inward and outward population flows beginning even before the Roman and Norman conquests. While debates regarding the current situation are often cast in racist terms and focus on immigrants from the Caribbean, South Asia and their descendants (that is, those migrants considered "non-white"), their number is exceeded by "white" immigrants coming both from within Europe and from the Commonwealth (Holmes 1991). Migration to the United Kingdom in the last two centuries has primarily been from within Europe and has included, among others, economic migrants from Ireland and Germany, and political refugees from Eastern European countries and Russia. Other ethnic groups which have chosen to settle in the United Kingdom are Cypriots, West Africans, Chinese, and Vietnamese. Cypriots originally came to London in small numbers in the 1920s; successive waves of migration occurred in the 1950s and 1960s, and in 1974. Large numbers of Cypriots are employed in the clothing trade, in restaurants and grocers and other service industries. West Africans generally come to the United Kingdom to obtain further professional qualifications (Black 1989). Chinese communities have existed for many generations in the major port cities. Over the last 20 years, increasing numbers of Chinese have come to the United Kingdom from
Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore. There are currently large communities in Liverpool, Manchester, and Bristol (Black 1989).

Post-war reconstruction and structural expansion (1950s-1960s). In the immediate post-war period, Southern and Eastern European workers were heavily recruited to fill the new demands for labour. It was also during this period that the number of Caribbean immigrants increased significantly, followed, and surpassed, by South Asian immigrants. Immigration from the Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent was facilitated by co-nationals already settled in the United Kingdom.

African Caribbean were early arrivals among the economic migrants from the New Commonwealth countries. The major period of immigration from the Caribbean took place during the 1950s, peaking in 1961 prior to the passing of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act. Because migrations included women, there was a tendency by the end of the 1960s for short-term migrants to settle, putting down roots and establishing households (Bhat et al. 1988).

South Asian immigrants began to outnumber West Indians in the 1960s. Generally single and male, these immigrants made up a mobile labour force whose geographic location was determined by the labour market. Most came to the United Kingdom via East Africa, especially Kenya and Uganda. In the late 1960s, refugees from Kenya accounted for a substantial part of the increase in South Asian immigrants in the United Kingdom.

Structural crisis and the internationalization of labour (late 1960s to early 1980s). Like France, the United Kingdom put a halt to primary immigration in the early 1970s, permitting only the migration of dependents. Between 1971 and 1983, the net immigration from India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh averaged 18,200 a year and consisted mostly of dependents. The arrival of women was the consequence of the family reunification policies of the 1960s and 1970s, and resulted in the establishment of households and relatively large families as women bore a number of children in rapid succession (Smith 1989). In the early 1970s, South Asian refugees from East Africa, primarily Uganda, helped to contribute to the 10 per cent increase in the size of the Asian population that took place during that decade (1971-81). Secondary dependents were also the overwhelming majority of immigrants from the Caribbean by the late 1970s.
The Current Situation: New and Old Immigrant Groups (1980s and early 1990s)

*Legislation.* Immigration in the United Kingdom was crucially affected by the Commonwealth Immigration Acts of 1962, 1968, and 1972. Before 1962, because Commonwealth citizens could settle freely in the United Kingdom, there were large-scale migrations of workers. After that date, vouchers were required and only a small number of voucher holders and dependents of those who settled were admitted (Rex 1987). As a result of the 1971 Immigration Act, wives and children of Commonwealth citizens could only enter the United Kingdom if a sponsor could support and accommodate them without recourse to public funds. The net effect of these policies has been to cause financial hardship as people struggle to live without assistance from the State. Families have been forced to live apart and the tendency to consider ethnic minorities as outsiders has been reinforced (Oppenheim 1990).

The separation of families because of immigration laws can occur in two ways: children can be denied entry into the United Kingdom to join their parents, or parents can be issued deportation orders while children remain in the country as British citizens. Children have difficulty joining their parents in the United Kingdom for several reasons. First, they must prove they are related either through birth certificates or DNA ‘fingerprinting’ (since 1985). Parents must also show that they have had sole responsibility for the upbringing of children who wish to join them and that children have not been abandoned. In addition, parents must prove that they can support their children without the aid of public assistance and that they can provide adequate accommodations. Conversely, family separation can occur in instances where children are British citizens (as is the case when they were born in the United Kingdom prior to 1983, for example) and their parents are issued deportation orders (Children’s Legal Centre 1991, Sondhi 1987).

*Numerical dimensions.* An estimated 1,785,000 foreigners officially reside in the United Kingdom, or 3.1 per cent of the population (Melotti 1991). People of African Caribbean descent form approximately one-quarter of the non-white ethnic minority population in the United Kingdom. Of those born in the West Indies, the majority are Jamaican (56 per cent), followed by Barbadians (8.5 per cent), Guyanese (7.35 per cent) and Trinidadians (5.5 per cent). These New Commonwealth migrants are concentrated in the urban-industrial areas of London and the West Midlands. They tend to be overqualified and underpaid for the mainly low-status jobs they hold. Their present geographic distribution reflects the role of West Indian migrants as a replacement labour force attracted to areas where the demand for labour
was high in occupations unable (because of employment opportunities elsewhere) to retain a white labour force (Smith 1989).

South Asian immigrants to the United Kingdom may be divided by nationality, religion and language. The largest national subgroups of South Asians are Indians followed by immigrants from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the state of Kashmir. They are Hindus, Sikhs, Muslims and the languages they speak include Punjab, Gujarati, Urdu, Bengali, Pashto. Among the Indians, 20 per cent were born in, or migrated via, East Africa to which they had been drawn as indentured labourers, and the majority of the remainder originated in East Punjab. Two-fifths of the Indians are Sikhs, one-third are Hindus (two-thirds of East African Indians are Hindu) and one-sixth are Muslim. The Pakistani population, for the most part from Punjab, is one-half the size of the Indian population and predominantly Muslim. The Bangladeshi population is the smallest and is predominantly Muslim (Smith 1989).

Since 1975, 16,000 people from Vietnam have come to The United Kingdom, 11,000 of whom are from South Vietnam and are ethnically Chinese. Most of these families were separated and only now are becoming reunited (Black 1989). Vietnamese refugees have been resettled throughout the United Kingdom: over 1,500 in Scotland, 30 families in Northern Ireland with the rest settled in major cities, small country towns and villages throughout the nation (Edholm et al. 1983).

A survey released in 1990 covering the years 1984 to 1986 showed that the African Caribbean and South Asian population, including those of black and Asian descent born in the United Kingdom, was approximately 1.93 million out of a total British population of 54.51 million) (Holmes 1991).

The breakdown of the estimated ethnic minority population as of 1988 is as follows: African 4.5 per cent, Arab 2.5 per cent, Bangladeshi 3.4 per cent, Chinese 5.1 per cent, Indian 30.2 per cent, Pakistani 17.8 per cent, cent, West Indian 17.4 per cent, mixed 12.2, per cent and Other (including settlers from the rest of the New Commonwealth and other Third World countries such as Iran) 6.9 per cent (Home Office 1991).

Geographic distribution. The areas in which immigrants have settled are within easy (and cheap) travelling distance of the central city. At the time of settlement, these areas were already in a process of decline as the middle classes spread outward leaving behind their suburban residences. Large houses were subdivided for renting in order maximize profits and minimize maintenance (Bhat et. al. 1988). Only 3 per cent of the ethnic minority population (in contrast to the national average of 24 per cent) live in rural districts; 75 per
cent live in urban districts containing 10 per cent of all whites. Differences exist not only in how segregated various populations are, but also where, within a city, clustering occurs. It has been estimated that 43 per cent of persons of African Caribbean origin and 23 per cent of the Asians live in the inner-city zones of London, Manchester and Birmingham (Smith 1989).

An analysis of the geographical distribution and residence patterns in the United Kingdom supports the argument that segregated cities have become a British norm. With the exception of a limited dispersal of Caribbean West Indians as they moved into council housing and the existence of some suburbanization among an emerging Asian middle class, there is little evidence that segregation is progressively declining (Smith 1989).

*Social Policies.* The Race Relations Acts of 1965 and 1968 and 1976, which more or less paralleled the immigration Acts, were passed to curb discrimination on the basis of "race, colour, ethnic or national origin" in employment, housing, public facilities and displays. The Race Relations Board was set up to investigate reports of racism. Publishing or distributing racist material became a legal offense. The 1976 Act is the most comprehensive legislation to date, but there is still little evidence proving its effectiveness (Hall 1988).

*Housing.* The housing situation for ethnic minorities has generally been characterized by shortages. In the post-war period, as had happened in France, the Government was faced with the contradiction of a labour shortage coupled with a housing shortage which resulted in conflict between those who considered themselves part of the indigenous population and the "newcomers". In the 1940s and especially after the labour victory in 1945, local authorities worked towards providing housing for the poor and for slum dwellers. However rents were often too high to admit the poor who found it cheaper to rent in the private sector. Large numbers of immigrants were excluded from admission to council housing by the 5-year residential condition (Mullings 1991). Between 1951 and 1961, two trends characterized the housing situation of immigrants to the United Kingdom. The first was an over-representation of migrant families in the highly overcrowded, privately furnished sector, and the second was the acquisition of tenancy from landlords of the same ethnic background, especially in the case of South Asian immigrants. Usually the landlord served as a principal mediator between the white world and the new arrivals (Bhat et al. 1988).

Although owner-occupation among Caribbean migrants existed, there was a greater tendency to live in rented spaces. This was due to a variety of factors including the two-way
flow of their migration, the movement of individuals (rather than dependents seeking to join households), the nurturing of a myth of return, and the fact that when the Caribbean migrants arrived in Britain the rented sector was large. (By the time Asian migration flows took place, the rented sector had decreased from 58 to 28 per cent of the housing market [Bhat et al. 1988].) By the 1970s, Caribbean immigrants had begun to enter public sector housing having fulfilled residential qualifications and aided by their smaller household size (relative to Asians) (Bhat et al. 1988).

In contrast, the housing situation of Asians migrants from Pakistan and the Commonwealth was characterized by a high proportion of owner-occupants. Religion, kinship ties, the spatial distribution of the South Asian community, and the migrant's need to form transient landlord-tenant relationships were factors contributing to this situation (Bhat et al 1988). By the 1970s, Asians had strengthened their own private rented sector through the purchase of inexpensive, run-down properties and by using internal financing systems (Bhat et al. 1988). In the United Kingdom, owner-occupied housing, like education, is a significant variable which influenced social and economic mobility since it provides a way of developing equity, it is inheritable, it is a safeguard against inflation, it is an investment, and it serves as collateral (Bhat et al. 1988).

Employment. Ethnic minorities are concentrated in semi-skilled and unskilled jobs and earn less than their white counterparts in the same field. Approximately 25 per cent of employed ethnic minority men work in industries known for low pay rates and poor working conditions. Similarly, ethnic minority women are concentrated in manufacturing industries and health services (Bhat et al. 1988). A collapse in the labour market has heavily affected the textile industry in which ethnic minority labourers are concentrated. What new employment opportunities do appear are in new areas that are not historically industrial and where the ethnic minority population is low (Cross 1988). Although there was a greater diversity in the occupational structure and a greater involvement of ethnic minorities in public life by the 1980s, African Caribbean and Asians remained locked into working-class structures and employed in the kinds of work particularly sensitive to downswings in the economy (Holmes 1991).
Children of Migrant Background and their Families

*Family/household situations.* Among the prominent features of ethnic minority families are the incidence of single parenthood (especially among African Caribbean families) and the incidence of extended families living in the same home. A recent survey found that 43.4 per cent of Caribbean families, 17.6 per cent of other ethnic minorities, 11.8 per cent of white families, and 4.8 per cent of Asian families were single-parent families. Among those living in extended families (households with more than three adults), 22 per cent were classified as South Asian and 17 per cent African Caribbean, compared with 6 per cent white. These characteristics mean that ethnic minority families will be affected differently by policy which assumes the average two-adult household characteristic of the majority population. For example, the introduction of the Poll tax, a flat rate individual tax, has negatively affected large families and has thus penalized ethnic minority families (Oppenheim 1989).

Issues of adoption and foster parenthood are particularly relevant to the situation of ethnic minority youth. The reasons these children come into care include the poverty, violence or the breakdown of the family, especially in mixed-race families; the provision of respite care, especially in the case of single- (female-) headed households; and conflict older children have with parents, as in the case of teenage Asian girls. For children placed in foster care, same-race placement is generally encouraged since it would theoretically provide an environment that is positive to the cultural, religious, and linguistic needs of children. In practice, this tends not to happen. An investigation of the criteria used by the Social Services Department is now being conducted by the Commission for Racial Equality (Ahmad 1989: Commission for Racial Equality 1990a & 1990b).

Social security is another factor which has a direct effect on family/household situations. Because the age profile of ethnic minorities is especially young, this group is disproportionately affected by the direct and indirect discrimination inherent in the structure of the social security system. This is clearly illustrated in government policies such as freezing child benefits and cuts in income support to young people. The government system of benefits allocation is also discriminatory in a variety of ways. In the case of retirement, pension, unemployment and other contributory benefits, people who have intermittent and low-paid work (where ethnic minority youth are disproportionately represented) earn below a certain amount, do not pay insurance, and therefore do not have access to benefits. Other benefits require residence and/or presence conditions or will affect family reunification since
entry of additional family members into the United Kingdom is dependent on proving non-reliance on public funds (Oppenheim 1990).

Education. The summary of educational issues related to ethnic minority youth will first provide a general statistical outline, a description of some of the patterns of educational achievement that have been identified, the main theoretical framework underlying government educational policy and the new national curriculum.

A very general assessment of ethnic minority educational achievement is provided by the British Home Office Statistical Monitor (Home Office 1991). According to these figures, Pakistani and Bangladeshi children obtain the lowest level of qualifications overall, Indians have the greatest success at A level and perform better than whites at the degree level, and West Indians who go on to higher education are more likely to get a non-degree qualification.

Several patterns emerge in the analysis of educational achievement of ethnic minority students. Generally, there is a higher level of educational attainment among the second generation of immigrants. There are several trends specific to African Caribbean students in particular. These include a tendency to ‘catch up’ during secondary school by remaining in school longer to obtain qualifications (Tomlinson 1991); a tendency for African Caribbean girls to do well in school, often on a par with their white counterparts (Mirza 1992, Tomlinson 1991); and the likelihood that these students will take access courses as a means of entering colleges rather than attempt entry to polytechnics or universities (Tomlinson 1991). Among Asian students differentiation also occurs along national and religious lines; for example, there is a tendency for Muslim Bangladeshi girls to do less well than Sikh Indian students (Tomlinson 1991). These distinctions make it clear that generalizations made in terms of ethnic minority classification gloss over differences between groups and work to the detriment of theoretical analyses and policy recommendations.

An analytical framework that seeks to explain student performance in terms of the effectiveness of the school has emerged to shape educational policy (Tomlinson 1991, Troyna 1991). This framework replaces previous models that sought to lay the blame of low educational achievement on a variety of factors that centered on the student, such as his or her family structure, cultural and economic background, native language or lack of self esteem. Once established as an important factor affecting student performance, regardless of ethnic status, the effectiveness of schools in preparing children and, minority children in particular, is shaped by additional factors including the quality of leadership of school administration (Mirza 1992).
The effect of a National Curriculum, the product of the 1988 Education Act, on ethnic minority student achievement is still uncertain. Proponents argue that it may be advantageous for ethnic minority students since it will (a) guarantee a standardized curriculum for all students without discriminating against schools and classrooms with high concentrations of ethnic minority students and (b) make it mandatory for all parents to receive student test scores. On the other hand, underlying the National Curriculum is a strong assimilationist policy that emphasizes the concept of a single national and particularly 'English' culture that is supposedly threatened by multi-culturalism (Troyna and Hatcher 1991).

Health. Access to, and quality of, health care for ethnic minority youth living in urban areas characterized by deteriorating infrastructure is an issue with many ramifications besides the quality of medical facilities. Principal among these is the receptiveness of medical practitioners to particular situations ethnic minority children face when dealing with health institutions. Thus, language can be a problem for some groups and has been identified as a factor contributing to the tendency of some ethnic groups not to use medical services as often as they might. The reluctance to use medical services has been identified among Chinese families (Black 1989). Among South Asian women, in addition to linguistic barriers, differences in medical practice contribute to their reduced use of medical services and contributes to high perinatal mortality rates. With respect to health education, sensitivity to language and cultural issues is also important. In the case of AIDS education, the example of the Health Education Authority translating "oral sex" into Bengali as "verbal" or "talking sex" is a dangerous example of the shortcomings educational programmes can have if they do not take into account linguistic and cultural issues (Robinson 1992).

Another dimension affecting the quality of health services available to ethnic minority youth is awareness of medical conditions from which certain ethnic minority groups are more likely to suffer. These conditions can be either genetically-determined or acquired as a result of social, economic and cultural circumstances. For example, certain blood diseases are more likely to be found among populations coming from the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, Africa and South Asia. Acquired diseases include anaemia which can be prevalent among Hindu children living on a British vegetarian diet or other diseases that can be contracted during visits to the parent's country of origin (Black 1989).

Discrimination within the health care system further intensifies the difficulty these youth face. In the field of mental health, the Mental Health Act, Section 136, is used by the
police to detain people for 24 hours. South Asian and African Caribbean youth are most likely to be stopped under this Act, labeled as violent, and treated with control medication rather than psychotherapy (Bhat et al. 1988; Robinson, 1992). The practice of prescribing depopovera as a contraceptive and its high use among South Asian women despite the fact that it is recognized as a serious health hazard is representative of the subtler forms discriminatory practice takes within the health care system.

A much less discussed aspect of ethnic minority health is that of the environment. The concentration of the ethnic minority population in the inner city with narrow streets, on-street parking and through traffic leads to higher incidence of accidents among ethnic minority youth. For example, young Asian pedestrians are twice as likely to be involved in accidents than non-Asian children (Lawson, n.d.).

Youth employment. Child labour (prior to legal working age) and youth insertion into the labour market once they have reached legal working age are two issues which affect ethnic minority children in especially difficult circumstances. A survey of 10- to 16-year-olds, conducted by the Low Pay Unit in Birmingham (which because of its size and mix of population was thought by the authors to provide a good indication of what is occurring nationally) concluded that child labour is a widespread phenomenon throughout the United Kingdom (Pond and Searle 1991). Accidents and injuries at work and low pay were among the principal concerns identified. In addition, three-quarters of the children in the sample were recorded as working illegally, either because of the hours they worked, their age, or because the job they were doing was prohibited by law. Among these, 25 per cent were Asian, 10 per cent were African Caribbean, and 62 per cent were classified as white/European. In addition, the study found that children living in more deprived areas (where ethnic minority population tends to be concentrated) were less likely to be working during the school term than children living in areas where greater economic opportunity existed.

As children reach legal working age, the lack of economic opportunities translates into higher unemployment rates and hinders their insertion into the labour market. In the current economic context, young people in the United Kingdom are more likely to be unemployed than older people. A wide age difference between the white and ethnic minority population (80 per cent of West Indians born in the United Kingdom are under 30 years of age compared to about 30 per cent among whites) has resulted in a greater proportion of the ethnic minority population being adversely affected by unemployment, and leaves ethnic minorities
particularly vulnerable to the threat of unemployment (Bhat et al. 1988). Ethnic minority youth are most likely to use the services of the official recruitment agencies when seeking employment. For them, occupational placement is least likely to be the outcome of social networks, family relationships and other informal channels (Mirza 1992). Discrimination in government services offering placement assistance and/or vocational training (Cross 1988) serves to compound an already desolate employment situation.

*Marginalization and encounters with the law.* There are a number of statistical issues with respect to encounters with the law that have policy implications. Statistics on crime must be looked at comparatively, especially with respect to acquittal rates. While non-white offenders are over-represented in both assault and robbery, the variation in their acquittal rates is significant. In cases where victims could not identify a skin colour of assailants, there was a low acquittal rate in contrast to an acquittal rate of 74 per cent in cases where skin colour was reported as non-white. Another problem related to the interpretation of statistics arises because of differences in a number of variables between population groups. One example of this is afforded by the differential arrest rates for black and white populations which can, in part, be explained by differences in the age structure of the two populations. Moreover, differences in the areas where studies are conducted may mean that their findings could not be substantiated in other areas of the country (Bhat et al. 1988:).

Ethnic minority youth have been found to have a more negative attitude than their white counterparts towards the police. However, this is interpreted as being a result of their experience with specific past policing strategies and their encounters with the law (Bhat et al. 1988). Male ethnic minority youth are most likely to be stopped by police and they tend to get fewer warnings than white youths. Even though they have a higher rate of acquittal than white youth, when convicted they are more often given stricter sentences. After arrest, a juvenile can be charged immediately or referred to the juvenile bureaucracy which can either take no further action, caution the juvenile, or charge him or her. In 1981, a study found that ethnic minority children had a higher probability of being charged immediately. The proportion of ethnic minorities in prison is growing, particularly among the young. Institutions in South England reported about 30 per cent ethnic minority youths in 1981 (Bhat et al. 1989; NACRO 1991).
VI. ITALY

Terminology

In Italy, a relatively new nation with strong regional differences owing to different historical pasts, the term "ethnic minority" refers specifically, but not pejoratively, to the non-Italian populations who have lived for centuries in the border regions of the country or in areas which formerly were part of other nations. Although all ethnic minorities are protected by the Constitution, special provisions ensuring that the minority language is used in the schools and courts of law have only been adopted for the natives of the Valley of Aosta whose mother tongue is French, for the German-speaking Tyroleans and Ladins living in the province of Bolzano, and Slovenians living in Trieste and Gorizia. In contrast, the Albanian and Greek communities in Southern Italy have not received government assistance to enable them to preserve their cultural identity. The term "immigrants" is used less frequently than "stranieri" (foreigners), and there is a tendency to identify migrants by their continent of origin. "Extra-Communitari" (non-EEC) is the current euphemism for immigrants from Africa. Classification by first or second generation is not used at all.

The Historical Context

Post-war reconstruction and structural expansion (1950s-1960s). In this period, massive internal migrations took place within Italy. Workers deserted rural areas in the South and moved to the industrialized areas in the North, mainly to Milan and Turin. This South/North movement continued towards industrialized countries, as has been seen in the preceding case studies. Statistics for the number of Italian emigrants at the end of the 1960s show that there were approximately 575,000 Italians in the Federal Republic of Germany, 612,000 in France, 530,000 in Switzerland (especially in Ticino where Italian is the official language), and 100,00 in the United Kingdom. Naturally, large-scale Italian migrations also continued to traditional recipient countries outside of Europe (the United States, Australia, and various countries in Latin America, for example). It has been estimated that approximately seven million Italians emigrated between 1946 and 1970, with a negative balance of three million (Melotti 1991).

Structural crisis and the internationalization of labour (late 1960s to early 1980s). By the late 1960s, Italy had begun to import labour as well as export it. Among the non-European
migrants who settled in Italy were female migrants, mainly from the Philippines and Cape Verde, who found work as domestics, North Africans who poured into the service sector, and political exiles from Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Vietnam and Eritrea.

The Current Situation: New and Old Immigrant Groups (1980s and early 1990s)

Since Italy can still be characterized as a sending economy, with more than five million emigrants living abroad, a high unemployment rate, hundreds of thousands of workers receiving unemployment benefits, and a precarious job market, it is clear that immigration to Italy is propelled above all by serious social, political and economic problems in other parts of the globe. However, there are other factors besides drought, poverty, famine, economic crises, and oppressive political regimes that have affected immigration trends in Italy.

The closing of borders and the restrictive immigration policies adopted by most Northern and Central European countries, especially in the early 1970s, has made Italy the "second-best" solution for many migrants. Moreover, until the passage of the Martelli Act in 1990, controls were too superficial to prevent migrants from entering Italy clandestinely or staying on after their visitor's permits had expired.

Religious institutions have also played a decisive role in directing migrations to Italy. The Catholic Church, in particular, has intervened both in Italy and abroad as a mediator (in the case of female immigrants from the Cape Verde Islands), as an incentive (for immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa), or as a pull factor (particularly with regard to Polish immigrants).

As in other host countries, psychological, social, cultural and economic motivations must also be taken into account. These could include such factors as the lure of the West, the desire to be reunited with expatriate family members, and the higher wages paid in industrialized countries.

Legislation. Italy was substantially ill-prepared to handle large-scale migration from developing countries. This phenomenon was unique in the nation’s history and not foreseen by the legislative framework. In fact, until the first of the two fundamental immigration laws was enacted in 1986, the only norms regulating immigration dated back to the Fascist era, and virtually barred the immigration of foreign workers. These highly restrictive laws forced many immigrants to live clandestinely in the country during the 1980s.
In December 1986, Parliament passed Law 943 shutting Italy’s doors on newcomers, in line with the prevailing international tendencies. The amnesty granted by the Law enabled more than 100,000 immigrants (mainly from Africa and Asia) to legalize their position, a number which actually disappointed the expectations of policy-makers. One of the problems was that Law 943 was clearly biased in favour of dependent workers. Moreover, it was never fully implemented.

An additional amnesty was granted by Law 39 of 28.02.1990 (the Martelli Act) which permitted more than 220,000 clandestine immigrants to become legal. The Martelli Act also addresses the shortcomings of Law 943. It is applicable to all workers, and not just to dependent workers, and it has revoked geographic restrictions which limited political asylum strictly to European nationals. However, the Martelli Act is a double-edged policy: it is extremely broad-minded towards legal alien residents, and, at the same time, totally unreceptive towards future immigrants.

While no doubt a step in the right direction, the Martelli Act still fails to resolve the many problems linked to non-EEC immigration, including employment, housing, health, social rights, education, training and equal social dignity. Furthermore, enforcement of the Act has been stalled by bureaucratic difficulties, including serious delays in setting up special immigration offices and in distributing circulars detailing enforcement norms. However, despite its limitations, this policy has tried to ensure that legal immigrants enjoy the same civil, social and economic rights as do Italians. The issue of political participation, and more specifically the right to vote, even in local elections, has not yet been dealt with.

In Italy, citizenship is acquired at birth. The criterion preferred by policy makers is descent (*ius sanguinis*); in the case of orphans, citizenship is granted by virtue of birth within national territory (*ius soli*). More restrictive norms for the acquisition of Italian citizenship were recently stipulated in Law 91 of 5.02.1992 according to which a person of foreign parentage can become an Italian citizen at the age of adulthood if he or she has maintained residence in Italy without interruption from birth. A child automatically acquires Italian citizenship at birth if one of his or her parents is Italian. A foreigner can become an Italian citizen in one of two ways: either by legally residing in Italy for ten continuous years (previously only five were required), or, if married for at least three years to an Italian citizen, after six months of legal residence in Italy.

*Numerical dimensions.* Even according to high estimates, immigrants in Italy represent less than 3 per cent of the total population. More moderate estimates are 781,000 foreigners
living in Italy, or 1.4 per cent of the total population (Melotti 1991). It is, however, very
difficult to give exact figures because reliable, or at least plausible, statistics on foreign
immigration have only been available since 1990.

The most recent data issued by the Ministry of the Interior show 844,092 foreigners
legally residing in Italy as at 31 May 1992, 134,819 from EEC-member countries and the
remaining 709,273 from non-member countries. Preliminary 1991 census returns, instead,
show a foreign population of only 501,921, 56.1 per cent in the North, 28 per cent in the
Centre and 15.9 per cent in the South and on the Islands. However, official data obviously
underestimate the actual situation because they only refer to legal immigration, whereas the
incidence of illegal immigration in Italy is extremely high (Ibid). As a result of the
immigration amnesties of 1987 and 1990, for instance, more than 320,000 illegal immigrants
legalized their position. The inflow of undocumented immigrants has naturally continued and
the problem is, therefore, far from being resolved. Given these considerations, the Institute
for Statistical Research (ISTAT) estimated in 1990 that there were 1,144,000 foreigners
nationwide, of whom 963,000 non-EEC nationals (ISTAT 1990).

A further breakdown is given in 1989 ISTAT data, which again are out of date but still
highly indicative. About one-third of the non-EEC nationals living in Italy come from some
of the most highly industrialized countries in the world (the Scandinavian countries, Austria,
Switzerland, the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand). The remaining
two-thirds are from developing countries. Because this latter group is the most at risk, it will
be the sole focus of this case study. Its ethnic composition can be sub-divided as follows:

Africans (27.4 per cent) form the largest sub-group. The majority are Arabs from North
Africa (Algerians, Egyptians, Moroccans and Tunisians), male, single, fairly well-educated,
and predominately Muslim. Most are motivated by a desire for economic betterment, and
have made short- or medium-term plans for the future. Recently, there has been a shift
towards family migration, especially from Egypt. Other African immigrants are from the
former colony of Eritrea (often families seeking political asylum), Somalia, the sub-Saharan
countries (usually males without specific plans who are fleeing countries rift by serious
political, economic or cultural crises), Cape Verde (mainly Creole women), and Mauritius.

Asians (22.5 per cent) have emigrated from the Middle East (mainly young male
Iranians), India, Sri Lanka, the Philippines (prevalently young, single, economically-
motivated, Catholic women with a medium-high level of education), Thailand and Vietnam.
The Chinese are a category apart. The first influx of Chinese dates back to the years between
the two world wars, followed by two successive waves of Chinese immigrants, one in the 1960s and another, still in progress, which began in the late 1970s. A relatively closed and homogenous society with a strong ethnic identity and clearly-demarcated territory, the Chinese form "encapsulated communities" which have established a high degree of autonomy and self-sufficiency within the host country through social, economic and ethnic infrastructures. The most numerous Chinese community in Italy, with more than 10,000 members, can be found in the Sempione district in Milan.

*Latin Americans* (11 per cent) are mainly from Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile and El Salvador. Latin American immigration has strong political overtones. Set in motion initially by exiles (some of whom were descendants of Italian immigrants, highly educated and politically motivated), the influx has continued even after the successive democratization of their counties, mainly because of the grave economic crises in Latin America.

*Eastern Europeans* (7.1 per cent) form the smallest sub-group and are mainly Poles who have claimed political asylum, Albanians and Yugoslavs. The number of Eastern Europeans in Italy has been steadily increasing since the fall of the communist regimes.

*Geographic distribution.* Data concerning the geographic distribution of non-EEC immigrants within Italy, published jointly by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Interior, and Labour in 1990, are already obsolete because of the rapidly-changing situation. Nevertheless, they provide a fairly detailed and accurate picture of the current situation. Of 549,000 non-EEC nationals legally residing in Italy on 31 August 1990, 209,000 lived in the North, 218,000 in the Centre and 122,000 in the South and on the Islands. The majority of immigrants holding jobs were found in the northern and central regions (50 and 43 per cent, respectively), compared with only 7 per cent in the South and on the Islands. Of the different regions, Latium had the largest concentration of non-EEC migrants (approximately 166,000, mainly from the Philippines, India and Pakistan, and mostly living in Rome), followed by Lombardy (94,000 split equally between Africans and Asians), Sicily (56,000, mainly of Tunisian, Algerian or Moroccan, origin), and Tuscany (48,000, predominantly Asian).

Because of the initial legislative void into which immigration fell and the subsequent difficulties encountered in putting legal theory into practice, a number of associations and voluntary organizations have taken up the immigrant cause alongside local authorities, immigration offices, labour unions, and various immigrant associations. Some are purely research institutions (e.g. the Scalabrini Centre for Emigration Studies). Others, working at local and national levels, seek to resolve special problems or to assist specific migrant
categories. For example, Apicolf handles problems related to domestics, UCSEI is a focal point for students, and the Saint Egidio Community is specialized in youth training. Another example is provided by the Italian section of the Association for the Study of the World Refugee Problem, an international, non-governmental research organization, which fought actively for the removal of geographic limitations on refugee status.

Church groups and associations have also played an important role, drawing on a large reservoir of volunteers, and collaborating with local and regional authorities. The Catholic Church has worked tirelessly on behalf of immigrants through Caritas, other religious organizations and parishes. The Federation of Evangelistic Churches provides practical assistance through its "Immigrant Services" and promotes research on immigration issues.

Employment. While in Northern and Central Europe immigrants work in the formal sector, in Italy, most are employed in the service sector in informal and poorly-paid jobs, often under coercive conditions. Immigrants are most frequently employed as household servants (mainly women from the Philippines, Cape Verde Islands, Mauritius, Sri Lanka and Eritrea). It has been estimated that approximately half of all foreign workers living in Italy's largest cities (which attract roughly two-thirds of all foreign immigrants) are domestics. Other private-sector employment categories include hotel and restaurant workers, predominantly Egyptians, Moroccans, Tunisians and Chinese; manual labourers (Eritreans and Maghrebins); cleaning contractors, street or coastal resort vendors (Moroccans and Senegalese); seasonal workers in resorts (Maghrebins).

With the exception of construction workers who find work, albeit seasonal, throughout the national territory, the job market (prevalently informal) is diversified by geographic area: seasonal agricultural workers find jobs mainly in the South, fishermen (mainly Tunisians) in Sicily, sailors and dock workers in the coastal areas.

Various other categories could be enumerated, including intellectuals, mainly refugees from Latin America who hold a variety of underpaid and precarious jobs; models, dancers and masseuses (usually young women from Brazil, Argentina, the Philippines, Thailand and Egypt) whose occupations often camouflage, or lead to, prostitution; and, finally, prostitutes, drug traffickers or petty criminals. The incidence of criminal activities increases with unemployment which currently affects more than 25 per cent of all immigrants. It is significant that 15 per cent of the prisoners in Italy are non-EEC nationals, an extremely high figure considering that less than 3 per cent of the total population are immigrants, as mentioned above.
Children of Migrant Background and their Families

*Family/household situations.* By legal definition, a *bambino straniero* (foreign child) is a child below 18 years of age who holds foreign citizenship or whose parents are foreigners. Because foreign children lack a separate legal identity, their legal status being completely determined by their family’s, it is very difficult to estimate their numbers. Few traces of their existence are found in statistical records, and even the meager "official" data available are unreliable.

According to ISTAT statistics, of the 781,138 foreigners to whom residence permits were issued during 1990, 171,069 (21 per cent) were less than 26 years old, and 74,789 (9.6 per cent) had dependent children. On the other hand, a recent publication, quoting sources within the Ministry of the Interior, estimates that only 30,000 foreign children between the ages of 0 and 15 years are currently living in Italy (Demetrio and Favaro 1992).

Official data have a number of obvious shortcomings. They enumerate only the children of legal residents and do not take into account children born in Italy to unregistered parents, nor children who lack the documents required by law to apply for legal residence. Moreover, the statistics exclude children who are Italian nationals, but could actually be considered foreign either because of their different cultural origin or because they belong to a clearly defined minority. This category could include the children of intercultural marriages who, because one of their parents is Italian, are entitled to Italian citizenship in accordance with Law 91 of 05.02.92; adopted children of foreign parentage; children who hold dual citizenship; individuals of Italian extraction who are born abroad and decide to return to Italy; and Italian or foreign-born gypsy children.

However, irrespective of whether the statistics are accurate or not, one fact is certain: the number of foreign children in Italy is clearly rising and is expected to continue to do so not only because of the higher marriage and birth rates among foreigners (about 6,000 foreign children are born in Italy every year according to a recent report by the political party, Sinistra Indipendente), but also because more and more foreigners are taking advantage of the family reunification policy enacted in Law 39 of 1990. Statistics published by the Ministry of the Interior show, for example, that there were 2000 more family reunions during the first eight months of 1991 than there were during the entire of 1990. Long settled ethnic groups, such as the Eritreans, Egyptians, Filipinos and Chinese, have the highest number of children, while the child population of recently or newly arrived immigrant groups is, for the moment, very small.
Not many foreign children live with their parents in a normal family setting. The lack of affordable housing and long working hours (for instance, in the case of domestics) cause many parents either to repatriate their children or to place them in institutions which are mainly church-run. In Rome, for instance, 21 per cent of institutionalized children are foreign. Newborns (from three months of age) or newly-arrived foreign children are the categories most likely to institutionalized.

The institutional environment exacerbates the conflicts and problems which are already evident within the immigrant family and which are connected with lifestyles, values, conflicting role models, and the split between the affective and the social spheres. The consequences to the child’s physical and psychological development are especially negative in cases where children find that their contact with a parent (often only the mother) has been reduced to only one visit a week.

While trying to work out better solutions, immigrant parents may also resort to "temporary and consensual" foster care, either making direct arrangements with the family concerned, or going through municipal placement offices. Foster-care arrangements of less than six months are not subject to legal or administrative controls; exceeding this period, they must be reported to the social welfare service which assigns a case worker to make periodical reports on the child’s status to a tutelary judge. However, most immigrant parents prefer institutional to foster care, either because they lack knowledge about this option or because they are afraid that their child will somehow be taken away from them. Their distrust often leads them to settle for what is actually the more traumatic option for their child.

Internationally-adopted children, while obviously in very different circumstances and not legally considered "foreign" although foreign-born, share with immigrant children some of the same problems related to ethnicity. Following the passage of Law 184 of 1984 which regulates child-care institutes and adoption procedures, more couples have adopted children, often choosing inter-country adoption which is known to be faster and simpler. Nearly 6,000 foreign children were adopted by Italian couples between 1986 and 1989. Adoption is official after one year, at which time the child becomes a legal member of the family nucleus and acquires Italian citizenship.

Education. ISTAT data also reveal that the number of foreign students in Italian schools has increased by 119 per cent in the past 7 years, from 8,400 foreign students registered in the 1983/4 scholastic year to 18,400 enrolled in 1989/90. Of these 18,400, 15.9 per cent were in nursery school (however this percentage excludes private and municipal
nursery schools); 36.8 per cent in primary school; 14.1 per cent in middle school; 17.4 per cent in secondary school; 5.4 per cent in various academies; and 10.2 per cent in professional training schools. A breakdown by regional provenance reveals that the majority of the foreign students are either from Africa (24.4 per cent) or from Asia (23.1 per cent). There is also a fairly large group of Eastern European students.

Although there has been clear evidence of a steady increase in the number of foreign children in Italian schools since the early 1980s, the Ministry of Education has only recently acknowledged the situation by issuing Circulars 301 of 08.09.1989 and 205 of 26.07.1990. These two circulars, which are based on the Constitution, international conventions and established norms guaranteeing foreign children the right to attend state-run schools, launch the concept of an intercultural school, and identify, but do not resolve, the many problems connected with this concept. For example, the circulars point out that periodic refresher courses for teachers need to be provided, specialized personnel trained, and special structures strengthened. They also stress the importance of establishing mechanisms for evaluating the grade-level of the immigrant child, facilitating his or her integration into mainly indigenous classes, reinforcing the child’s culture of origin, and offering courses in Italian as a second language. Issues relating to nourishment and religion were also touched upon, as well as the school/immigrant-family relationships which are too often marred by a lack of information, distance and/or reciprocal misunderstandings. No mention at all is made of the implementation costs for such a wide-ranging support system. Today, nearly two years after the circulars were issued, schools still resort to using teachers for the handicapped to help the immigrant child adapt to his or her new situation.

Health. According to current laws, foreigners with a residence permit, including non-EEC nationals legally residing in Italy and registered with the state-run employment office, are entitled to have access to health-care services. Immigrants who are not legal residents are not covered by the health-care system except in cases of health emergencies requiring immediate hospitalization. Actually, few foreigners use the health services, mainly because they lack knowledge about the system. (A study conducted in Milan by volunteer doctors at the Naga Centre found that 54 per cent of the immigrants interviewed were unable to indicate where health services could be found and how they worked). For these reasons, the picture of the needs and health status of the immigrant population as a whole remains sketchy and that of immigrant children even more so. From an analysis of fragmentary data gathered by volunteers, it would appear that immigrant children living at home are most
frequently affected by illnesses which stem from unsatisfactory hygienic, environmental and socio-economic conditions. Psychological, psychic and social maladjustment are found among foreign children living both at home or in institutions.

*Youth employment.* The minimum legal age for entry into the work force in Italy is 15 years for domestic service and jobs in industries, and, exceptionally, 14 years for agricultural work. The extent to which a child labour problem exists among the different immigrant groups has not yet been sufficiently documented. It is known that Chinese children frequently help their parents in family-run restaurants and leather workshops. The gypsy children experience a different and decidedly more dramatic reality. Often, at best, children (usually only the males) help their father in various artisan activities. More commonly, they peddle roses or wash windshields in exchange for offerings, or just simply beg. Many gypsy children are also involved in petty larceny including burglary and purse-snatching.

*Marginalization and encounters with the law.* In Italy, where the proportion of minors among all individuals officially accused of crimes rose from 7.78 per cent in 1987 to 36.47 per cent in 1990, the percentage of foreign children in correctional institutions is disproportionately high. Data for 1991 show that almost 39 per cent of all new entries into institutions for "delinquent" minors are foreigners. The majority are nomad gypsy children who come almost exclusively from the large cities of central and northern Italy. The others are young male foreigners who are often illegal immigrants (Ministry of Justice 1992).

**VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS**

The purpose of this paper has been to analyse the conditions of children of migrant background living in urban areas in select industrialized countries and to examine some of the policies and programmes affecting them and their parents. On the basis of this first analysis, we can draw the following conclusions:

1. A growing number of children in the 0-18 age-group are severely affected by their situation, both in their country of origin and their new home country.

*Divided families both at home and abroad.* The migration patterns since World War Two have tended to create an increasing number of divided families. Some of the colonial migrants of the 1950s, and most of the contract workers of the 1960s, were male migrants who initially set out on their own, leaving their families behind to fare for themselves. This
created female-headed households with children in their country of origin. These families had to manage in both rural and urban settings without a father figure and without the working contribution of the father in their income-generating activities. While ultimately expecting a better cash income, women and children worked the farms and managed their urban informal businesses on their own. In many cases, children suddenly had adult responsibilities to shoulder.

"Transnational" children. As a consequence of the family reunification policies initiated by many countries after 1965 and the general increase in "commuter" or cyclical migrations, children have begun to be shuttled back and forth between vastly different worlds. Small children are increasingly found in the urban areas of source countries where they are left in the care of overburdened grandparents or distant relatives. Adolescents are also left behind to finish studies or support the family, and may run into problems because of a total lack of supervision.

The feminization of poverty in both industrialized and developing countries. The new migrants of the 1970s and 1980s entered host countries in a different way. The migrations from Southeast Asia, the Caribbean or Cape Verde are feminized. Filipino women, for example, often precede their families and fill whatever employment openings the host economies have available. These young women come as domestic workers or nurses, and only later are able to call some of their other family members to the new setting. They often increase the already large numbers of relatively poor female-headed households that are starting to develop in the large cities of the United Kingdom, the United States, and even Italy. Their children tend to have additional burdens of income generation and child care and fewer educational opportunities because of their overworked mothers.

The racialization of poverty. Despite evidence of occasional upward mobility and relative success, on the whole there has been a qualitative change in the composition of the EEC poor. Poverty is being racialized in Europe. This has a direct effect on the children of migrants.

Informal-sector employment. New qualification requirements for employment, its casualization (especially with regard to part-time employment carried out by women), the rise of undocumented employment (possibly even one-third of the labour market) and black-market employment (employment with no medical, social security or other benefits), are creating especially deprived categories among migrants and their children. There is a danger that these trends will increase in the future and augment the problems of young people of migrant background.
Children of new and old urban ghettos. Migrant/ethnic minority ghettos are being formed within the old urban pockets of poverty in industrialized countries. Children of Maghrebin families in the shanty towns surrounding Paris or in the depressed new suburbs of Rome and Milan are being raised in environments which are deprived in terms of access to services and quality of life. Their parents, barely speaking their new language and increasingly unemployed, are struggling to survive. The children search for support in peer groups, and in that process may run into serious problems, including stealing, and drug-use or trafficking.

Loss of hope. Even when children of migrants study hard in order to succeed in their new environment, they discover that it is not enough to speak the language like a native and to have the same, or even better, qualifications. In subtle ways, they are still outsiders whom employers do not hire. They experience discrimination by service-providers (education, health), the authorities (immigration offices) and the police. They all, in varying degrees, feel marginalized and excluded. Some at times revert to petty crime and other anti-social activities to survive.

And all of this is occurring in a modern world where the former societal reference points are being challenged and where individuals are searching for their identities (Giddens 1991).

2. Different levels of responses are possible:

Containment in housing estates or allocated sections of the urban area has been the pattern in France, the United Kingdom and, increasingly, other countries.

Repressive measures have been used to attempt to control the migration flows and limit illegal immigration. They have so far proven relatively unsuccessful. There is also a tendency in certain countries to use repressive measures against young migrants. They are given harsher sentences than non-immigrant groups and their presence in prisons is disproportionately high.

Attempts to encourage return migrations, that is to revert the flows and limit the permanency of migrants’ stays through a variety of incentives, including, in the Swedish case, efforts to improve the development conditions of the rural and urban areas where they came from in their country of origin (Krane 1979), have similarly proven relatively unsuccessful.

Accommodation to the present state of affairs seems to be the only other option. Unless we can revert the whole process of international development in significant ways - an important
effort that would take considerable time - we need to accept today's realities and actively learn lessons about how to deal with the situation in positive ways.

3. A number of preliminary lessons have been learned from this first assessment of the situation of children of migrants:

*The same migrant populations may fare differently in different host countries.* It is interesting to note, for example, that educational inequality does not follow the same pattern in each country. Certain ethnic groups consistently show a relatively low level of achievement in different countries. This is particularly true of Turkish children in Belgium, Germany, Britain and the Netherlands (Roosens 1989:92; De Jong 1988:68; Elderling 1989: 125; Tomlinson 1989:28; Roelandt, Martens, Veenman 1991). On the other hand, other groups do relatively well in one country and not so well in another. This applies, for example, to children born in the Caribbean or of Caribbean parents: in comparison with other minority pupils, they do relatively well in school in the Netherlands, and relatively poorly in Britain (Cross and Entzinger 1988:9-11; Mehrlander 1988; Roelandt et al.1991).

*Migrant children fare less well in the school systems than indigenous children with the same socio-economic characteristics.* While socio-economic differences account for much of the variation in educational levels in most countries, when they are held constant, migrant children still have lower achievement levels. (Veenman 1992).

Given these two important observations, *one must be cautious not to attribute all difficulties encountered by the children in schools exclusively to minority arrears*, such as poor language ability, limited previous exposure to complex urban settings and developed society structures, or cultural characteristics. Other factors including the current in-country dynamics of ethno-cultural allocation and acquisition that express themselves in discriminatory practices, the socio-economic conditions of the parents, and the social mobility expectations of both migrant parents and their children must also come into play.

**The Importance of Social and Ethno-cultural Position for Integration.**

If one examines how the children of both old and new migrant populations are doing educationally (by gender), occupationally (if old enough) and in terms of actual housing as well as in terms of housing and social security prospects with respect to their parents, it will be found that they are doing often better. Few however show signs of complete integration
in their new societies. Education levels vary by country and migrant population. Education remains, however, a very important element favouring future integration.

On average, the younger generations of the larger migrant populations often succeed in attaining a higher educational level than the older generations. In the Netherlands, for example, where serious attempts have been made to break differential patterns, there is evidence of more educational progress for some groups (Antilleans and Surinamese as well as Italians, Greeks, Portuguese and Yugoslavs), but much less progress for others (Moroccans and Turks in particular). And none of the groups, even the earlier Mediterranean migrants such as the Italians and Greeks, are faring quite as well as indigenous Dutch students (Braat and Veenman 1990, Veenman 1992). Furthermore, all of those ethnic youngsters, with the exception of the Italians, tend to go to junior and vocational types of secondary schools. They come out of them usually with an age-arrear that also negatively affects their entry into the labor force.

The same seems to hold true in the other countries, with higher drop-out rates and longer completion time among the major trends in the younger generations.

In terms of housing, the situations are mixed. In the Netherlands, where urban housing is heavily government-structured, the Government has succeeded in improving the urban housing situation of migrants considerably, with the partial exception of the Moluccans housing estates now being addressed by policy. In France and the United Kingdom, where it is largely an informal system totally in private hands, the situation is still de facto very poor.

Entrance into the labour market is probably the most problematical area in each of the countries, and is strongly affected by the dynamics of the ethno-cultural position of the migrants. The high unemployment rates of children of migrant background can be partly attributed to unfavourable labour market qualifications. For instance, ethnic minorities generally have a low educational level, attend types of schools with unfavourable labour market perspectives, have a lower language proficiency than their counterparts, and are over-represented within the group of unskilled and inexperienced unemployed. Moreover, migrant populations live, more often than the "indigenous" populations, in regions with high unemployment rates. This further reduces their chances of finding a job.

The lack of appropriate qualifications is not the only reason for the unfavourable labour market position of migrant groups. A key ingredient in all this seems to be the ethnocultural dimension, i.e. the negative image carried by most populations of migrant background in the mind of the majority, and the sense of identity and projection towards the
future many children and youngsters of migrant background actually carry within themselves.

*Legal citizenship does not automatically entail social citizenship.* This review of existing literature and the country’s ‘photographs’ fully confirm that acquiring legal citizenship does not make one automatically acceptable.

*National models and related trends significantly affect key elements of the policies and programmes adopted in each country.* One important lesson emerging from the analysis of the cases is that it is essential to understand the national models for responding to the problems and the convergent and divergent trends those models have manifested over time in order to understand the thrust of their policies and programmes. Each country has its own internal discussions about the issue.

The pluralistic Netherlands has adopted an approach that recognizes the migrants’ diversity and tries to remedy their inadequate integration in different ways. The situation of migrants is heavily researched and the Government has created groups of academic researchers to provide advice on the subject. A first national scientific advisory group (WRR) has published two initial reports on the situation of migrants in the country (1979 and 1990). Research groups have now been created to advise the Ministries of Education and of Welfare on specific minority problems. There has been an attempt to utilize ethnic organizations to carry out programmes in coordination with the Government. Some progress has been made in education and housing and new approaches are being developed in those areas. There is, however, a growing awareness that an excessive emphasis on ethnic groups and their diversity may actually create as many problems as it attempts to solve.

Assimilationist France is structuring many of its policies on the assumption that the problem lies in socio-economic differences rather than in ethnic diversity. In comparison with the Netherlands, research on the populations of migrant background has been less of a government priority. There is however, limited evidence of some improvements in housing, education and employment for many of these populations.

In the United Kingdom, within a conservative context, an innovative "anti-racist" undercurrent is attempting to address jointly the concerns of majority and minority populations in key policy areas (education/housing/employment).
A more accurate sociological diagnosis of the problems is often extremely helpful in order to improve programmes and thus goal attainment. Another important lesson is that, if our aims are to improve the integration of the younger generation and to avoid their disaffection and all the additional costs it entails for their new home countries, it is essential to make a very careful diagnosis of both the specific family/household situation and the urban residential situation each population of migrant background is facing in its new country in order to identify preventive approaches to facilitate their integration. Are we faced with whole families with small children living in deprived urban environments where uneducated mothers are hindering the integration effort of the schools (the case of the Moroccans in the Netherlands)? Then solutions that emphasize community-based work that connects schools and families, such as the model established by the Israeli HIPPY projects now adopted in the Netherlands, could be most useful. Or are we dealing with over-burdened female-headed households or with isolated youths? Then other approaches would obviously be much more effective.

Finally, there is a need for a new European social agenda to address the challenges and new problems of multi-culturalism. As we move towards European integration and witness the growth of a new multi-cultural society in a time of recession, we are also faced with the challenge of making that society as just as possible. This may require monitoring of economic policies and services to avoid the excessive stratification of the labour force, given the rise of employment of undocumented immigrants. It also requires adopting policies that will facilitate the lives of immigrants and avoid the increasing disaffection of their children who, although often born and raised in the new host country, view themselves as objects of discrimination, suspicion or even hatred. Also, there is much misinformation about migrants in national media. This misinformation needs to be dissipated by clarifying the long-term perspectives of migrations.

In the schools, which are major instruments of socialization, it may be useful, for example, to adopt an intercultural approach that aims at all children and that protects their original cultural identity while facilitating their optimum integration into the receiving society. One first step of such an approach would be to seek and encourage exchange between children and to support the introduction of a history of the development and patterns of migration of developing countries, for example, in the school curriculum.
The Need for a New International Ethos

There is already ample evidence that poor conditions in the host countries are not acting as a deterrent to migration which means that industrialized countries need to come to terms with the large and growing immigrant population. Making migrants fuller members of their new societies and showing them a more humane face is part of the formulation of a new international ethos and sense of responsibility towards them. The North must try to gain a greater understanding of the human dimension of migrations and develop popular awareness for the needs and rights of migrants at home and abroad. This sense of responsibility should start at home and from there expand to the home countries of migrants in order to create a new international network of solidarity. Children of migrants should become an important link in that chain.
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